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CHAPTER 1
RECONSTRUCTING THE LIVED CURRICULUM & DECONSTRUCTING
DYSACADEMIA
No learning can avoid the voyage. Under the supervision of a guide, education
pushes one to the outside. Depart: go forth. Leave the womb of your mother, the
crib, the shadow cast by your father’s house and the landscapes of your
childhood. In the wind, in the rain: the outside has no shelters. Your initial ideas
only repeat old phrases. Young: old parrot. The voyage of children, that is the
naked meaning of the Greek word pedagogy. Learning launches wandering.
Michel Serres (1991/1997, p. 8)

The Emergence of Curriculum Studies
In Understanding Curriculum, Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery & Taubman (1995) take
considerable effort to present a scholarly, yet admittedly cautious synopsis of the
historical and cultural events, processes, and phenomenon that have defined and shaped
curriculum in the United States. In walking a constant tight rope with their literary
mapping of the topography that was and is curriculum, the authors of Understanding
Curriculum unequivocally state their intent to avoid supplanting yet another
metanarrative as to “what” curriculum should specifically or officially be for their readers
(p. 14). In 1969, Joseph Schwab declared the curriculum field “moribund” (Pinar, et al.,
1995, p. 35), which when combined with Understanding Curriculum’s charge that the pre
1970s curriculum field was “balkanized” (p. 4), paints a rather static and ineffective
scene for curriculum studies. In short, curriculum in the 20th century was vastly affected
and infected by several modern concepts that flourished throughout our young and ever
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expanding educational systems, especially during the post WWII decades that can now be
historically marked by a rapid and deeply profound technologization of our society,
culture, and even the body.
As various branches within the social sciences gradually embraced a modern,
empirical and objective method of inquiry for all things social, such as education, the
hallways and red brick walkways of our educational institutions became virtual Petri
dishes for scientific and industrial modes of operation, application and identity.
Specifically, models of industrial efficiency and various “objective data” from cognitive
and educational psychology collectively intermingled their central tenets and
presumptions with Ralph Tyler’s (1949) curricular ideas to effectively produce a very
mechanical, linear and industrial based method of pedagogy that often belied sound
theory, or even rational educational thought. The result of this pedagogical mess is that it
took almost 70 years for curriculum thinking, writing and discourse to occur differently;
for it to be “reconceptualized”; for the “other” to be considered and articulated in both
theory and praxis; for the existing paradigms to be deconstructed and dialectically
challenged; and subsequently, for new discourses regarding our curricular phenomenon
to be generated, invented and substantiated. As Pinar, et al. state, the contemporary
curriculum field of the early 1970s no longer saw curricular problems as “technical
problems”, but rather as “why” problems (1995, p. 8).
The evolving paradigm shift for curriculum studies that began in the early 1970s
and 1980s with the generative and promising scholarship of Joseph Schwab, Elliot
Eisner, Herbert Kliebard, Philip Jackson, William Pinar, and others produced new
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curricular sub-discourses that critically challenged the concepts, research methods, status
and function of curriculum within the larger field known as education (Pinar, et al, 1995,
p. 12). For contemporary curricular theorists interested in “reconceptualizing” the field,
the purpose was now to “understand” the mosaic (p. 5) that is curriculum as a “symbolic
representation” (p. 16), not to rationalize or guide curriculum development as had Ralph
Tyler (1949, p. 20). To do this, curricular thinkers realized that they must “reflect more
profoundly” upon both the essence and function of theory in education, all the while
working under the central notion that the curriculum field is represented by various and
multiple “texts”. As such, all relevant curricular texts must then be viewed and handled
as separate but unified “discourses”, each replete with language, borders, rules, power,
and socially constructed concepts that define, describe, and delimit the discourse under
investigation (Pinar, p. 7).
Perhaps the most important aspect of the paradigmatic shifts gestating amongst
the increasing numbers of “counter curriculum theorists” was the attention being paid to
“what was included and not included” in contemporary curricular studies (p. 12). In
reading this simple line in Understanding Curriculum several years ago as I started my
doctoral studies, I soon realized what this book was essentially about for me. In effect,
Understanding Curriculum helped me to begin the process of reflecting upon what was
“not” in my lived curriculum; my high school curriculum, my undergraduate curriculum,
my master’s curriculum, and my life’s curriculum. At that moment I can explicitly recall
taking another look at the table of contents, reflecting upon my own educational
experiences at all levels, and then performing a simple contrast-and-compare analysis
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between “what was” and “what was not” in my curricular memories with what was
presented in Pinar, et al’s landmark 1995 text. In typical modernistic fashion, I actually
found myself “checking off” those things that I had experienced, as well as those that I
did not. Needless to say, my “had not” list was much longer than my “had” list. This
“retro” analytical process of substantiating my lived curriculum was extremely revealing,
deeply frustrating, and yet terribly exciting and potentially liberating for me in many
ways. Despite the many negative and anxious emotions that I encountered in analyzing
my “lived curriculum” and its many nulls, the experience also provided a sort of
“cathartic spark” for me in both my professional and educational worlds. In particular,
these reflexive and candid moments allowed me to better understand what my current and
future doctoral studies potentially offered me in the form of redemptive and transcendent
curricular experiences. It is this personal epistemological and ontological catharsis that
has been ongoing in my consciousness since my arrival in Statesboro, GA that I will
attempt to articulate in this, my first dissertation chapter, as it is central to my personal
situatedness, the particular modes of inquiry I will employ, and the subsequent
constructive arguments that I will make use of to articulate my theoretical position.
Personal Situatedness & Curriculum Inquiry
Finally, it goes without saying that after a certain age, questions of upbringing
lose more and more of their pertinence, as a person becomes the father (sic) of
himself—as he takes responsibility for his decisive and definitive education. Only
the lazy and the infirm remain dependant on their initial upbringing—an ailment
that should be treated (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 20).
As the third in my family to attend a private liberal arts institution in search of
“higher education”, I now realize that leading up to college, I was largely unaware of the
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larger purposes, and missions of higher education and its potential power of
transformation. And although I thought at that time that I knew the fundamental
differences between a liberal arts college and larger, public university, I also know now
that I was rather naïve in that regard as well. Somehow I knew, or at least thought I
knew, that liberal arts colleges were more demanding, more intensive, and thus more
rewarding than their larger, broader in scope, public counterparts; but in looking back, I
don’t suppose I knew precisely why, or how. I somehow thought that all liberal arts
colleges would be fairly comparable in terms of curriculum, pedagogy and their
transformative abilities-after all, college is college right? Although I knew I was going to
Marietta College in Southeastern Ohio primarily because of their reputable sports
medicine/athletic training program, I suppose that I also took some sort of comfort in
knowing that Marietta was also a “reputable” liberal arts college, and thus, it would offer
me the same form of emancipative education that I saw my slightly older brothers
experiencing at their respective New England liberal arts campuses. After all, I too
wanted to be liberated by “the college experience”—but liberated from “what”, to
“where”, or in what “ways”, I wasn’t quite sure.
Both of my older brothers went to idyllic, esteemed and very reputable traditional
liberal arts colleges located in New England, each unofficially but notoriously considered
to be members of the fictitious “small Ivy League” schools. Each studied a traditional
and intensive liberal arts discipline (English and history, respectively) that radically
transformed their respective worldviews, politics, and sense of being. Meanwhile, I, the
family jock, sometimes class clown and family dissenter who had been the least
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accomplished academically by the time I graduated high school, enrolled in a reputable
Midwestern liberal arts college with intent to study a very technical and non liberal arts
field called “athletic training”. Little did I know how this decision would affect my sense
of identity and purpose, and my sense of place in the coming years as I entered the worlds
of corporate healthcare, parenthood, and eventually, academia as a purveyor of higher
education.
In retrospect, I can now appreciate that it was during my very first Thanksgiving
homecoming that I began to become somewhat aware of the critical and intellectual gap
that was instantaneously propagating before my very eyes. Time after time during these
four long days of constant and close familial dialogue, my brothers proceeded to
dominate the happy hour and dinnertime conversations with profound and wellarticulated discourses relative to their respective, but apparently interconnected academic
studies of English and history. As they excitedly and energetically discussed their
extensive readings, dialogues and writings of Sartre, Descartes, Milton, Marx, hooks, and
everything in between and beyond, I was largely resigned to sitting idly by wondering
just what language they were speaking; and how I might interject something intelligent,
something relevant, and something “learned” into the conversation without embarrassing
myself with my intellectual ineptitude. In all honesty, I was afraid to speak, afraid to be
wrong, afraid to further perpetuate the mild but pronounced “dumb jock” anxiety that I
rightfully or wrongfully carried in my subconscious since my high school glory days. In
fact, rather than contributing to the conversation(s) I often found my thoughts occupied
with “office of admissions like” promotional scenes depicting my brothers engaged in a
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class session under a beautiful maple tree in their respective campus quads. Rather than
adding my two cents worth and testing my self constructively, I was busy daydreaming
about Mother Nature’s artistic transformation of the Bates and Trinity [College]
campuses into explosive canvases of spectacular New England color typical of a Norman
Rockwell scene, or a coffee table picture book. Rather than taking the opportunity to
engage in the discourse of the day, and thus potentially learning something, I spent my
time generating virtual dreamscapes of my brothers, their classmates, and their tweed
cloaked, bespectacled and bearded professors argue and debate the various merits,
meanings and pitfalls of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, Sartre’s Nausea, or Plato’s
Republic. Why wasn’t I reading the same things they were…writing the sorts of papers
they were…conversing like they were…seeing and thinking like they were? Why was
my erudition so dramatically different than theirs? Wasn’t all higher education “higher
education”?
Despite my academic successes in my chosen specialized and technical field of
study and my liberal arts core classes, I became increasingly disenfranchised with the
overall quality, depth and breadth of my own undergraduate education as time
progressed. Where were Plato, Marx, Toni Morrison, and W. B. DuBois in my
curriculum? Where were the critical and profound debates and dialogues? When were
we going to discuss politics, postmodern theory, multiculturalism, critical theory and
religion, I wondered? When was I going to find myself embroiled in an intense
intellectual debate with one of my professors over truth, justice and democracy? When
was I going to figure out if I should join the Young Republicans or the Young Democrats
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club? Looking back, I now can also ask myself why it was that I had never even heard of
the term “postmodernism”, despite the fact that I was at the time enrolled in a liberal arts
college during very active and pronounced postmodern times. Just where was the
discourse?
In looking back upon my varied college experiences and social interchanges with
my family, I can now recognize that my awareness of the fundamental differences that
existed in both the quality and intensity of education that I was receiving was a gradual
and sluggish process. Although something seemed amiss to me during my early
undergraduate years, my relative level of intellectual immaturity and ignorance didn’t
allow me the opportunity to explicitly articulate the nature of my “angst”. In short, I felt
that I knew “something” was missing from my higher educational experiences, but I
really had no idea what that thing might be. Even though I felt a discernable level of
what I now can recognize as epistemological and ontological anxiety, I wasn’t able to
pinpoint exactly what that void represented, nor what was needed to fill it, and thus, to
satiate the angst. To borrow from William Pinar’s expression of what curriculum was, is,
and/or ought to be, I didn’t quite know what was missing from my experiences simply
because “I didn’t know what I was missing”. I didn’t quite understand the shape, form,
or the subsequent professional and personal consequences that my missing curriculum
would eventually reveal as my life experiences came into being.
I was a good student; I graduated on time, passed the grueling national
certification exam to become a certified athletic trainer on the first attempt, and had been
accepted to the graduate schools of my choice, including the two premier programs for
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graduate sports medicine study, the University of Virginia, and The University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill. Yet despite this “obvious” academic “excellence” at a reputable
liberal arts college, I’m quite sure that I had never even heard of the Western Canon,
modernism, postmodernism, post colonialism, cultural studies, multiculturalism, or
poststructuralism during my tenure (what is a “discourse”?). For me, identity, truth, and
language were simple, linear and fixed concepts that could be thought out rationally and
critically; they were essential and sovereign entities that I had bought, ingested and
reproduced like other, “good” students. Worse yet, despite leaving with a bachelor’s of
science degree I had not yet been required to didactically or socially engage in any
meaningful study about the environment, politics, power, education, ethics, or morality,
and their inherent and critical connections to the institution(s) of “big” science, and our
democratic way of life. I was a certified allied health care provider; a consumer,
producer and provider of medical and health science; yet, I knew not of the potential and
real challenges, pitfalls, and limits of scientific epistemology and the method(s) used to
generate such knowledge. I knew not of the inherent power relations between
knowledge, authority and scientific discourse, the metannaratives it generated and
possessed, or the subsequent hierarchical position that science held over other forms of
knowing. From professional and civic standpoints alike, I knew not of the various
cultural and social factors that can, and do complicate our medico-scientific institutions
and their subsequent delivery of services to our diverse and heterogeneous populations.
Something was different…something was omitted from Marietta’s liberal arts, and UNC-
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Chapel Hill’s master’s curricula, and so also from the potential intellectual and liberal
enlightenment that awaited me upon my matriculation.
I can now understand that I had become “disciplined” by my chosen “discipline”,
a powerful concept and self-realization that exposes shape and form for my theoretical
framework, and subsequent mode of dissertation inquiry. Because of the strong
autobiographical and theoretical connections this impression has to my overarching
analysis, I will elaborate further upon its meaning and impact in forthcoming sections of
this text, but suffice to say that I can now more readily realize the impact and significance
of Messer-Davidow, Shumway, and Sylvan’s table setting comment put forth in the
preface of their edited collection regarding disciplinarity and its multiple discourses,
“socially and conceptually, we are disciplined by our disciplines” (1993, p. vii.). That is,
I have gradually come to the self-awareness that despite the purported breadth and depth
of the required liberal arts core classes that I had endured and passed with flying colors,
things felt disconnected, incomplete, and less than challenging; less than what my
brothers had experienced on their New England campuses, respectively. Reflecting a
void more so than it does some positive entity or variety of other, I was different. In the
words of John Michael, I had at least partially succeeded in becoming a “technocratic
intellectual”, but was far off from being considered, or considering myself what he calls a
“critical intellectual” (2000, p. 2). But as chance would have it, the gradual passage of
time, continuous internal reflections and deconstruction of my own subjectivity, and the
advent of new and varied learning experiences would eventually coalesce to help

23
meformulate a more clarified insight regarding the ontological and epistemological
nausea that I had been experiencing for some time.
My Lived Curriculum & Moving On
After eleven subsequent years of myriad clinical and professional practice in the
field of sports medicine, including working for a Fortune 500 healthcare company for
five years, my wife and I opted for a lifestyle change and moved to Statesboro in 1998 in
order to take university teaching positions in the Department of Health & Kinesiology
(now, the Department of Public Health), at Georgia Southern University. Although
excited by the pending change in professional scenery and by the opportunity to work
again with my former graduate school mentor, I must admit that I was very anxious about
entering the academy and the potential reception I would receive from my new highly
educated colleagues. After all, I possessed neither a doctoral degree, nor an academic
pedigree with which to justify my hiring. I suppose my romantic vision of the academy
and the immense respect and awe I possess for my (at that point) doctored and tenured
eldest brother played psychological havoc with my professional esteem, my confidence,
and thus with the expectations I had for the academy, and what it offered.
Although I was resolutely confident in my athletic training/sports medicine
knowledge and skills, and thus not concerned with adequately representing my profession
or with carrying out my discipline specific responsibilities, I was dreadfully fearful of not
being able to hold my own in an intellectual debate with members of my department and
college who after all, were in custody of something I didn’t possess—impressive
academic vitas. Even worse, I was twice as fearful of “getting caught with my pants
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down” in any type of critical discourse with an external colleague from another
department or college from within the university. To be truthful, I didn’t even know
what the word “discourse” meant when I entered the academy, and so that was one of the
first words I looked up in the dictionary. This being said, I decided to take a proactive
approach to enhancing my intellectual agility, and as Serres alludes, to “treat my ailment”
(1995, p. 20) by hitting the books in an effort to avoid being categorized as “that guy who
teaches athletic training”. In short, I wanted to become the “father of myself” so as to be
rightfully respected and recognized as an academic; as someone with a certain degree of
intellectual fiber, and as someone who, quite frankly “belonged” in the academy. I
suppose that I must also confess that I wanted to “right” what I perceived as my
educational shortfalls, and to make my brothers take notice with my pending intellectual
transformation. I wanted to belong; I wanted people to taken notice of me as an
academic first, to consider my actual disciplinary home only as an afterthought. To do
this, to become the father of myself and subsequently set a new path for growth, I had to
continue to deconstruct both my lived and living curricula in ways that revealed the
subjective nature of my consciousness and the voids that I felt existed in my
epistemology, ontology and axiology. To “re-invent” myself, I had to find spaces and
methods capable of opening up new passageways and possibilities that would allow a
reformation and altered evolution of my subjectivity. For Jacques Derrida, such a
“critique of consciousness, of the subject, of self-identity and of self-proximity or selfpossession” represents his intentional notion of decentering structure and the humanistic
construction of the sovereign subject (1978, p. 280). For Serres, who chooses to
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represent complex poststructural notions such as Derrida’s deconstruction of the subject
in a more poetic manner because he detests ultratechnical vocabulary and its propensity
to exclude and discourage, this means that I had/have to leave “the shadow cast by my
father’s house” and the “landscapes of my childhood” in order to re-invent my own
pedagogy and launch my own wandering (1997, p. 8).
As chance would have it, while browsing through the university bookstore one
day without any particular agenda in mind, I happened across a book that inspired my
ontological and epistemological consciousness forever—Consilience: The Unity of
Knowledge, by Harvard biologist and Pulitzer Prize winning author, E. O. Wilson (1998).
Promoted as an “intense intellectual journey” for its readers on the book’s jacket,
Consilience was just what I desired for my intellectually myopic mind. My first reading
of Consilience opened my mind’s eye to other forms of knowing, to various philosophical
debates in the diverse fields of knowledge, and most importantly, to how much I did not
know. In short, my “non knowledge” was critically and enthusiastically exposed by my
experiences with Consilience, and although I have now largely moved away from much
of Wilson’s modernist ideology for unifying knowledge around one metanarrative
(biology) that some critics have called “fascist pseudo-science” (Rosenthal, 1998, p. 3),
the current intellectual journey that I now find myself in the midst of was affectively
fertilized for future augmentation by other texts, other authors, and other erudite
experiences. Despite the inherent limits and subsequent critiques of Wilson’s production,
upon which I will pontificate upon further in Chapter 2, the depth, intensity and breadth
of discourse contained within Consilience afforded me the primary intellectual nutrition
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and confidence to converse about “something” outside my professional field on a variety
of topics, issues, and debates. Because it gave me new ideas, new knowledge, and new
curiosities, it effectively provided me the self-assurance to discuss something “other”
than athletic training with those outside my professional identity; it filled in some of my
voids. But perhaps most importantly, Consilience gave me the stimulus to look for other
things, to read other texts, to wander into other spaces, to ask other questions, and most
importantly, to feel comfortable leaving behind the landscapes of my childhood, to cure
my ailment.
Becoming “Rewired”: Undisciplining The Disciplined Self
As stated, my experiences with Consilience exposed me to other texts, other
languages and other discourses; all of which expanded what may be thought of as my
“intellectual circle of safety”. Cultural anthropology from Marvin Harris, the theory of
the mind from Howard Gardner and Steven Pinker, and the philosophy of science from
Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein, Bruno Latour and Paul Feyerabend soon began to take
up spaces on my nightstand, in my book bag, and most importantly in my consciousness.
The language(s), questions and opinions contained within these diverse “extra
disciplinary” texts gradually worked their way into my own now mushrooming
vernacular, and thus, a funny, unanticipated occurrence “happened on the way to the ball”
that was/is my self-deconstruction. The more I read, the more I wandered; the more I
saw and heard, the more I realized what I couldn’t see and hear; and as time passed, the
younger I began to feel. Although I obviously wasn’t aware of the language of
poststructural discourse at the time of these events, the deconstruction and subsequent
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reemergence of the self that I was in the midst of can be seen, not as the liquidation of the
subject (mine), but rather as Michael Peters argues the rehabilitation, decentering and
repositioning of the subject, a tour de force that represents the actual intention and
practice of Derrida’s poststructural thinking (2003, p. 71). For Michel Serres, such
chaotic and turbulent experiences represent what he sees as the essential and authentic
meaning of learning, knowledge and living, a domain of thought in which he spends
considerable time and energy addressing in his work, particularly his treatise on
education, The Troubadour of Knowledge (1991/1997).
Learning launches wandering (p. 8).
The creator is born old and dies young, the opposite of those who are realistic
and, as they say, have their feet on the ground, know how to be born infants and
die senile like everyone else (p. 104).
Serres & Latour discuss the meaning of meaning making as well (1990/1995).
Authentic epistemology is the art of inventing, the springboard for passing from
the old to the new (p. 14).
As my deconstruction crept along on my own volition and direction (lack of?), I
suddenly began to take greater notice in the arts, in nature, in ethics; and in the larger,
more global sociocultural conditions that define and challenge our current epoch. I began
to pay more attention to cultural events, politics, social commentary, and other more
meaningful and dialectical discourses; and as such, my life began to take on a different
meaning, a different quality, a more pronounced turbulence, and thus, a different purpose.
I began to be even more critical of my past educational experiences and the structural
influences of my “father’s house”, and how they worked to shape my consciousness and
subjective self. Thus experienced, I arrived at a more genuine ability to reflect on and
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analyze my lived curricula, on what was “there”, and on what was missing. I was
ravenous with curiosity. Gradually, I found myself better able to “put my finger” on
some of the issues affecting my subjective and rather nascent “state”, and soon I realized
that Serres was on to something—it was time to become the father of myself, to take
responsibility for my own learning and exploration, to construct my own reality, and thus
to reformulate and adapt my own subjectivity.
I was becoming increasingly interested in, and somewhat conversant in myriad
“other” things—other ways of knowing, other ways of seeing, hearing, and feeling; other
“others”. On a different but obviously interconnected level, I also began to look more
critically at the educational experiences in which my students and my two sons were
currently enmeshed in, a process that revealed a stronger sense of urgency to discover
more about their respective living curricula. I began to notice and to feel the effects and
affects of the humanist pedagogy that I had experienced almost exclusively as a student at
multiple levels. I began the disciplinary process of critically challenging my own
epistemology, of “de-essentializing” and “de-privileging” my disciplined notions of
knowledge described by Messer-Davidow, et al. in their critical analysis of the discourses
that shape and define the various disciplines (1993, p. 3). I became more readily
cognizant of the fact that I too was reproducing many, if not most of the homogeneic and
modern principles and truths embedded in our historically grounded essentialist
paradigms of thought and pedagogy. In making his point regarding the calculation of the
subject, Peters explicitly connects Derrida’s deconstruction to pedagogy in a manner
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reflective of my ongoing autobiographical deconstruction and theoretical exposition
(2003).
Derridean philosophy offers an active interpretation, resistance, and reevaluation
of humanist pedagogy, of forms of pedagogy based on the sovereign subject—
which is to say, the predominant forms of pedagogy existing today that structure
our pedagogical institutions, theories, and practices…the question of pedagogy is
never far from Derrida’s concerns; that when he poses the question of style, of
new styles of writing and thinking, he is engaged in rethinking traditional
humanist pedagogical practices and the founding principles of our educational
institutions (p. 64).
Induced by the deconstructive catharsis that was now consuming my
consciousness, my various theoretical perspectives, ways of doing, and ways of being
began to shift drastically towards a being that reflected a more postmodern sensibility.
This new way of “being” in the world, although not yet, nor will it ever be complete
brought about subsequent and pronounced adjustments in both my parental and
professional manners of praxis. I began to avoid, dislike even, structure and disorder; I
increasingly began to seek out and embrace chaos and chance, to look for things that I
was trained not to look for; I began to feel comfortable in the gray areas, and to shun the
black and white poles. I was in effect, and finally in my mind at least, just starting the life
long and time reversal process of becoming “higher educated”. Interestingly and perhaps
somewhat paradoxically to structurephiliacs, this subjective transformation was
occurring at the same time that I was becoming more deeply involved in a more
postmodern and critical approach to higher education.
Higher Education Finally Becomes “High”
Because of myriad circumstances, some professional and some personal, I soon
found myself enrolled in a curriculum theory and cultural studies doctoral program at
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Georgia Southern University. To date, my doctoral studies have provided an enduring
and transformative experience which continues to supply me with the intellectual
nourishment and erudition that I have so intensely craved since my freshman
Thanksgiving homecoming, since my subsequent visits and conversations with my family
members, and since that “fateful” day in the university bookstore when Consilience
provided the semi-epiphany that I needed to spark my pedagogical wandering. Over
time, the various and sundry intellectual, cultural and phenomenological experiences that
I have been fortunate to experience as a result of my collective life events have
progressively dilated various and multiple channels of social and academic opportunity
for me; and it was/is my doctoral studies that provided the coup d’etat for me to put it all
together and to make sense of my lived curricula. On a humorous note that also reflects
the actual self-organizing nature of chaotic systems, my doctoral studies also endowed
me with the language, knowledge and understanding needed to give “labels” and shape to
the deconstructive and reconstructive processes that I have been describing; without
which, I doubt I’d be capable of articulating in any coherent and meaningful way to the
reader of this text. Additionally, I can now say with earnest and heartfelt excitement,
appreciation and awe, “Holy cow, my brother studied with Lyotard & Derrida…and
Derrida was on his dissertation committee!” without sounding like a game show
contestant, or sitcom character oblivious to the significance and relevance of this
recognition.
Collectively, the authentically liberal and emancipative experiences that I have
been fortunate to be in the middle of have vigorously opened multiple passageways for a
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deeper ontological exploration of my self, my future, and my soul. For Gilles Deleuze,
“lines of flight” such as these are required to resist fascist power regimes that cage the
individual self, and thus are necessary for revealing avenues for escape, and for fostering
the exploration and execution of desire (1990/1995).
We set against this fascism of power active, positive lines of flight, because these
lines open up desire, desire’s machines and the organization of a social field of
desire; it’s not a matter of escaping “personally from oneself, but allowing
something to escape, like bursting a pipe or a boil (p. 19).
For Serres, the soul is constructed through experience, joy, sadness and magnitude, and
represents “the kind of space and time that can be expanded from its natal position
toward all exposures” (1991/1997, p. 31). Serres’ conception of the soul can only be
exposed by learning things, things in an invented, turbulent and experiential 3rd place,
and is thus best represented by a “vacant intensity, potential world and thought right in
the middle of the body which is like a rose window, or a small sun” (p. 34). In this sense
then, my doctoral studies can be seen metaphorically as an offensive lineman that
functions to open holes in the defense for me, the running back with the ball, so that I can
run through and advance to new, as of yet undetermined spaces. My experiences with
curriculum studies as a doctoral student have effectively coalesced with my other lived
curricular events to open and maintain multiple lines of flight, to expose and nourish my
desire, and to give accent, expression, and spirit to my soul. I’m off and running!
In effect, the dilation of these inquiring passageways has allowed me, as Serres
proposes, to be the “father of myself…to take responsibility for my own decisive and
definitive education” (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 20). And indirectly, my recent
intellectual enlightenment has also worked to better crystallize my personal philosophy of
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education on the larger scale, with particular relevance to the current and future plight
and experiences of my two sons. The curriculum that I had struggled to find since my
entrance into Marietta College, the journey that I had been seeking for so long had finally
materialized, and thus, the deep intellectual transformation that I felt I was missing had
finally come about for me in very powerful, transcendent and liberating ways. In
reference to my particular voyage of lived curriculum, Lyotard answers his own question
regarding the state of being educated by using a spaceship metaphor, “When we know
more or less which is the far off planet that we desire, and when we do all that we can to
set off for it” (cited in Peters, 1995, p. xx).
For Lyotard, as for me then, education can be seen as the examination of and
subsequent following of the inner desire that lies deep within all of us, and consequently
charting a course that allows for the invention of the self. In Lyotardian parlance then, it
wasn’t until after my entry into the academy and my subsequent immersion in doctoral
studies that I was able to locate my “planets”, to leave behind the shadows of my father’s
house and the landscapes of my childhood; and thus find the appropriate vehicles needed
to travel to, from and within the opened and far off spaces. Alternately, my currere, or
what William Pinar refers to more specifically as the “running of the course”, had finally
heard its starting gun, and I was now beginning to enjoy this new form of action research
on myself that was consuming much of my time and energy (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery &
Taubman, 1995).
My soul then, is what I yearn to nourish and cultivate through unstructured
experience and wandering; through an endless and perpetually plastic expansion of my
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epistemological and ontological self. Perhaps most excitedly for me then is the new found
realization that the metastatic, contextual and infinite nature of this experiential soul
searching process ensures that multiple and unforeseen corridors of inquiry will forever
remain open and available to me, and my desires. Thus allowing my mind and my self to
cross over multiple, untold static thresholds towards an unknown and perpetual
intellectual transformation that evades sovereign truth and essential constructions. In
effect then, “I will never again know what I am, where I am, from where I’m from, where
I’m going, through where to pass” (Serres, 1991/1997, p. 8), because I now know that
“nothing gives greater direction than to change direction” (p. 4). I am not yet
satiated…my hunger and my thirst persist…I want to be exposed to others and to foreign
things…I want to run through the holes. Again, Serres poetically elaborates upon the
poststructural notion of contextual and virtual growth and learning of the self
(1991/1997).
Now nothing can make an exception of this experience. Doubtless, everyone, one
day at least, experiences this formidable dilation of his being—in explosive
volume, strength, and potential—this free break, this unemployed greatness, that
remains virginal no matter what one does, the infinite regret of remaining to one
side: the infinite possibility of learning (p. 34).
Subsequently, one recurring and perhaps rhetorical question began to dominate my
consciousness as I continued to garner experience and insight as a university educator, a
parent, and as an infantile scholar of curriculum theory—“Shouldn’t all education be
equally transformative, emancipatory, and eventually self-generating in some similar
manner for all of its subjects?”
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My Higher Education at a Crossroads
Although in retrospect, I am not exactly sure what I was thinking when my wife
and I decided to reinvent our professional selves as university educators and thus move to
the low country of southeast Georgia, I can now safely say that I certainly wasn’t
thinking realistically, but rather more ideologically. True, I had been far removed from
the university for over ten years and deeply enmeshed in a world of corporate culture and
anti-intellectualism for a long time by the moment I entered the academic ranks, but I
suppose that I also maintained a romantic sense that the academy remained the “last”
bastion of higher thought, exploration and transformation for all those contained therein.
Much to my naivety, I thought that the university was immune, or at least too far
removed from the capital culture that had by then, infested much of our society and ways
of being in our hyper capitalistic society. Although ignorant at that time as to what had
really happened to the university culture in the last several decades, most of my
excitement in taking the position was based upon my desire to dive into learning and
teaching with students as equally malnourished as I had been. I couldn’t wait to engage
in real learning and meaningful dialogue with my students by applying the “real world”
knowledge that I had acquired…to watch them get knocked down and stand back up,
only to be “enlightened” further…to be challenged by students interested in technical
knowledge and other worldly pursuits of truth, knowledge and experience.
It wasn’t long, less than three months in fact, before I became radically aware that
higher education had “changed”, that it was “different” from what my perception of what
it “should” be. Not only were most of my students not interested in deep and complex
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insights, knowledge and inquiry into areas of thought “not related” to their chosen major,
but most were also pathetically disinterested in genuinely learning major, disciplinary
domains of knowledge, its intricacies, its complexities, and its applications beyond
rudimentary, cookbook levels. Rather, most of my students were (are) more interested in
“what they need to know” to move on…to pass this class, or that one…to keep their
HOPE (scholarship)…to graduate…to pass the national exam…to gain admission to
graduate or professional schools…to get a job. In effect, they were after the “codified
data” or knowledge necessary to “perform”, and subsequently secure gainful employment
in the field. They had already been sufficiently “disciplined” to study “a discipline”, to
see learning strictly from within a behaviorist’s perspective, and to excessively value and
compete for grades and outcomes. They were/are for the most part subversively enrolled
in what amounts to the “UPD”, or what can metaphorically be considered as the
University of Professional Development. Viewed in this vein then, it made me wonder
just what my “role” actually was as a professor and educator, why I was working as hard
as I was to learn the art and science of teaching, and why I was so concerned with being
“scholarly” beyond my specific discipline. Where were all those dynamic, interesting
and challenging students? Just what did (does) it mean to be an “effective teacher”?
Where were those interdisciplinary dialogues and spontaneous moments of intellectual
debate that I envisioned occurring on my brothers’ campuses, but missed at Marietta
College?
In my early semesters, I suppose that I could somewhat tolerate, almost expect
even a certain level of student apathy towards non-major courses and the inherent and
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critical connections to democracy, sociology, and ontology that other modes of thought
possess. After all, I have always prided myself on being more of a pragmatist than an
idealist. But what I was not prepared for was for the majority of my students to be so
fundamentally disinterested in meaningful and challenging learning experiences
respective to their chosen major…to be so disinterested in learning just for learning’s
sake…to dismiss my energy and passion for learning and engagement as just another
eccentric teacher. I couldn’t help repeatedly and exasperatingly wonder just what had
happened to college students today…to high schools…to education in general, as I
worked my way through my initial semesters as a university teacher, program director,
and non-doctored member of the academy. Now I know…they had become disciplined
too.
Now five years removed from the initiation of my intellectual catharsis, I suppose
that I can now recognize how my reading of the central tenets contained in
Understanding Curriculum has helped me to more deeply analyze my lived curriculum,
and thus, the lived curricula that I was/am now intricately connected to as an instructor
and program director. I can better understand the frustration my brother Marc felt
regarding his secondary and early college educational experiences, as well as the
“techno-liberal” education that I endured at Marietta College as a non-liberal arts major,
and the even more advanced technical degree that I earned at the University of North
Carolina. Leading up to the moment of our respective college admission, neither of us
had any significant intellectual nor applied experiences with curriculum as political,
gender, racial, phenomenological, poststructural, postmodern, autobiographical, aesthetic,
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or theological text(s); but the central difference between Marc and I, was that theirs
expanded upon what they arrived with, mine did not. Certainly, both of my brothers were
exposed to and immersed in curricular matters such as these in their formal
undergraduate classes, and by happenstance also in their informal endeavors. Just by
being and living on campuses that were much more diverse, much more critical, much
more committed to the historical ideals of a liberal arts education, and thus much more
emancipative and critical, my brothers had multiple opportunities to experience
curriculum in many of the manifestations expounded upon in Understanding Curriculum.
In retrospect, I now realize that I had not yet lived many of these “types” of
curriculum in any of my formal, or informal educational experiences; and now, I realize
that most of my university students haven’t either. Rather, it took over 34 years of
combined educational, professional and lived experiences before I was even sentient of
curriculum thought as rich, complex, and intriguing as that presented in Understanding
Curriculum. How could I be in possession of a bachelor’s of science degree from a
liberal arts college and a master’s of arts degree from a larger public institution then? In
effect, my first reading of Understanding Curriculum in the fall of 2000 provided me
with a unique and profound autobiographical reconceptualization of my lived curriculum,
of my currere; or perhaps more appropriately, my curriculum “not lived”. Over the
course of time, the deconstruction of my lived curriculum that I have put forth here, has
profoundly impacted both my theory and praxis as a university educator, program
director, mentor, advisor and role model for over 30 undergraduate students under my
guidance each academic year. Perhaps most evident, and thus of most significance and
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relevance to the larger analysis that I am undertaking, is the passionate impact these still
evolving changes have had on my pedagogical world view regarding curriculum as lived
and embodied text. Thus expressed, the lived/unlived curriculum that I am now
experiencing as someone on the other side of the podium, as a member of the
professorate provides the central precept for my forthcoming structural analysis and
discourse surrounding our contemporary institutions of postsecondary education, its
affective powers on the self, desire, and the soul.
Sitting At The Crossroads…Or Is It Sitting In The Crosshairs?
Thus, here I now sit at a crossroads of sorts, at a place and time wherein I find
myself reconceptualizing both my lived curriculum, and the current curriculum in which
I am wholeheartedly engaged in as a university educator empowered to coordinate an
accredited allied health education program. Firmly affixed in the vortex of these
crossroads sit the various challenges, issues, and discourses surrounding my personal,
educational and institutional responsibilities and ideals. Am I here to help produce
students according to a fixed recipe that guarantees economic and professional success?
Do I just take the easy road, and discipline my students with my disciplinary knowledge
while ignoring the existence of other modes of thought and ways to see the world? Have
my internal and external administrators figured out all that I need to know, and how to
transmit authoritative knowledge in order to ensure academic excellence and produce
exemplary disciplinary professionals? If so, what kind of research and teaching
initiatives should I undertake, and, what will I be missing if I ignore “other” issues that
pertain to higher education, and to the higher educated? Or, does my academic utility
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call for something much deeper and more critical than merely contributing to the
technocratization of our society? If that’s the case, how should my various service,
scholarship and teaching expectations be shaped so as to constructively address this
fundamentally paradoxical set of academic challenges? William Reynolds reflects on
this sort of “tugging of the professional heartstrings” in his essay entitled “Curriculum
Theory in the Age of Dole & Clinton” by pondering the effective utility and value of his
own academic work, and how it subsequently contributes (or doesn’t) to the much needed
social criticism of our national educational condition (2003).
I begin to think that maybe I should be more concerned about what type of
articles and books I am writing than how many I write. Whose interest do those
articles and books serve? Who, besides other curriculum scholars is reading what
I am writing (p. 64).
For Reynolds, as for other members of the academic professorate dedicated to an
impassioned critique of our social and cultural milieu, the modern university can readily
be seen to exert pronounced and multiple effects on “how” professors think, work, and
teach. In a nutshell, there now exists a very profound and dubious affective disorder
wallowing in higher education that challenges our historical and practical notions of
academic productivity, utility and responsibility. Today’s critical educator in the
academy is now, perhaps more than ever confronted with an array of disconcerting and
complex questions pertaining to the validity and value of their scholarly work, what
“counts” as effective teaching and learning, and in the end, what is expected of them in
order to fulfill their role as public intellectuals, and to receive promotion and tenure. In
accordance with the various critical analyses of postsecondary education already put forth
by multiple scholars (Aronowitz, 2000; Readings, 1996; Giroux, 2003; Reynolds, 2003),
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I am contesting that this “affective disorder of the academic self” can be justly coupled to
the increasingly corporate and performative identity and utility of many, if not most of
our colleges and universities today. Simply said, the corporate university has power,
shapes power and exerts power in subversive fashion over all of its constituencies, right
down to each and every last teacher and student. Aronowitz elaborates on the farreaching impact that the new world university directly has upon its professorate, and thus
indirectly too, upon the production and transmission of knowledge for, and to the student
body (2000).
Symptomatically, we now speak of a corporate “culture,” which in the academy
signifies a displacement of the old intellectual culture of the sciences, humanities,
and the arts. Research and writing goes on, but it becomes increasingly
instrumental to the overarching goal of individual survival, let alone
advancement, in the academic hierarchy. But in their official roles, faculty are
more than ever urged, cajoled, and even threatened to direct their scholarship and
research to the ever-decreasing pots of grant gold on penalty of losing resources
such as computer time, assistants, equipment, promotions, and tenure (p. 67).
Perhaps this testament is just an overt and tedious example of “preaching to the choir”,
but what may not be so obvious is the insight that the corporate university doesn’t “give
power” to its subjects, it doesn’t empower the self; but rather that its subjects are the
direct and unequivocal objects of its power. That is, today’s university doesn’t empower
the self as it once did when the pedagogy of Bildung emphasized the development of
character and culture by teaching “the rules of thought” (Readings, 1996, p. 67), but
rather it controls and normalizes individual subjects within the confines of disciplinary
knowledge and specialization, a priori established standards and guidelines, and
sovereign yet opaque notions of academic excellence and quality. Giroux’s definition of
corporate culture and its particular relevance to the pedagogy of higher education are
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reflective of my innermost concern for the contemporary university, and for my
professional future within it (1999).
Corporate culture is an ensemble of ideological and institutional forces that
functions politically and pedagogically to both govern organizational life through
senior managerial control and to produce compliant workers, spectorial
consumers, and passive citizens (p. 9).
Like other complex and multifarious social phenomena that require structural
analysis, a myriad of interconnected and complex historical, social, personal, and cultural
factors have dynamically contributed to the evolution of the modern coroporatized
university. In considering the impact, effects and affect that the corporate university has
had, and continues to have upon me and our society at large, a central paradox presents
itself and begs for analytical elaboration. To be precise, the current “state of things” in
our modern universities imparts a certain level of exasperation for my multiple and
interconnected social and cultural roles as a neointellectual, a teacher, and as a parent all
concerned with our social, cultural, environmental and democratic futures. More
specifically, the “hidden curriculum” that Giroux explains as a “creeping
vocationalization and subordination of learning to the dictates of the market” (1999, p.
16), can be seen as the open and defining principle not only of primary through secondary
schooling, but now also at all levels of education, including universities and colleges.
Yet the paradoxical challenge that corporate culture’s hidden curriculum poses also
sparks a certain passion, purpose and constructive promise for me and other persons
concerned with inventing new counter discourses capable of challenging the status quo
that is the contemporary, corporate university. Again, Reynolds’ frank and personal
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comments regarding his role as a public intellectual working within the field of teacher
education are right on the mark (2003).
So as a teacher and an academic I need to be concerned with “wide-awakeness.”
To be wide awake to our part and our choices in the concerns of the historical
moment is to move toward a passionate engagement with social criticism. The
movement toward wide-awakeness is to be tempered with the thoughts of the
problems that will be encountered (p. 66).
It is precisely from within this fundamental paradox that I will attempt to articulate my
critical and theoretical perspectives, and my particular “wide-awakeness” regarding my
unveiling of the hidden curriculum; and if my utterance is productive, perhaps it will
resonate in the ears of others who have inhabited similar spaces and times.
Dysacademia Contaminates The Ivory Towers
Framing the fundamental structure of my theoretical argument will be a critical
analysis of today’s higher educational machine, or what Bill Readings communally calls
“the University” to represent the status quo institutions, and not the exceptional (1996).
For Michel Foucault, this means that I will be attempting to elucidate a “discourse” that
outlines and shapes the current University’s operative dynamics. Discourse then, as
defined by Foucault, is a discursive practice that becomes part of itself by framing and
giving meaning to the objects and phenomenon that it describes without reference or
insinuation to essential forms, objective realities or sovereign truths (1980, p. 122).
Discourses are found everywhere one looks, schools, religion, disciplines, social clubs,
professional practices; each replete with its own language, codes, norms, and boundaries
of thought. Discourses, and the discursive practices they live off of and promote,
produce and work on the assumption of normativity, of ideals, and absolutes; and they all
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contain subversive and usually unseen connections between power and knowledge that
must be exposed and brought to light (Foucault, 1980).
It is in discourse that power and knowledge are joined together…Discourse can be
both an instrument and an effects of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling
block, a point of resistance and a starting point for opposing strategies (p. 100101).
In this particular and local instance, I will be articulating the discourse of the University
as I have come to see, feel and experience it, not as it “really”, essentially, and globally
exists. I intend to analyze and describe a particular discourse that represents a particular
structural analysis of present-day higher education and its “hidden curriculum”, how it
manages to constrain and limit subjective and epistemological freedom, how it effectively
ignores its larger roles that society requires of it, how it has operatively “flip-flopped” to
mirror and submissively respond to culture, rather than to produce, acquire and resist
culture (Readings, 1996, p. 119), how power functions and reproduces itself through the
formation of passive subjectivities, and the inherent connections it has to neoliberal and
corporate values that promote excellence and cost-efficient quality. Likewise, I also
intend to take full advantage of Foucault’s study of a discourse’s recursive power by
utilizing my analysis of this discourse, as a “starting point for opposing strategies” that
may one day prove capable of generating new, more socially conscious, and ontologically
open discourses.
Following Readings, I will use “University” with a capital “U” to represent the
collective institution of higher education as it pertains to my analysis and commentary of
the corporate university. Most notably, it is my Readingsonian contention that today’s
University can be characterized highly “dysfunctional” in that it now operates largely in a
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state of being far removed from its original social mission and democratic utility. In
short, the University writ large can now be seen to “only serve itself” (Readings, 1996, p.
40). In coining what he calls “The University of Excellence” because of the inextricably
neoliberal and professional agendas that influence most, if not all initiatives, policies, and
allocations, Readings goes so far as to state that the University has no referent, but
instead, that it’s merely a “simulacrum of the idea of a University” (p. 54). Indeed, to
those not ordained to engage in serious and meaningful social criticism, the image and
conception of the University as an archetype of higher intellectual thought, debate, and
self-transcendence is unknowingly just that—a simulacrum.
In complementing the grave and meritous concerns put forth by Readings, Stanley
Aronowitz’s thematic declaration that there now exists a specific and tangible difference
between true “higher education” and vocationally oriented “postsecondary training” has
strong and credible merit, as well (2000). Specifically, because of myriad reasons and
factors separate unto themselves, yet somehow all genealogically and archaeologically
connected to economics, power or science (or a combination thereof), higher education
institutions in the Western world today can be seen as highly fragmented, corporatized,
and ontologically disoriented with regards to their “other” social, humanistic, and ethical
responsibilities. As such, the inherent connections that readily exist today in Academia
pertaining to impressions of excellence, corporatization, specialization, technocratization,
performativity, and control requires a perfunctory structural analysis that is capable of
revealing the affective and effective nature of the modern university. A deconstruction of
the discourse that is the Ivory towers is indeed warranted.
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As such, I intend to take on a very arduous and ambitious project in the
forthcoming sections of this text. In using the autobiographical exposition of my lived
curriculum as the operative foundation, I would like to expand Readings’ critique of the
University and Aronowitz’s eloquent and well-articulated analysis of postsecondary
education put forth in The Knowledge Factory (2000) to produce a structural analysis of
higher education that reveals and articulates an institution in Byzantine disarray. And, in
keeping with the various elements of my persona that can be directly attributed to my
formal training and background in the allied health sciences, I aim to color my discourse
surrounding the contemporary university by borrowing select terms and conditions from
the medical sciences in order to pontificate various metaphors that represent the current
physical and mental wellness of the Ivory Towers. To do this, I would like to assert
DysAcademia as an umbrella term to describe the discourse of the contemporary
university, its operations, its identity, and its effective (dys) servitude. “Dys”, in Greek
means “bad; difficult; disordered” (Miller & Keane, 1983, p. 346), and so I chose the
prefix “Dys” because of its medical inferences and its association to various and multiple
pathological and disconcerting conditions of the living self; to life in general. Thus
situated, I wish to take advantage of the metaphorical power and discursive relevance of
this particular prefix by juxtaposing various medical states and conditions of the body
associated with “dys” into my structural analysis of the University. It is my specific
argument that Dysacademia, and the many dysconditions I will employ to help shape and
articulate the analysis of the discourse, have profound and subsequent effects and affect
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on the University’s inorganic (the University as institution) and organic sub
constituencies (the living elements, namely the educators and students).
Dysacademia And The Inorganic—Affecting The Institutional Metabolism
Inorganically, the discourse of Dysacademia can be conceptually embodied on
three separate, yet deeply interconnected and interdependent levels that operationally and
qualitatively affect the contemporary University’s effective identity. First and foremost
is the reiteration of Lyotard’s “performative university” (1979/1984), or as Readings calls
it, “the University of Excellence” (1996, p. 32) in an attempt to show how corporate
America and contemporary politicians have transformed the educational landscape in our
society. More specifically, the “new world” corporate University described by Bok
(2003), Giroux (2003; 1999), Aronowitz (2000), and countless others has worked “hand
in hand” with our increasingly consumerist and materialistic society to drastically alter
the ideological mission, educational landscape, and effective utility of higher education in
the West today. Perhaps Giroux states it most succinctly and effectively in his brief but
theoretically dense critique of the contemporary university, Corporate Culture & The
Attack on Higher Education and Public Schooling (2003).
The cost-accounting principles of efficiency, calculability, predictability, and
control of the corporate order have restructured the meaning and purpose of
education (p. 23).
In short, it is my central concern that far too many students enter college and university
today specifically and resolutely to a) increase their lifetime earning potential, b) improve
their respective families’ class and social position, c) to get specific job training that
promises significant material compensation, or d) any logical and interspersed
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combination thereof. Indeed, it is the third reason (job training = more money) that has
had the greatest effect on the modern University and the modern student, as private and
public monies are allocated en masse in order to develop and promote academic majors
that promise significant and speedy bounties for local, regional and national economies.
Or, as Giroux bluntly puts it, “if it’s not profitable, it’s not funded” (1999, p. 20).
Because of the far-reaching influence and outcomes associated with corporate culture’s
role in the university, the discourse pertaining to the neoliberal disposition of today’s
University, as articulated by Giroux, Readings and Aronowitz will be interwoven into the
analyses presented in both Chapters 2 & 3, with an attempt to coalesce the argument that
“corporate culture” rules.
Neoliberal Influences In Higher Education
Widespread budget shortfalls, the renewed pleas from conservatives to squelch
academic freedom and to eliminate tenure, and the increasing neoliberal fragmentation
and technocratization of the curriculum; these are just a few of the many current
challenges that threaten to destabilize the historical, intellectual, socio-cultural missions
of the American university system. In University in Ruins (1996), Bill Readings goes so
far as to say that because of the decline in our national cultural mission, the wider social
role of the University as an institution is “now up for grabs”; and that both the place and
nature of the contemporary university are now nebulous and problematic for intellectuals
vested in our academic and social futures (p. 2). In short, it is Reading’s critical
contention that the University has succumbed to the capitalistic demands associated with
the Western neocolonial globalization project, and thus, it no longer participates in the
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historical project for humanity that once served as the original legacy of medieval
Enlightenment, that being “the historical project of culture” (p. 5).
Ever the more cynical, Lyotard believes that the “desired goal becomes the
optimal contribution of higher education to the best performativity of the social system”,
with two kinds of indispensable skills created in the process (1979/1984, p. 48). First,
students acquire the specialized skills necessary to “tackle world competition” as it is
locally relevant to the global market, and secondly, higher learning will have to supply
the social system with the skills needed to maintain its’ own internal cohesion. It is
within Lyotard’s contentions that “in the context of delegitimation, universities and the
institutions of higher learning are called upon to create skills, and no longer ideals”, and
“the transmission of knowledge is no longer designed to train an elite capable of guiding
the nation towards its emancipation, but to supply the system with players capable of
acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions” (p. 48),
that I center the current critique of higher education and the production of performative
subjectivity. Added to this sad and counterproductive industrial based development is
Norbert Wiener’s observation that the pursuit of higher education is no longer driven by a
“deep impulse” to transform and grow intellectually, but rather by the desire to attain a
certain “social prestige” (1954, p. 133).
In his efforts to “map out” the framework of his discourse on education, markets,
standards, God and inequality, Michael Apple identifies four different “groups” of
players from the political and religious “right” who have/are drastically effecting the
educational topography in the United States (2001, p. 11). Of these four principal groups,
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only the first one—neoliberals—is relevant to the current discourse. Neoliberal activists
and ideologists from the right, as Apple terms them, are “deeply committed to markets
and to freedom as ‘individual choice’ (p. 11). In other words, neoliberal theory is based
strictly upon the idea that a “free market economy” is the democratic and just pillar upon
which to base educational reform, Budgetary decisions, and other curriculum policies
upon because it is “available to everyone”. As a definition, Apple imports the work of
Robert McChesney to better articulate the multifarious aspects of neoliberalism (2001).
Neoliberal initiatives are characterized as free market policies that encourage
private enterprise and consumer choice, reward personal responsibility and
entrepreneurial initiative, and undermine the dead hand of the incompetent,
bureaucratic and parasitic government, that can never do good even if well
intended, which it rarely is (p. 17).
As he builds his critique of the “Right” education, Apple goes on to elaborate how
neoliberal influences have changed the scenery in education by “aiming to provide the
educational conditions believed necessary both for increasing international
competitiveness, profit, and discipline” (p. 65), by “setting the market loose on schools so
as to ensure that only ‘good’ ones survive” (p. 68). Central to this corporatized process
of schooling is the centralization of practices that promote fiscal and pedagogical
accountability and efficiency, and industrial based models of management, with a
concurrent marginilization of “other” forms of learning not deemed vital to economic
sustainability and vitality (humanities, liberal arts, social sciences), along with the
inherent and varied interests of the students. In dire contrast to classical liberalism,
where state power is disdained and the individual is a free entity with an autonomous
human nature, Apple qualifies neoliberalism as an ideology that favors the state’s
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“neutral” role in the creation of appropriate markets and individuals as market players
which signifies a subtle shift in the school’s emphasis, “from student needs to student
performance and from what the school does for the student to what the student does for
the school” (p. 71). Although much of Apple’s criticism focuses on primary and
secondary education in the United States there is no doubt that his points regarding the
encroachment of neoliberal policies, and the resultant missionary shifts it induces can
aptly and justly be applied to higher education, as well.
In his chapter entitled “Higher Education, Inc.”, critical theorist Henry Giroux
does just that—critically illustrates contemporary society’s neoliberal impact on higher
education by bringing to light the “hidden curriculum” of higher education, and by
drawing numerous uncanny congruencies between Wall Street and the Ivory Towers
(2003). Perhaps most indicative of the subtle, but perceptible transformation, that Giroux
is attempting to articulate can be found in the changing role of the University president
(2003).
The new breed of university presidents is characterized less by their ability to take
risks, think critically, engaging important progressive social issues, and provoke
national debates than they are for raising money, producing media-grabbing
public relations, and looking good for photo shoots (p. 170).
But perhaps the most disturbing and penultimate example of the impending neoliberal
conservative threat on academic freedom that both Apple and Giroux highlight can be
witnessed in the administrative desires of James Carlin, a multimillionaire ex business
executive, who as chairmen of the Massachusetts’s State Board of Education in 1998
launched a four fold attack on the academic professorate (as cited in Giroux, 2003, p.
175). Specifically, Carlin attempted to convince other policy makers and the public that
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1) higher education should model itself after successful corporations, 2) that professorial
tenure should be eliminated, 3) that faculty members had too much democratic power to
shape university decisions, and 4) that all “non essential research” not central and
relevant to the market economy of the state of Massachusetts was to be condemned.
This “university as corporation” discourse operates as a major component of the
neoliberal machinery that characterizes our postmodern economic, social, cultural and
political conditions. Giroux’s comments regarding the neoliberal era and its technocratic
effects on higher education, the student-consumers, and thus society at large
subsequently, clearly reflect the concerns put forth by Lyotard, Wiener, and others as
they pertain to our social coherence, and so are also current with the sub discourse I am
attempting to articulate here (Giroux, 2003).
In the neoliberal era of deregulation and the triumph of the market, many students
and their families no longer believe that higher education is about higher learning,
but about gaining a better foothold in the job market. Colleges and universities
are perceived—and perceive themselves—as training grounds for corporate berths
(p. 167).
Second, the overly performative and neoliberal function of the new world,
corporate university can be seen to work in concert with the fragmentation and
specialization of the academic disciplines to severely limit the potential levels of
subjective, personal and contextual learning and self-transformation that might occur for
most students. In essence, the pronounced proliferation of Foucault’s disciplinary society
discourse has worked in concert with neoliberalism and performativity to have now taken
full hold of the academy, and as such has multiple contributing factors, associations, and
consequences that require deconstruction. The specific dynamics of our essentially
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economically driven, and academically supported disciplinary society can be seen then as
inextricably operating with various financial, economic and material factors to produce
an even more complex system. This neoliberal disciplinary system can be seen then, as
both a byproduct and as the perpetuator of our overly technocratic and capitalist
education system—a system that, sad to say has dominated Western culture since the
advent of the industrial revolution, and one that has arguably grown even more
pronounced during our current “techno-cybernetic revolution”.
Thus stated, the various historical, social and cultural factors that contribute to
this (de)evolution necessitate a deconstructive analysis that is capable of rendering the
corporate University that Readings (1996), Aronowitz (2000), Giroux (1999; 2003),
Gould (2003), and countless others have described. With this task firmly in mind, a
genealogical analysis of the development of our disciplinary society will thus be
undertaken in an attempt to connect the disciplinary dynamics described by Foucault with
the proliferation of economically laden neoliberalist agendas in the modern University.
Using Foucault to set the table for their discussion on disciplinarity, Messer-Davidow et
al, describe genealogy as a “means of de-essentializing phenomena”, and capable of
helping us “to understand just how these elements became the disciplines they are, rather
than something else” (1993, p. 4). Further, genealogy “insists that knowledge not only is
a product of power but also is itself a nonneutral form of power” (p. 5), and so it is my
explicit intent to genealogically analyze the academic learning of disciplines in a critical
and problematized manner by further examining the specific socialization of individuals
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into disciplines, disciplinary professionals, and thus active constituents of our disciplinary
society.
Lastly, Deleuze (1990/1995, p. 177) has written that we have gradually re-evolved
from Foucault’s notion of a disciplinary society to a control society, a contention well
supported and expertly connected to pedagogy by William Reynolds (2003b), and
Rebecca Martusewicz (2001). As Deleuze points out, we have been gradually entering a
society of control, one characterized by “new weapons”, technology, communication, and
varying other forms of social control. Chiefly stated, disciplinary societies are confined
by molds, while control societies are modulated by different ways of doing business,
school reform, technological advancements, and other social transmutations that in
Deleuze’s words, “never allow us to finish anything” (p. 178-9). Similar to, sometimes
difficult to discern the difference between, and all together linked to a point whereby one
must be considered whenever the other is discussed, control and disciplinary based
societies operate symbiotically and interdependently in the modern University in many
complex and discursive manners. And as one may logically surmise, both control and
disciplinary societies also work collectively with neoliberal and performative functions to
reinforce, reproduce, and perpetuate the existing power structures that exist in
Dysacademia today. Deleuze is explicit with his educational critique and the subsequent
conversion of our schools to institutions governed and characterized by disciplinary
control and surveillance, a.k.a., training (1990/1995).
One can envisage education becoming less and less a closed site differentiated
from the workplace as another closed site, but both disappearing and giving way
to frightful continual training, to continual monitoring or worker-school kids or
bureaucrat-students (p. 175).
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Operating as a discursive element of power and authority, and deeply connected
to the economic realities of our current social epoch then, the control society that is the
modern University can be seen to have weighty effects on the teachers and students
filling the classrooms and offices, the production and dissemination of knowledge, and
the resultant pedagogy and curricula employed within. In addition to various and more
subtle examples of “corporatized” control that now occur on a daily basis in the modern
University, the increasing love affair that policy makers, administrators and the general
public now have with accreditation arrangements can be seen as outward manifestations
of control and power in concerted operation with monolingual disciplinary modes of
thought, and neoliberal centered agendas to both stimulate and propagate Dysacademia.
Chapter 3 will further analyze the various manners and materializations in which control
and surveillance operate in the contemporary University, and how they are inextricably
connected to the disciplinary and neoliberal tendencies that now define my articulation of
Dysacademia.
Dysacademia & The Organic—Affecting the Living & Being
Organically, Dysacademia and its offspring, Dyscurriculum and Dyspedagogy,
must be analyzed according to how it affects its living constituencies on at least two
separate, yet interconnected levels, 1) the consequences that it has fashioned for the
deliverers and providers of higher education, the professorate, and 2) in terms of it’s
subsequent and unquestionable role as an accomplice in the public manufacturing of far
too many socially and intellectually apathetic objects molded mostly for economic,
technical and professional needs. As it regards the first organic element, the professorate,
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Dysacademia’s organic affects can be conceptualized by making use of Lyotard’s “death
of the professor” (1979/1984, p. 50) in relation to the various control and accreditation
mandates, and Dysacademia’s residing corporate culture. Together, these inorganic
attributes can be thought to effectively produce the dysacademic. As Giroux would most
undoubtedly confer, the dysacademic can be seen as a mutation of the professorate that
can be directly traced to the “deskilling and anti-intellectualizing” that accompanies the
corporate model of teaching (1999, p. 36). For the Dysacademic working from within
Dysacademia then, the inevitable condition that results over time as a complication of the
constant control, surveillance, and performativity expectations can be seen
metaphorically as a form of “dysbulia” (weakness or perversion of the will, Miller &
Kean, 1983, p. 348). Dysbulia wears down the professorate, it makes them submit, it
makes them play by the rules, and in time, it kills them. Thus, the pivotal and urgent
question for critical pedagogues now regards the effective role of the contemporary
professor in the postmodern university. Is it to teach the self, or to train the body? Or, as
Giroux points out, to “emphasize the translation of educational exchange into financial
exchange”? (1999, p. 35). Is it to resist the corporate culture, or to submit to the standards
of excellence and profit? Chapter Three’s emphasis on control, standards and excellence,
and their operative affects on the University will incorporate an analysis of the current
state of the professor as part of a larger discourse concerning our transition to a Deleuzian
control society and its subsequent contributions to Dysacademia.
Dyserethesia (“impairment of sensibility”, Miller & Keane, 1983, p. 347),
dysgnosia (“any abnormality of the intellect”, Miller & Keane, 1983, p. 348), and
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dyslogia (“impairment of the power of reasoning”, Miller & Keane, 1983, p. 348) can be
seen to exemplify the constraining and dysfunctional affects that Dysacademia has upon
its organic constituencies; especially the student body. The development and shaping of
individual consciousnesses, epistemologies, ontologies and subjectivities in the spirit
typical of the University ideals of Kant or Humboldt, seem to sadly be a thing of the past
(Readings, 1996). In simple terms, the state of dyscrasia that now exists in the University
as a result of the disciplinary influences and fragmentation, control based policies, and
neoliberal dynamics have had a profound and complicating affect upon both the
professorate and student body in terms of knowledge production and construction,
ontological freedom, and the subsequent creation of critical subjectivities (or lack
thereof). Specifically, the inherent connections between power, authority, and knowledge
and their subsequent predication upon disciplinary knowledge and metannaratives leads
to the formation of largely monolingual and fixed subjectivities in the modern University;
a university without Reason (Kant), or Culture (Humboldt), or moral development
(Readings, p. 55). Because multiple and open modes of thought, freely disassociated
from economic and authoritative motives and/or habits, are not regularly promoted or
pursued in the modern University, students can successfully pass through the various
technocratic and specialized curricula without ever embracing a more postmodern
sensibility of heterogeneity and multilingualism; without ever developing their own
culture; without ever constructing their own knowledge; and without ever learning the
power of thinking, of speculative utterances. Furthermore, the pronounced neoliberal and
corporate influences that now dominate most public universities, as well as our
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generalsocietal mindset, can be seen as accomplices in the development and promotion of
impaired sensibilities, reasoning and intellect as materialism, consumerism and
egocentrism become the dominant modes of consciousness in our younger generations.
Stated as such, this sentiment has led Readings to require that “we accept that the modern
University is a ruined institution” (p. 129). As a ruined institution then, David Kirp poses
the “ultimate question” for all publicly supported institutions of higher learning, and for
those empowered to make policy and fiscal decisions that impact the Academy (2003).
The ultimate question is this: Can the public be persuaded that universities
represent something as ineffable as the common good—more specifically, that
higher education contributes to the development of knowledgeable and
responsible citizens, encourages social cohesion, promotes and spreads
knowledge, increases social mobility, and stimulates the economy? Can the
argument convincingly be made that the university offers something of such great
value that it is worth subsidizing despite bottom-line pressures? (p. 2).
From the student perspective, the role of the University and its affective
disciplinary powers over its legions of subscribers must be analyzed from an
epistemological, ontological and even axiological perspective. In short, a Dysacademic
in charge of carrying out and implementing a Dyscurriculum more than likely contributes
to the production of multiple states of dysgnosia (any abnormality of the intellect) and
dysbulia (the will) either willingly or not. In this pathological state of “dys”, the intellect
is sadly characterized by homogeneity, linearity, myopia, and homonormativity; all
sublimely laced with neoliberal ideals and initiatives tied to the various markets that now
control most, if not all of our social policies and values. To be blunt, the modern
University works from within, and towards a paradigm largely defined by narrow
mindedness and vocational specialization. To be more clear, the central purpose and long
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term action potentials that higher education promises and provides (used to? supposed
to?) for the nation’s students must be critically assessed and weighed against the social
and cultural costs of doing business in its current manifestation. Again, Kirp’s insight
here is valuable and insightful as it pertains to the “purpose” and utility of the University
(2003).
Embedded in the idea of the university—not the romanticized idea, but the
university as its truest and best—are values that the market does not honor: a
community of scholars and not a confederacy of self-seekers; an openness and not
ownership of ideas; the professor as a pursuer of truth, not simply an
entrepreneur; and the student as an acolyte whose preferences are to be formed,
not a consumer whose preferences are to be satisfied (p. 3).
In the end, Dyskinesia (“impairment of the power of voluntary movement”, Miller
& Keane, 1983, p. 348), and dysbulia (weakness or perversion of the will, Miller &
Keane, 1983, p. 347) may prove to be the most powerful and apropos metaphors to
embody the hyperfragmentation of knowledge and its contributions to Dysacademia and
its resultant power to (de) limit and control subjective movement, evolution and
transformation of the individual self to spaces and times beyond those embodied by
professional and neoliberal initiatives. By going to college in order to study for a job,
rather than to study for learning as learning, for self-transcendence and transformation, or
for the open and chaotic formation of subjective ontologies and epistemologies, young
students unknowingly, yet actively contribute to their own dyskinesia and dysbulia.
Students enrolling in institutions of higher education in order to attain postsecondary
training effectively limit their own ability to move beyond, amongst and between the
various spaces of knowledge and being that exist for anyone interested in such voluntary
movement. In time, this perversion of freedom and movement can be seen to work on the
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will, as dyskinetic individuals become comfortable and learn to avoid the exhilarating
and empowering turbulences associated with active movement and perpetual, untold
change. And, because colleges and universities are all too happy to “offer what the
customer wants” and what the economy needs, the process becomes deeply and
problematically symbiotic for all parties involved. David Kirp, author of the recent
critique on the marketing of higher education entitled Shakespeare, Einstein, and the
Bottom Line (2003), reflects upon this tendency in an excerpted article criticizing
Governor Mitt Romney’s explicit business plans for corporatizing the entire
Massachusetts university system in a current Boston Globe commentary (2003).
Such ideas exemplify an age when priorities in higher education are determined
less by academic values than by the interests of multiple constituencies—students,
donors, corporations, politicians. In today’s university, the student is a
“customer” and the professor is an “entrepreneur.” Each campus unit is a “profit
(or loss) center,” and each institution is busily promoting its “brand” and looking
for its “niche market,” whether in money capital or intellectual capital (p. 1).
Young doctoral students and newly minted assistant professors fall into and
become part of this same trap, as doctoral degree programs have also become highly
specialized and market driven, producing highly competent, yet myopically educated
researchers and scholars for multiple specialties and subspecialties (Abbott, 2001).
Although the humanities and some of the social sciences seem more immune to this
socially induced transformation, it is probably not incidental that the natural,
technological, and military science related fields (those deemed more economically
viable and useful) are not as lucky. Again, Kirp’s analysis is on the mark (2003).
What’s troubling today, however, is the single-minded fixation on marketplace
and managerial values. The winners are those with the skills valued by the
market. The losers are advocates of the liberal arts, who can’t prove their bottom-
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line value, and students from poor households, who are increasingly priced out of
higher education (p. 1).
This “downsizing of the disciplines” according to their perceived market value can be
seen then, as just another example of the profit standard mantra that the corporate
University utilizes to calibrate their operations according to standard supply and demand
operating procedures (Giroux, 1999, p. 25).
Specifically it is within the critical contentions put forth by Lyotard, and mirrored
in the scholarship of Aronowitz (2000), Giroux (2003), Readings (1996), and others that
“in the context of delegitimation, universities and the institutions of higher learning are
called upon to create skills, and no longer ideals”, and “the transmission of knowledge is
no longer designed to train an elite capable of guiding the nation towards its
emancipation, but to supply the system with players capable of acceptably fulfilling their
roles at the pragmatic posts required by its institutions” (Lyotard, 1979/1984, p. 48), that
I intend to center my own personal critique of higher education and the production of
performative subjectivities. Inherent in these (de) transformative processes are myriad
factors that have contributed to the educational and social demise of many of today’s
institutions of higher learning, especially mid to large size public institutions. Complex
in nature and scope, today’s commercialized academia stems from myriad sources, such
as rapidly rising university costs since the 1970s (largely due to the tremendous costs
associated with biotech and high-tech research projects), and shrinking federal and local
funding sources (Kirp, 2003, p. 1). As such, these developments have forced universities
into a survival mode as they have all scrambled to look for viable and sustainable funding
sources, and creative ways to boost enrollment and decrease attrition. In other words,
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higher education today may now be more readily described as one of the central
metabolic forces that nourish and sustain the human capital theory of economic
reproduction. In The Knowledge Factory, Stanley Aronowitz elaborates more fully on
the changing nature and function of postsecondary education in our culture (2000).
Most colleges and universities are part of an academic system in American
society whose success is measured by, among other criteria, how much it
contributes to the economy (p. 11).
The gradual institutional transformation that occurred largely in the 20th century,
and described as the “university-corporate complex” by Aronowitz (p. 16), is not a “new
thing”, however. In fact, this complex and progressive transformation actually began as
early as 1900, and subsequently evolved as a consequence of a myriad social, political,
industrial, economic and scientific factors that occurred throughout both World Wars, the
Cold War, and our current postmodern epoch (p. 19). In the end, the result is that most, if
not many of our current public universities now resemble mid to large size corporations
more than they do centers of higher thought, or institutions of cultural production and
dissemination (Kirp, 2003).
A new generation of administrators, schooled in business practice, has acquired
ever-greater power in the retooled universities. Those officials, veterans of
government streamlining and corporate downsizing, have brought all the
fashionable management and budgeting nostrums—ideas like TQM (total quality
management), revenue-center management, and emphasis on “core
competencies”—to higher education. The intention is to make universities run
more like businesses, whether that means using financial aid to maximize
revenues, skimping on the library and counseling center while spending money on
gyms and rock-climbing walls, or hiring superstar professors to burnish a school’s
reputation while relying on adjuncts and other academic day laborers to shoulder
the burden of teaching. Those borrowed innovations have been problematic
because universities aren’t like widget-making firms or the post office and
organizational strategies can’t be create by the logic used to assemble cars (p. 1).
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Seen then as a bothersome sequalae (“a morbid condition following or occurring as a
consequence of another condition or event, Miller & Keane, 1983, p. 1015) to the
inorganic operations of the University, the role that Dysacademia plays (whether
implicitly, or explicitly) in preventing the free and open development of critical and
individual subjectivities, in denying the necessary space(s) needed for the development of
social and cultural agency, and in drastically altering the history, identity, and
undertakings of the intellectual professorate requires an inclusive and interconnected
analysis.
The Academic Paradox: The Modern University Student & Postmodern Knowledge
Chapter 4 will take a meticulous look at the postmodern nature of knowledge,
closed vs. open systems, chaos and their intertwining effects on the nature of knowledge
and its subsequent construction of subjective epistemologies. If, as noted and selfprofessed amodern philosopher Michel Serres says, “the goal of instruction is invention”
(Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 133), and the “goal of teaching is to have teaching to
cease” (p. 22) is accepted as a feasible premise, then pedagogy today may be exposed as
being more “necrotic” (dead, as in lacking nutrition and energy) than alive; or at least
because of its relatively closed and static nature, “quasi-necrotic”. Simply put, in these
current times of classroom discipline, rabid standardization, measurable outcomes,
surveillance and teacher accountability that so typify our 21st century educational
paradigm, the typical American student has very little opportunity or initiative to invent
his/her own knowledge, and thus, very little ability to teach the self. As the “founder” of
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cybernetics Norbert Wiener expressed nearly 50 years ago, this is not a novel argument
(1954).
Our elementary and secondary schools are more interested in formal classroom
discipline than in the intellectual discipline of learning something thoroughly, and
a great deal of the serious preparation for a scientific or a literary course is
relegated to some sort of graduate school or other (p. 132).
For Wiener, education in the 1950s was already being viewed as a closed and myopic
system, one wherein young minds were no longer implored to think, to invent, or to
experience knowledge for themselves; young actors were “taught” how to act rather than
being allowed to express their art forms from within, and young writers were schooled in
“how” to write from expert sources, rather than being allowed to invent their own form of
communicative art. In short time, highly specialized and advanced degrees, especially
the PhD, were the standard bearers of knowledge and communication needed to impart
learning and skill onto the masses, leading inevitably to the multiple metannaratives of
authority and truth that now define academia (Abbott, 2001). To Wiener, “forms” of
knowledge and occupational skill now superseded critical and intellectual mass as part of
a fast moving trend towards an “ever-increasing thinness of educational content”; while
the artistic desire to invent was rapidly being structured around particular methods and
forms, and thus, subsequently extinguished in all but the most extraordinary of students
(1954, p. 133). In harmony with Serres’ and Wiener’s critical calls for invention to serve
as the primary focus of education, Katherine Hayles suggests that the creative writer is
perhaps the best example of a free-floating and chaotic inventor, capable of connecting
various epistemic cultures. Working from the “third territory” then, somewhere between
order and disorder, is what allows the creative writer to communicate beyond one
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particular field of study, and thus better capture and articulate the “aura of cultural
meanings that surround chaos” (1990, p. 19).
From this perspective then, I wish to advance my “curriculum reconceptualized”
by integrating what I see as complementary concepts from various scientific frames of
thought to the larger framework of pedagogy, curriculum and the student in a postmodern
manner. Specifically, it is my position that much, if not all of the central constructs that
characterize open systems theory (OST), cybernetics and information theory, and chaos
and complexity theories can, with a little theoretical creativity, be applied to a
postmodern curriculum, and in so doing, connect the central theoretical tenets of these
analogous theories to the central problem put forth by Wilson’s Consilience in order to
create a postmodern educational paradigm that maximizes mobility, growth, wandering
and eventually negentropy (or, complex order). I will then connect and interrelate
specific and pertinent elements of OST, chaos and cybernetics that are amenable to the
philosophical creations of Michel Serres, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. In doing so,
I will introduce a theoretical conception of what may be called a POST; or a postmodern
open systems theory. It is hoped that a POST framework, articulated as such, will
effectively extrapolate and take advantage of specific conceptual elements from open
systems, chaos, information, multiplicities, and rhizomes, and subsequently connect and
interrelate these complimentary concepts as constituent structures of an alternative
postmodern curricular discourse that provides openings, possibilities, multiple lines of
flight, and rhizomatic recursions that prove capable of developing critical epistemologies,
and thus too, subjective and contextual ontologies. And, in an attempt to adhere to the
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poststructural notion that “theory is not prescriptive”, it’s merely “idiosyncratic”, the
current discourse will be offered “up front” with the full awareness that its effectiveness,
if any, can only be embodied by a discourse structured by invention, hope, prospects and
multiplicity (Pinar, et al, 1995, p. 56).
Thus said, it is the specific intent of Chapter 4 to present the various
characteristics, criteria, and phenomena associated with open systems, and to
communicate them as a compelling and practical model for an open systems curriculum;
and likewise, for students to be understood, viewed, and handled as living open systems
with equal complexity, depth, and breadth. All of course, regarded and understood as a
paradigm of hope operating underneath a veil of postmodern sensibility. As such, it is
my intention to present a model of pedagogy (inclusive of the curriculum and the student)
that can reasonably and theoretically be seen as a self-organizing, entropic, fractal,
chaotic, dissipative, and autopoietic subjectivity for students entering into the curriculum.
From there, I wish to add a more postmodern intellect to these concepts by elaborating
more upon the pedagogical and cultural thoughts of Michel Serres, Gilles Deleuze, Felix
Guattari, amongst others in an attempt to articulate a POST. As students progress
through a curriculum reconceptualized as such, they won’t likely proceed in a linear and
scientific fashion of objectivity and controlled order; rather, they will have the
opportunity to transform from entropy (disorder) towards negentropic (order) and
complex forms, and in a more fractal, rhizomatic and postmodern manner that is not
predicted, controlled, or manipulated by objective ideals, essential knowledge, or modern
absolutes. In looking at education in this light, Bill Readings hypothetical, “How long

66
does it take to become ‘educated’?” takes on even more weight and significance for all
concerned with the intellectual development of personal, critical and local subjectivities
(1996, p. 25). Thus presented, the POST that forms and shapes Chapter 4 will then set
the stage for my closing chapter, which will make specific use of the curricular and
philosophical thoughts of Michel Serres to articulate a cohesive and inventive paradigm
for a postmodern and poststructural curriculum embodied by subjective potential,
wandering and empowerment.
Collectively, I intend to use Chapters 2-4 to demonstrate how the gradual
hyperfragmentation of the disciplines that started with the University of Berlin in 1910
(Ford, 2002, p. 39), and augmented by events, circumstances and outcomes associated
primarily with the industrial revolution, World War II, the Cold War, the information
technology boom, and now the desire to make the globe one big, open market defines the
inorganic operations and character of the typical contemporary University in the West.
Further, I aim to illustrate how this comminution (“breaking apart into multiple pieces”)
of the disciplines has intertwined with various other social, political and cultural factors
previously described and further articulated by Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard and other
scholars to help spawn what may now be seen as a pronounced disciplinary, control
based and neoliberal/performative culture existing and thriving in our Universities.
In critically reflecting upon these complex and multiple planes of consciousness, I
gradually came to the observation that something was askew with college and university
education today. From a personal perspective, the central premise(s) put forth in
Consilience (that being the fragmentation of the disciplines) has forced me take a long,
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hard look at my own educational experiences, my current intellectual state of mind, and
eventually at the epistemological dimensions of my past and current students. I became
aware of the various “dys” conditions that affect and infect the contemporary University;
and, I became aware of my own self-conditions and the factors that gave rise to them in
my earlier years. As my interactions with students and colleagues alike gradually
expanded, I realized that up until my entry in the academy when I became enamored with
knowledge and learning in ways that had never before touched my consciousness in my
previous 32 years, I was in many ways like most of my undergraduate students. I was
effectively, for most of my life, suffering from the dysbulia, dysgnosia, dyserethesia, and
dyslogia that proliferated from within the Dysacademia I had been deeply immersed. I
began to notice that far too many university students resembled docile bodies functioning
mostly under the pretext that the purpose of attaining a university degree was primarily,
or resolutely even, for economic and professional success. The inherent and profound
connection between this “fragmentation of the disciplines”, and the corporate
professionalization of the academy that treats students like consumers, and produces
ready made degrees for highly specific industrial means has led me to further investigate
the archaeological underpinnings that give the University its character and collective
voice today.
In noticing that very few of my students possess much of the more historical and
romantic notions of what higher education can do for the intellect, the spirit, and the
individual ontological development (subjectivity), I have come to believe that far too
many students, parents and educators are content with being cogs in the central
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mechanistic devices that drive “human capital theory”, and its production of capable but
docile consumer objects of production (Apple, 1995, p. 39). Lyotard went so far as to
apply his notion of “performativity” to education, whereby the “other” facet of
knowledge (that being its transmission) is now just a “subset of the social system”,
whereby higher education can be perceived as based on the best possible input/output
equation (1979/1984, p. 46-48). Lyotard believes that with regards to education, the
“desired goal becomes the optimal contribution of higher education to the best
performativity of the social system”, with two kinds of indispensable skills created in the
process (p. 48). First, students acquire the specialized skills necessary to “tackle world
competition” as it is locally relevant to the global market, and secondly, higher learning
will have to supply the social system with the skills needed to maintain its own internal
cohesion (p. 48).
Michael Peters extends Lyotard’s critique further by arguing that any analysis of
the commodification of education is not completely clear unless an analysis of what the
“student is buying” is conducted (1995, p. xxii). Specifically, Peters wonders aloud just
“what the student is buying?” Do students and their families think they are purchasing
“the skills of the teacher”, “the program or course”, or the “certificate or qualification”
awarded upon graduation? Pointing out that education might be the only market
endeavor in which the student-consumer actually gets to participate in the production of
the service they are buying, Peters charges that active participation is an essential and
inherent part of the “product” that is being purchased, and without it (active
participation), there actually is no “product” produced, or delivered to the consumer (p.
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xxii). Theoretically, Peters is more correct than not, the student “does” get to participate
in the production of the product they are consuming, but realistically, how many actually
do just this?
It is my contention that the compounding effects of our currently fragmented,
disciplinary-control based, and neoliberal influenced agendas are the primary
prophylactic forces working to prevent and deny students from engaging in the
production and construction of their personal, democratic and subjective educations.
Instead, most students enter the academy with specific goals of gaining an education in
order to improve their social, cultural and class positions, and to ensure life long rewards
as members of the cultural elite. In referring back to Lyotard’s “Spaceship” metaphor for
a contrasting approach to learning and education, those subjects who allow themselves to
become objects deeply embedded in our market based society without investigating their
true inner desires, may instead find themselves occupying what Lyotard refers to as a
“rusting spaceship” (1995).
If adults are often tough and sad, it is because they are disappointed. They do not
listen well enough to the invitation to grace which is in them. They let the
spaceship rust (p. xx).
With such economical motivation and technical foci towards learning as a
consumerist based activity, it has also became apparent to me that these same students are
largely incapable of then producing their own epistemological creations, of meaningful
knowledge synthesis, or of de- and re-constructing complex phenomena, or critical issues
pertaining to our ecological and social sustainability. And in all honesty, I saw in them
what I was now able to see in myself following my undergraduate and master’s
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experiences 10 years earlier—highly and technically trained, but certainly not what one
might call critically educated. Stanley Aronowitz comments further on this observation
in The Knowledge Factory, by acutely distinguishing between true “higher education”,
whereby students are enlightened, transformed, and critically educated, and
“postsecondary education”, whereby technocratic and industrial modes of production
predominate the pedagogy and the curricula (2000). As it regards the other primary
factor of higher education equation, John Michael’s coining of the “technocratic
intellectual” is an apropos descriptor that effectively identifies the professorate as a fait
accomplice in this mess I am calling Dysacademia (2000, p. 2). Obviously, this implies
that higher educators must embrace Michael’s and Giroux’s similar call for teachers to be
critical intellectuals capable of resisting the corporate university and maintaining the
academic values linked to culture, ethics, open thought, and transformation of the self
reminiscent of pre-modern universities.
Together, the various manifestations of “dys” that I have chosen to employ can be
seen as interconnected and interdependent maladies capable of portraying the discourse
of Dysacademia. Just what do these various pathologies of the University add up to when
all is said and done? The professor as Dysacademic? The curriculum as Dyscurriculum?
Higher education as Dyseducation? Or, just general and widespread “dys”? It is my
deepest hope that together, the various dysconditions presented herein as structural and
affective metaphors can effectively vaporize the “University as simulacra” prophecy that
Bill Readings laments by exposing what’s really going on in our modern institutions of
postsecondary training. Interestingly, the metaphorical approach that I am using to
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articulate the many tentacles and subsequent discourse of Dysacademia typifies one of
Michel Serres’ favorite “methodologies” for articulating complex ideas. Because Serres
detests “ultratechnical language” and its inherent power to exclude and inevitably “kill”,
he has become known for his artistic and deft implementation of various poetic and
graceful metaphors and use of otherwise simple terms and language to express complex
ideas and propositions of thought to his readers (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 24).
Although, the various “dys” terms that I have introduced are medically based and
thus, not common knowledge for most, I sincerely hope that my metaphorical use of them
has the affect(s) that I intend. That is, I hope the reader is able to sense and feel my
points, rather than define them, and subsequently that they are able to transfer my
metaphors into their own, subjective and locally meaningful discursive elements that
embody a personal meaning and insight of the analysis presented. Furthermore, it bears
acknowledging that as both the shape and texture of my lived curriculum has revealed
itself to interact deeply with the philosophical musings of Michel Serres, it has
inventively provided me with a multifarious, Harlequin-like patchwork of perspectives
with which to pursue both the living of my life, and the current dissertation inquiry.
Here, medical science, autobiography, cultural studies, and curriculum theory will come
together in a patchwork of thought, analysis and application. In borrowing liberally from
Serres’ motivation when he informs us that “Hiroshima is in everything that he does”
(Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 15) then, I now consider Serres’ inventive, experiential
and chaotic philosophy of education to be part of everything that I do; particularly as it
regards the current inquiry and analysis concerning higher education.
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As the following sections of this text gradually unfold and as I labor to articulate
the various points of my analysis, I intend to continue interpolating, juxtaposing and
taking full advantage of the many extraordinary and profound metaphors, ideas and
perspectives on philosophy, education, knowledge, learning, and life that Michel Serres
has given us in his many creative and Hermetic works. Thus said, a Serresian expression
of thought will be amalgamated throughout my analysis, culminating in an articulation of
possibility and hope that I believe provides multiple and exciting potentialities for the
invention of new, more promising dialectical discourse(s) in Chapter 5. A new discourse
that possesses the potential to displace and disposition the current metanarratives
currently occupying the center of the discourse that is the contemporary University; a
discourse that has the healing powers to dismiss the various dysconditions that shape and
define the current discourse; a discourse that possesses the power to dismantle and
disavow Dysacademia. In the introduction to their forthcoming book dealing with the
many potentials for expanding curriculum theory research and practice, Reynolds and
Webber elaborate on the notion of “dis/positioning” the conversations, on creating
multiple Deleuzian “lines of flight”, and on discovering the new; the focus of which will
be the centerpiece of my concluding chapter (2003).
We wish to distinguish this volume from current models of research and offer the
possibility of refusing them, questioning them and directing practitioners towards
this idea of adopting lines of flight” or multiplicities…It advocates
multiplicity…It is a question of discovering the conditions under which
something new might be produced. This discovery of, or working toward the new
is at the heart of multiplicities and lines of flight (p. 2).
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Moving Towards A 3rd Person, Space & Education
In this vein then, my ultimate goal is to simply create a new, discursive “line of
flight(s)” for curriculum theory and inquiry, as it pertains specifically to higher education.
Chapter 5 will attempt to do just this, to invent a new discourse, a discourse of open
possibility and empowerment, and a discourse that centers the self at/in/between the heart
of the University. Thus stated, my closing chapter will dis/position Dysacademia by
offering a 3rd option, a 3rd curriculum, a 3rd pedagogy, and a 3rd space--a postmodern,
postdisciplinary approach to cultural, social and subjective learning that may prove
capable of critical ontological and epistemological transformation of multiple individual
subjects. In light of this recognition and its profound effects on the (anti)development of
the intellect and self, I propose embracing an educational conception that is more
“postdisciplinary”, in that it reflects and requires Michel Serres’ “multiple multiples”
thoughts concerning the infinite possibilities associated with ways of seeing, hearing,
speaking and knowing (1982/1995a). This counter narrative for myriad freed and open
spaces and possibilities take up the spaces of Chapter 5, a chapter devoted to the
curricular applications of Michel Serres, Gilles Deleuze, and Jacques Derrida. A
curriculum conceived as such dismantles power, disciplinary boundaries, and
homogenous metanarratives and modes of thought that historically work to block
invention and wandering of the subjective self; and instead opens up various and multiple
spaces for thought, knowledge production and deconstruction, transformation and
wandering of the self. A postmodern, postdisciplinary curriculum that works to connect
various modes of thought, all the while respecting the differences and similarities that

74
exist to give shape and form to the respective disciplines, thus creating a fragile synthesis
of thought, or what Serres calls a “syrrhese” (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 122), that is
interlaced with a postmodern sensibility reflective of Lyotard’s observations on
postmodern knowledge from over 20 years ago.
I will synthesize these thoughts into what I am calling a Serresian Curriculum, the
depth, character and potentiality of which will be elaborated upon more fully in Chapter
5. Specifically, I will take advantage of Derrida’s passionate plea for the “right to a
cosmopolitical philosophy” (1997/2002) in order to demonstrate how the interfusion of
popular culture, philosophy, literature, science and postmodern deconstruction can be
used to promote a more critical level of social awareness, ethics, control and power in
issues related to science, the environment, and schooling; regardless of the chosen
academic major or field of study being undertaken by the audience. The potential utility
of such a curriculum will be presented as a potentiality of thought and discourse that
holds promise for deconstructing old and existing discourses, while also allowing for the
generation of new and multiple discourses of difference that can better enable “higher
educated” students to understand how power and knowledge are inextricably linked in
all, if not most of our social endeavors. It is hoped that students enmeshed within a
Serresian 3rd Curriculum will prove capable of recognizing how power, authority and
metanarratives operate, define and constrain most, if not all aspects of their lives, their
being and their ethics. In attempting to theoretically elucidate the middle spaces between
hope and despair, my Serresian 3rd construction can be seen as analogous to the
“dystopia” that Marla Morris laments in her exposition of Curriculum and the Holocaust
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2001, p. 197-198). More specifically, the discourse I have constructed holds the potential
for the creation of undetermined and middle change(s), much in the same way that
Morris’ dystopic curriculum is not a utopian reduction of hope defined by particular and
essential methods and recipes that guarantee happiness and hope for all. Thus
recognized, students educated in the postmodern 3rd University may be truly capable of
inventing their own knowledge, of traveling in and amongst the middle and dystopic
spaces, and of inventing their own authentic and democratic self(s) in profound, untold
and myriad ways.
For me, as is for Serres, this is the ultimate and empowering purpose of education
and the only true sign of intelligence—that being the ability “to invent” (Serres,
1991/1997). In the end, the relative value and utility of my finished theoretical inquiry
will be based upon its ability (or inability) to enable curricular thought and practice to
discern new from old, inventive from stifling and reified; or to produce a language
system or conceptual scheme that is capable of producing a meaningful and enumerative
discourse (Short, 1991, p. 211). In other words, if my research does not cause its patrons
to think, reflect, reiterate, and eventually to invent something else, something personal,
and something ontologically new, it is just that--“re-search”. I’m in a search that I hope
provides the spark for others who are looking to search; I’m not searching for the
essential answer or solution. “Re-search” for Serres is old, copied, redundant, and most
importantly structurally iterative; whereas invention is generative, fresh, noisy, chaotic,
synthetic, entropic and risky; it is here that my mode of inquiry and scholarly intentions
steadfastly harmonize with Serres’ thoughts on productivity and invention (1982/1995a).
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The productive man is born old and dies young. The productive man turns time
around. You will recognize a thinker by the way he goes from truth to
possibilities. As life goes from repetition to negentropy (p. 17).
Inventive thinking is unstable, it is undetermined, it is undifferentiated…it
bleaches the body (p. 35).
If my personal journey continues to be unstable and turbulent, productive and
noisy; if I am successful in treating my ailments, in finding my spaceship, in leaving my
womb; I too will turn time around, I will die young. I can only hope. If my personal
pedagogy proves to be turbulent and negentropic; if I can find the energy and the means
to overcome the Academic dyskinesia; if I’m allowed to lead my students into open, 3rd
spaces; if I can lead my students to the outside, into the rain, away from the shadows of
their youth; if I can teach my students to dance; my students too will grow young, they
will prove capable of treating and preventing their own dyserethesia, dysgnosia, and
dyslogia. Imagine the possibilities…both old and young becoming young together.
Dysacademia can be eradicated; distopia can begin and flourish.
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“CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS A DECONSTRUCTION OF DYSACADEMIA & ITS DISCIPLINARY
PRACTICES
1

discipline n 1 : PUNISHMENT 2 : a field of study : SUBJECT 3 : training that
corrects, molds, or perfects 4 : control gained by obedience or training : orderly
conduct 5 : a system of rules governing conduct
2

discipline vb 1 : PUNISH 2 : to train or develop by instruction and exercise exp.
In self-control 3 : to bring under control (∼troops); also : to impose order upon
The Merriam-Webster Dictionary (1997, p. 221)
“Disciplines provide the rationale for the departmental structure of U. S. colleges
and universities and strongly influence faculty appointments; hiring, promotion,
and tenure practices; teaching assignments; student recruitment and enrollment;
and even accounting practices”, and moreover, “disciplinary frameworks still
organize most faculty members’ understandings and interpretations of information
and experience.”
Lattuca (2001, p. 1)
An Imbalance Of Component Elements: Dyscrasia Sets In
One afternoon in my office a few seasons ago, a colleague of mine and I were
chatting about education, students, scholarship and a myriad other connected topics of
critical mass. This particular colleague was a young, newly indoctrinated assistant
professor with an extremely impressive track record, and affinity for high-level science
scholarship. Nonetheless, he was/is also genuinely interested in other, more holistic
pursuits of knowledge and intellectual engagement, and so we had been regularly, but
informally getting together to exchange academic and philosophical banter regarding
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various social and academic maladies. A few days prior to this particular engagement, I
had given him a new book of Albert Einstein’s various speeches, papers and positions on
education, science, philosophy, economics, war, and everything in between to peruse.
Although at the time I took it to be a fairly innocuous interchange, after reading parts of
the book he expressed that he didn’t know “Einstein was such philosopher!” to which I
replied, “What did you think the ‘Ph’ stood for in ‘PhD’?” After reflecting upon this
short interchange for a day, or so, I later asked him if during his doctoral program he had
“any philosophy or history of science courses”, to which he honestly and rather
sheepishly answered, “no”. As it turned out, this casual and brief interchange of ideas
bestowed additional insight for me regarding the nature of PhD education, scholarship
and the academic pursuit of knowledge; insight that coalesced with my previously
articulated autobiographical experiences in education to formulate much of the impetus
for the current discourse. Essentially, and on a more general level, I began to become
more interested in how it came to be that someone with the highest academic degree
achievable had no formal class work in either the history or philosophy of his parent
field(s).
In order to explicate one of the major etiological factors that contributes to my
central metaphor Dysacademia, discipline, there exists an additional “dys” condition that
begs introduction to the discourse surrounding the modern University curriculum and its
subsequent state of effective utility. Dyscrasia (a morbid condition usually referring to
an imbalance of component elements, Miller & Keane, 1983, p. 347) is a medical term
usually reserved to describe circulatory irregularities in the human patient, but in its
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current usage can be seen to embody the pathologically fragmented and disciplined
condition of a different sort of patient--higher education. Stated as such, dyscrasia is
being used currently to describe the typical 21st Century college educational experience
that is, for myriad historical, cultural, social and political reasons, fragmented,
imbalanced, and disciplined by the disciplines and the surreal borders they construct and
perpetuate. As Lisa Lattuca explains in the introductory sections of her text on
interdisciplinarity, the exponential growth of knowledge in the 20th Century, particularly
in the sciences, reveals how disciplinary cultures and perspectives could discourage and
prevent inquiries and explanations that crossed the socially constructed disciplinary
boundaries (2001).
Disciplines, it now seems clear, are powerful but constraining ways of knowing.
As conceptual frames, they delimit the range of research questions that are asked,
the kinds of methods that are used to investigate phenomena, and the types of
answers that are considered legitimate (p. 2).
And, as disciplines and the knowledge they produce grow, they also become more
complex and eventually splinter into multiple and disparate subspecialties that complicate
and disunite things even further. In some cases, the sub specializations resemble, respect
and connect to their parent fields, and even sometimes cross borders with other
disciplines and sub disciplines; but as time progresses the larger, more realistic practice
that takes place more resembles a comminution of knowledges, languages, and views
with strong ancestral loyalties and genealogical ties that ironically, work to restrain the
subsequent development of non-disciplinary knowledge. Logically then, disciplined and
fragmented education leads to disciplined and a priori delimited ways of seeing and
being in the world, a sentiment best captured by Lattuca’s notion that “the more
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schooling we have, the more entrenched our sense of disciplinarity can become” (p. 1).
Viewed metaphorically on multiple levels then, our modern postsecondary curricula can
be characterized as being dyscratic because of its fundamentally and epistemologically
comminuted disposition (the act of breaking, or condition of being broken, into small
fragments, Miller & Keane, 1983, p. 255), a recognition that’s analogous with the central
premise put forth by E. O. Wilson in Consilience (1998). Because education and the
intellectual pursuits of knowledge and self-transcendence have in effect, been broken into
multiple sub disciplines and technical specializations for myriad reasons then, the overall
(dys) effect can be seen as “an imbalance of the component elements”—dyscrasia.
Academic Dyscrasia: Utterance & Discipline
Historically, genealogically, and archaeologically, academic dyscrasia has many
interrelated factors that require further inquiry and analysis, the most notable of which
being 1) the inherent connections that exist between knowledge and power, and their
subsequent connection to the evolution of disciplinary societies, as brought to our
attention by Michel Foucault (1975/1977), and 2) the strong neoliberal underpinnings that
oblige much of our educational missions today as alluded to in the previous chapter, and
elaborated upon more fully by Aronowitz (2000), Giroux (1999; 2003), and Readings
(1996). Epistemologically speaking, the comminuted and dyscratic Dyscurriculum that I
am articulating can be seen then as an inorganic structural phenomenon that actively and
perfunctorily contributes to a fundamental change in how knowledge is produced,
invented, shared, and dialectically challenged (or not). In using a neighborhood
community as a metaphor in which all the neighborhood parents work together to “keep
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the neighborhood kids in line”, Lattuca laments the evolution of our disciplined and
specialized society (2001).
The growth of specializations parallels the decline of the front porch from which
everyone could survey their territory. Now the more private world of the
backyard deck excludes all but a select few (p. 3).
Exposed as such, the dyscratic state of higher education can thus be seen as an
institutional accomplice in the perpetuation of various metanarratives of authority,
discourses of power, and neoliberal incentives that exists between and amongst the
academic disciplines that constitute higher education. Obviously, the inorganic existence
of dyscratic curricula in the University has the potential for profound and disturbing
affects for its organic constituencies, most notably the myriad restrictions and
constrictions that Dysacademia has had upon the developing ontologies and
epistemologies of both the student body, and the professorate.
In addressing both the genealogical and archaeological factors that have
contributed to the evolutionary development of disciplinary societies, one can’t help but
also consider the rather Derridean “tinted”, and different definitions that Webster’s
dictionary provides for the word, concept, or phenomenon known as “discipline”.
Essentially, the sign discipline must be conceptualized and understood as having
multiple, and very different meanings that effect and depend upon the other, relative to
the particular time and space in which the word is used/viewed/understood. In other
words, “discipline”, like “communication”, is a “performative act” in that it is not
exclusively a semantic or conceptual act, nor a semiotic operation, nor a linguistic
exchange, and defining it doesn’t involve a phenomena of authentic meaning or
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signification (Derrida, 2000, p. 87). Simply put, the use and thus the meaning, of
discipline is contextually relevant, but not predetermined…it is a “performative
utterance” that is different every time it is spoken, written, and analyzed (1997/2002, p.
13). Interestingly, it is this performative difference between discipline as a specific “field
of study”, discipline as “training that corrects, molds, or perfects “, and discipline as
“punishment” that begs a discursive analysis relative to the current discourse surrounding
Dysacademia.
Consilience: Centering & Decentering The Discourse Of Disciplined Knowledge
In Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, Edward O. Wilson (1998) claims that
the extreme proliferation of overzealous and narrow-minded inquiry, characteristic of the
evolution of the different branches of learning in modern times, has caused the various
disciplines to become far too fragmented and specialized for our social well being. In
particular, Wilson points out that the production of knowledge within the arts,
humanities, social and natural sciences has become so divergent and monofocal that
experts firmly and myopically entrenched in their fields are not only largely incapable of
fully understanding the complexity and comprehensiveness of their own discipline
specific knowledge, but also the inherent connections and practical relevancies of each
discipline to others, as well. In effect, Wilson renews the position put forth by C. P.
Snow in The Two Cultures (1964), by contending that the major branches of knowledge
(science and the humanities) have become so divergent that they cannot fully understand
or appreciate the historical foundations, breadth, depth, or complexity of their own
discipline specific knowledge.
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In medical parlance, one might say that learning and the construction of
knowledge have thus become comminuted, or from a physical science perspective that
knowledge has become “atomized”. In short, the average college student now goes to
college or university, not to “become educated” in a manner that reflects intellectual
transcendence and breadth of consciousness, but rather to attain a specialized,
technocratic, and highly disciplined degree. With the modern University all to happy to
oblige aspiring neophytes, the eventual outcome of this process takes the shape of a
disciplined citizenry with a limited cognitive flexibility, and one largely void of the
critical mass historically associated with higher education, with the higher educated. And
as is the case between the professionals and academics within the various disciplines and
pedagogues, the everyday educated person is thus likely denied a more meaningful
knowledge and understanding of the world, its many complexities, and it’ many
interconnected nodes of significance and interpretation (Wilson, 1998).
With rare exceptions American universities, and colleges have dissolved their
curriculum into a slurry of minor disciplines and specialized courses. While the
average number of undergraduate courses per institution doubled, the percentage
of mandatory courses in general education dropped by more than half… Win or
lose, true reform will aim at the consilience of science with the social sciences
and humanities in scholarship and teaching. Every college student should be able
to answer the following question: What is the relation between science and the
humanities, and how is it important for human welfare? (p. 13).
As such, techno-fragmented and non-consilient intellectuals are also seen to be
largely incapable of translating and understanding knowledge from outside their fields, or
the various interconnections and transmutations that inherently and chaotically exist
within the margins of all fields (Wilson, 1998). For Peter Galison, this means that actual
and accessible “trading zones” that may prove capable of highlighting those areas of
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knowledge that are connected and interdependent can’t be realized (1997, p. 803); an
epistemological shortcoming that inevitably, and exasperatingly contributes to a limited
scope and depth of knowledge concerning the object under inquiry. To Galison, trading
zones focus on “finite traditions with their own dynamics that are linked not by
homogenization, but by local coordination”, and represent a localized, “social, material,
and intellectual mortar binding together [of] the disunified traditions of experimenting,
theorizing, and instrument building.” (p. 803). In a dialogical attempt to demonstrate
what he sees as an utter and profound lack of appreciation for the true existence of
epistemological boundary crossing, trading zones, Wilson provides various examples of
social, cultural and scientific issues (the human mind, religion, the environment) that he
sees requiring explicit knowledge of the innate and dynamic interconnectedness of the
humanities and the arts with the different branches of science. In considering such
vexing human problems, Wilson charges that the epistemological and ontological states
of many of our current administrative professionals, policy leaders and politicians not
only mirrors the condition of the different branches of learning within the academy, but
that this recognition should also prove difficult for all those concerned with our social
and ecological well beings (Wilson, 1998).
Every public intellectual and political leader should be able to answer that
question as well. Already half the legislation coming before the United States
Congress contains important scientific and technological components. Most of
the issues that vex humanity daily—ethnic conflict, arms escalation,
overpopulation, abortion, environment, endemic poverty—cannot be solved
without integrating knowledge from the natural sciences with that of the social
sciences and humanities. Only fluency across the boundaries will provide a clear
view of the world as it really is, not as seen through the lens of ideologies and
religious dogmas or commanded by myopic response to immediate need. Yet the
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vast majority of our political leaders are trained exclusively in the social sciences
and humanities, and have little or no knowledge of the natural sciences (p. 13).
Obviously, one can see Wilson’s academic and professional biases in play here,
his ideological proclivity for the natural sciences, and his relative lack of a postmodern
sensibility for seeing “the world as it really is”. Nonetheless, Wilson’s motivation for
crafting a consilient worldview is certainly founded upon the apprehension of a
pronounced (dys) academic narrow-mindedness in many of our elected, public and
corporate leaders. Admitted as such, this consciousness of nonconsilience that Wilson
laments, is pregnant with potential illness and eventually disaster, if it is not adequately
addressed through profound and much need educational, social and cultural changes.
Because of the inherent relevance to Dysacademia and our subsequent dyscratic
curricula, Wilson’s central concern that our academic disciplines have become “islands
unto themselves” calls for an extended deconstructive analysis that may hold promise for
revealing some of the genealogical and archeological factors that have contributed to the
current (dys) state.
Unfortunately though, all is not well in Wilson’s theoretical arguments for a
consilient way to see and understand the world by connecting the various ways of
knowing. As Wilson makes his arguments for a more heterogeneous and open discourse
of knowledge, which ironically would imply a more postmodern, non-centered and
perhaps chaotic approach to knowledge free from a central and domineering hegemonic
authority, he makes (at least) two fundamental and deeply disturbing missteps that reveal
his affinity for reductionistic thinking and modern metannaratives of power. In the final
analysis, these two failings dilute both the strength and potential application of his
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arguments, especially for postmodern thinkers and practitioners. As previously stated,
Wilson goes to great depths to provide specific examples of the inherent and “natural”
interplay and unity of disciplinary knowledge between various historical, social and
human phenomena in an attempt to demonstrate and justify his desire for consilience.
Herein lies Wilson’s first, and perhaps most worrisome ideological blunder. More
specifically, it is not the examples that Wilson uses to make his point that have received
sharp criticism but rather, his subsequent theoretical and structural (or sufficient lack
thereof) analysis. Steve Rosenthal’s “Marxist Critique” of Consilience is quick to point
out that Wilson’s mistakes actually start with his decision to center human nature as “the
unifying concept of Consilience” (1988, p. 1). Additionally, Wilson’s arguments can be
seen to fall short of his goals because he fails to address the many historical, social, and
cultural factors involved in the construction of knowledge, the inherent connection
existing between power and authority, and the postmodern skepticism associated with
univocal perspectives that portray authenticity, objectivity, and realism. A double
derivative of his sociobiological and reductionist heritage, Wilson’s analysis of human
nature as a strictly hereditary and biological phenomenon responsible for driving and
determining our behavior, culture and social practices effectively ignores and dismisses
the capitalistic and disciplinary aspects of human nature that have shaped, among other
things, racism, religious hatred, sexism and war (Rosenthal, p.1). Thus recognized,
Wilson’s reductionist and materialistic approach to human nature, and thus to the
subsequent construction of knowledge, reveals a strategy deeply laced with imperialistic
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and fascist motivations that weaken and diminish the potential impact of his overarching
arguments.
While mistake number one proves to be extremely troublesome for poststructural
theorists because of its essentialist claims to human nature and identity, mistake number
two further draws the ire of postmodern thinkers because of the foundationalist character
of the metanarrative structure he proposes. In drawing up his blueprint for a consilient
approach to knowledge, Wilson directly locates the discipline of biology (“the science of
life”) as the just and deserving center of his consilient methodology (1998).
I say the master problem, because the most complex systems known to exist in the
universe are biological, and by far the most complex of all biological phenomena
is the human mind. If brain and mind are at base biological phenomena, it
follows that the biological sciences are essential to achieving coherence among all
the branches of learning, from the humanities on down to the physical sciences (p.
81).
By centering biology as the focal axis of knowledge, the more heterogeneous and
interconnected counter discourse that Wilson intends to propose is paradoxically
transformed into just another modern, hegemonic discourse defined by one “true center”.
It makes Galison’s “trading zones” operate in and out of, and go through one central port
in order to trade. For Michel Serres, Wilson’s inclination to center the discourse, to take
space, and thus to dictate the language and character of that space, represents a type of
violence; or a metaphysical death in that any type of inclusion automatically produces an
ancillary and reactive exclusion. Or to put it more straightforwardly, Serres believes that
any attempt to permanently occupy space, especially the center space, on the supposition
of authoritative knowing represents a parasitic act of violence; for Serres, “to know is to
kill” (1982/1995a, p. 20). Considered in this light then, the operative definition put forth
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by Amariglio, Resnick and Wolf may be helpful for understanding the complexity, nature
and power of “a discipline” (1993).
A discipline arises in the course of struggles to limit discourses involved in the
production of formal knowledge to a determinate set of objects of analysis,
questions about that object, methods of investigation, and modes of demonstration
of the nature and determinations of (presumably) these same objects (p. 151).
In reference to the current critique then, the more homogenous and interconnected
counter discourse that Wilson intends to propose is fundamentally transformed into just
another modern, hegemonic discourse defined by a true center that affectively denies the
potential energy and voice of other discourses, languages, and spaces. In the end,
Wilson’s blind faith in the biological center of a consilient discourse effectively supplants
one metanarrative in lieu of another--the one he is purportedly attempting to deconstruct
ironically. From a postmodern perspective then, Wilson’s variety of consilience can
actually be seen as structured by disciplinary barriers that can/will/do prevent true
osmotic exchanges of knowledge and ideas across, amongst, and between the various
disciplines. Thus revealed, his theoretical proposition for a more heterogeneous and open
discourse to connect all branches of knowledge can be seen then as contradictory and
antithetical to the postmodern, de-centered and perhaps chaotic approach to knowledge
that he tantalizes the reader with in the early passages of Consilience. Thus viewed, the
postmodern potential of Wilson’s ambitious efforts can be critically exposed for what it
really represents, a modernistic essentialism merely and sadly dressed in postmodern
drag.
Saul Cohen’s analysis of our disciplinary culture illustrates the inherent
contradictions in Wilson’s desires for a “center” of knowledge, while simultaneously
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extending Serres’ concern for epistemological death by acknowledging the difficulties
inherent in striving for a balance “between those energies that contribute to the healthy,
integration evolution of a discipline, and those that lead to its fragmentation” (1988, p. 1).
In addressing this problem Cohen says, the learned society that is the disciplinary body
must “guard against becoming so protective of its organizational territory as to become
an end unto itself, thus abandoning its proper role as the means for achieving the
expressed needs and desires of its disciplinary practitioners” (p. 1). What Cohen seems
to be saying here is that practitioners who are sensitive and open to a more postmodern,
or postdisciplinary approach to knowledge and inquiry are paradoxically faced with a
very complex and challenging tendency to “slip back into” modernist ways of thought by
drawing boundaries, and protecting their turf. An additional and paradoxical challenge to
working outside and in between the disciplines is brought to light by Lattuca, that being
the notion that interdisciplinary work is not credible enough because it is “not disciplined
enough” (2001, p. 3). But as Cohen, Abbott (2001), and Messer-Davidow, Shumway, &
Sylvan (1993) effectively point out, this territorial and predatory tendency is a learned
thing that comes with learning the boundaries and spatial configurations of one’s
disciplinary territory, not a natural or congenital trait as Wilson might contest (MeserDavidow, et. al, 1993).
To focus on the learning of disciplines is to problematize disciplinarity in an
obvious way; the socialization of individuals into disciplines produces them as
group experts, thereby supporting the authority of disciplinary knowledges and
the correspondingly lower status of nongroup members as disciplinary knowers.
If we think of disciplines as (in part) groups with members, it is much harder to
regard them as neutral enterprises wherein minds discover pure truths about
various phenomena (p. 5).
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As a result of these two major ideological weaknesses and misappropriations found in
Wilson’s thesis, numerous scholars have largely dismissed Wilson’s end product citing
its overly fascist, modern, and sociobiological underpinnings; and its subliminal attempt
to replace one authoritative metanarrative with another (Gould, 2003; Rosenthal, 1998).
But, if one temporarily displaces Wilson’s sociobiological tendencies for an “essential
scientific order” and also his modern biocentric metanarrative, perhaps all is not lost from
the actual issue under consideration—that being the disciplinary fragmentation of
knowledge and inquiry, and its resultant impedimentary effect on the acquisition of
critical knowledge. If the various disciplines of knowledge are indeed shattered into a
multiple and contingent archipelago of epistemic cultures, each abounding with their own
languages, modes of inquiry and areas of interest, as Wilson, Lattuca, Cohen, Ford, and
Messer-Davidow, et al. all summarily contest, then it can likely be appreciated that many
academics, educated elite, public intellectuals and service professionals are both working
from within, and trapped inside of distinct and remote disciplinary worlds. Wilson is on
the mark with his critique of the limitations of such disciplinary fragmentation and
specialization, “the best of their analyses are careful and responsible, and sometimes
correct, but the substantive base of their wisdom is fragmented and lopsided” (1998, p.
13).
I for one, concede the criticisms levied against Wilson, and in a manner that
reflects the reconstructive potential of postmodern analysis can displace his ideological
and theoretical shortcomings in hopes of developing a different “line of flight “ for my
subsequent analysis of our disciplined Dysacademia. With this concession firmly in
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hand, I concur with the observations of William Doll (1993), Stephen Jay Gould (2003),
Andrew Abbott (2001), C. P. Snow (1964), Marcus Peter Ford (2002), and most notably
those of Michel Serres (1982; 1995a; 1995b; 1997) in noting that the academic
disciplines have indeed disfavorably hyperfragmented into multiple modernistic
homogenous narratives, all competing for the same space, time and exposure, and
eventually authority and disciplinary power over other forms of knowing. And in a
performative sense, this hyperfragmented disciplinarity also has profound effects on the
disciplining of the various selves that constitute the Academy, the professorate and the
student body, collectively. Thinking in Derridean terms of performativity then, the
discipline that it takes to expertly learn ones’ chosen discipline works to produce an
intensely specialized and proficient disciple of a disciplinary practice that, because of the
discipline required to excel in that discipline, largely precludes one from becoming
disciplined in other disciplines, and in the meantime also inhibits the un-disciplined
extrusion into interdisciplinary and nondisciplinary modes of thinking, seeing, and
knowing that may prove capable of deconstructing the original disciplinary knowledge,
and thus loosening the constraints and affects that disciplinarity has upon the disciple. For
Serres, compartmentalizing knowledge in the modern disciplinary way induces a like
disciplining of the academic pursuit of knowledge, a practice that is stagnating, (de)
inventive, parasitic, and highly suggestive of power and control at work (1982/1995a).
The more classification there is, the less evolution there is, the more classes there
are, the less history there is, the more coded the sciences there are, the less
invention and knowledge there are, the more administrating there is, the less
movement there is…Parasitic growth has brought everything to a standstill. (p.
94-5).
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In Carl Boggs’ analysis, the elite specialists and bureaucrats that have been
spawned from the fragmented education that Wilson and others have described since the
1800s, “comes with advanced levels of industrial development and the rationalization of
social life that accompanies it”, can be represented collectively as “technocratic
intellectuals” (1993, p. 3). Technological intellectuals are a “new class” of specialized
and economically driven experts serving to “legitimate” their disciplines, professions,
associations, and ultimately the smooth functioning of bureaucratic state capitalism and
other forms of our neoliberalist society through the perpetuation of specialized languages,
forms of thought and disciplinary behaviors. Not surprisingly then, techno-intellectuals
can primarily be found thriving in state governments, universities, corporations, the
military, the media, and even the culture industry itself; themselves, all institutions of
power and legitimacy in the socio-cultural and political arenas. Again, the technical
words and subsequent identities that give shape and meaning to technical intellectuals are
problematical for Serres because of their exclusionary power (1990/1995b).
Nearly all technical words are harmful in science and philosophy; they serve only
to separate the sectarians of the parish from those who are excluded from the
conversation so that the masters can hold on to some form of power (p. 7).
In contrast to Boggs’ elaboration of the techno-intellectual, Michael Peters has
worked to articulate an analysis of what he sees as the antithesis of the technocratic
intellectual, the “critical intellectual” (2000, p. 2). Admittedly difficult to describe,
critical intellectuals can be viewed as having lost much of their authority and influence
over what Michaels calls “popular politics” (p. 3). Quite simply stated, “a critical
orientation toward a more general audience on more general topics” represents the
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popular politics that Michaels feels is missing from the “politics intellectuals as
technicians practice” (p. 3). Sympathetically, Wilson argues that scholars and political
leaders alike need to embrace more of a “consilient” approach to knowledge,
understanding, discourse and inquiry in order to address and manage the many complex
problems of our contemporary cultural epoch. For Wilson, “a balanced perspective
cannot be acquired by studying disciplines in pieces but through pursuit of the
consilience among them” (p. 13). This apparent and discursive lack of “critical
intelligentsia” in the public spheres that Wilson, Boggs and Michaels all lament can in
my view, be genealogically linked to Wilson’s central arguments regarding the
fragmentation of our academic disciplines; and as such, provide much of the initiative for
undertaking the current critical inquiry surrounding the Academy today. Thus, the
question now becomes “how did our disciplines come to be so fragmented and
specialized?”
Disciplines & Disciplinarity: Our Academic Crutch
Socially and conceptually, we are disciplined by our disciplines (MesserDavidow, Shumway & Sylvan, 1993, p. vii).
Systems scientist Ervin Laszlo has commented on the awkward social and
professional quandaries that can arise as a direct result of this modernistic development
of disciplinary specialization, in simple terms that most professionals and academicians
might appreciate with candid reflection upon the specific and atomistic epistemic culture
that defines and shapes their “chosen discipline” (1996).
The literary historian specializing in early Elizabethan theater may not have much
in common with a colleague specializing in Restoration drama, and will find

94
himself reduced to conversation about the weather when encountering an expert
on contemporary theater (p. 2).
And as Laszlo points out, modern educational paradigms that are built upon and shaped
by fragmented epistemes result in a construction of knowledge that have been largely
pursued in isolation; a process that effectively presents fragmentary and authoritative
pictures of “reality” to the disciplined pursuer of knowledge. Obviously, this
development hampers the ability of the learned subject to openly pursue and construct
knowledge with depth and integrated breadth; a restriction, that inevitably circumvents
the subjective formation of a coherent picture of the various contextual and local
networks, and organizational hierarchies of knowledge represent a more holistic
appreciation for the complexity and interrelatedness of knowledge (1996, p. 2). In
reflecting upon the dire condition of our now, unnatural world and the subsequent and
urgent eco-challenges that face our cultural epoch, Serres connects Mother Nature’s
illness, and our relative inability to treat them, with our technical specialization culture
(1990/1995b).
It is we who still have a say: administrators, journalists, and scientists, all men of
the short term and of highly focused specialization…we’re inept at finding
reasonable solutions because we’re immersed in the brief time of our powers and
imprisoned in our narrow domains (p. 30).
But if education is/was designed to liberate and transform the self, and to spawn creative
and critical thought for the betterment of society, just how did we become so inhibited
and static? How did we become so disciplined, or as Serres more aptly utters, “inept”?
In Knowledges: Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity, Ellen MesserDavidow, David Shumway and David Sylvan have collected a series of essays centered
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on a critical and multidimensional analysis of “disciplinarity”. For the editors,
“disciplinarity” is not merely the study of what knowledge is produced, nor of specific
disciplines themselves, but rather “what makes for disciplinary knowledge as such”, or
the concern of “the possibility conditions of a discipline” (p. 1-2). In short, the various
scholars addressing the study of knowledge and disciplinarity in Knowledges are
centrally concerned with the discourse that is disciplinarity, and as such, are interested in
“a radically heterogeneous inquiry” that investigates and ponders “a diverse set of terms
and a large methodological repertoire” from various disciplines (p. 3). As it attempts to
critically deconstruct the discourse that is/are the disciplines, to “defamiliarize the
disciplines”, to de-essentialize the disciplines, and to deprivelage traditional notions
about knowledge, disciplinarity can thus be seen to have a profoundly dispersed and
Foucaultian nature (Messer-Davidow, et al., 1993).
It is neither a field in itself nor a metafield in which one can study disciplines. It
is neither the essence of disciplines nor their foundation. Rather, disciplinarity is
about the coherence of a set of otherwise disparate elements: objects of study,
methods of analysis, scholars, students, journals, and grants, to name a few. To
borrow from Foucault, we could say that disciplinarity is the means by which
ensembles of diverse parts are brought into particular types of knowledge
relations with each other (p. 3).
Disciplinarity viewed through a postmodern lens critically attacks the “socializing
practices” that the various disciplines have had upon the construction of the self, and the
various knowledges that define our cultural and historical epoch. In describing
socializing practices as the discursive utility of disciplinarity that has discursive affects
not only on institutions and professions, but also on human bodies, Messer-Davidow, et
al. suggest that students, scholars, and scientists alike are all trained in the work of their
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disciplines, right down to the style and form of reading, writing, and thinking. As a form
of biopower then, disciplines must be seen as “institutionalized formations for organizing
schemes of perception, appreciation, and action, and for inculcating them as tools of
cognition and communication” (p. 7). In a passage that explicitly represents the academic
manifestation of Foucault’s disciplinary societies, while also supporting Andrew Abbott’s
accounts of disciplinary structure (2001), the editors of Knowledges effectively arrive at
the deconstructive heart of their text (1993).
To focus on the learning of disciplines is to problematize disciplinarity in an
obvious way: the socialization of individuals into disciplines produces them as
group experts, thereby supporting the authority of disciplinary knowledges and
the correspondingly lower status of nongroup member as disciplinary knowers. If
we think of disciplines as (in part) groups with members, it is much harder to
regard them as neutral enterprises wherein minds discover pure truths about
various phenomena (p. 5).
The Social History Of The Modern University
This notion of disciplinarity, the discursive centerpiece of the edited collection by
Messer-Davidow, et al (1993) on knowledge, is obviously a Foucaultian tethered
discourse that effectively embodies the performative powers of its root word, “discipline”
in myriad ways and forms that impact, and relate to the current analysis of Dysacademia.
Thus recognized, a discursive analysis of disciplinarity and its performative connections
to Foucault’s analysis of discipline and disciplinary societies must be undertaken by those
intellectuals and academics interested in the deconstruction of the virtual boundaries that
effectively encumber true interdisciplinary thought, and epistemological invention. In
order to do this, to look at how our academic disciplines have become immobilized and
disciplined, requires us then to perform an historical analysis capable of uncovering and
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demystifying the archaeological and genealogical factors that have contributed to the
condition that I am calling Dysacademia.
In Beyond the Modern University, Marcus Peter Ford (2002) laments the future of
our societies and the role that modern universities will/will not have in improving the
outlook of life in the year 2050. In setting the primary concern for his critique of the
modern university that sadly defines our postmodern times, Ford straightforwardly points
a finger at American higher education and accuses the modern university culture of doing
very little to prevent, circumvent, or correct the environmental devastation that is now
seen to be happening before our very eyes (p. 1). In charging that the modern university
is far too involved in economic initiatives and modes of capitalistic reproduction built
upon a consumerist ideology, Ford wonders aloud what role higher education in the West
should play as we confront an expanding human population, estimated to reach 10 billion
by 2050 (2002).
This book looks at the university and asks the question, given the present state of
the world, what should be the primary objective of higher education? One of the
underlying assumptions of this book is that higher education should help make the
world a better place by enabling human beings to live more meaningful and
satisfying lives and by helping to promote social justice and environmental
sustainability. It begins with the critical assessment that the university is
currently failing in this role, having in some ways lost its moral commitments, in
other ways having committed itself to false and destructive modes of thought, and
yet in other ways having made it difficult to know what to think or do (p. 2).
I include Ford’s concerns over our ecological and human futures not to divert my focus
towards ecocentric initiatives, ecoliteracy, or any related sub discourse, although they are
important for all of us, but rather to help illuminate the far-reaching impact that
disciplinary modes of thinking can have upon our global condition and future. This
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passage regarding the modern university’s “postmodern failings” is also central for better
understanding the subsequent historical analysis of the modern university that Ford
expertly provides in order to set up the counter narrative that makes up his book’s
subtitle, Towards A Constructive Postmodern University.
In mirroring my theoretical intentions, Ford first deconstructs the social histories
of the “modern university” that now “actively participates in the breakdown of human
communities and the destruction of the natural world”, and then to avoid being stuck with
the postmodern, relativist, nihilist tag, works to reconstruct an image of a more
postmodern university that “is devoted to strengthening human communities and
mending the natural world, a university that will be a force for good” (2002, p. 4). Ford
is also clear to critique those closest to the university, those that work within it, for failing
to recognize higher education’s shortcomings; an observation that proves extremely
ironic, hypocritical even in that the esteemed and honored “institution of critical
reflection and thought” fails to look at itself in the mirror (2002).
The task of criticizing higher education has been left to those outside the
university—to journalists, pundits, politicians, and others (p. 3).
Furthermore, Ford’s work is extremely relevant to the current exposition because he too
places a great deal of conviction in the academic disciplines’ culpability regarding the
current plight of higher education, and thus too, for our environmental and social futures
(2002).
Academic disciplines are a particular way of structuring thinking that has proved
to be very powerful and yet undermines the very possibility of a coherent
worldview. As long as the university is committed to the disciplinary form of
thinking, the university cannot make sense of the world. Seen through the lens of
academic disciplines, the world lacks coherence and meaning. The various
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assumptions and findings of one discipline are unaffected and unchecked by those
of another (p. 7).
Because of the synoptic value and relevance of Ford’s historical analysis, I will provide a
brief but germane summary of his account of the modern university’s disciplinary
evolution in order to better develop the framework for my analysis of disciplinarity and
its contributions to Dysacademia, and to interrelate this historical account to the
subsequent and coupled conversations regarding the evolution of our disciplinary
societies.
In the interest of pithiness, Ford divides the historical evolution of the Western
university in the last 1000 years into three fundamental categories, 1) the cathedral
schools of medieval Europe, that were essentially extensions of the Catholic Church in
the years 1150-1648, and best embodied by the University of Paris, 2) the nationalistic
universities that saw the initiation of church and state, and thus secular institutions of
higher learning like Germany’s University of Halle in 1694, and finally, 3) the more
modern universities founded upon an economic route to peace and prosperity, such as
America’s University of Phoenix (2002, pp. 22-31). At the University of Paris, the seven
liberal arts (grammar, logic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy) were
recast within the context, and under the ideological umbrella of Christian theology, and
most of the curriculum focused upon the learning of Latin (the language of the Church)
and logic (“highest truths”). So powerful and dominating was the emphasis on theology
at that time, it took longer to become a doctor of theology (16 years) than it did to
become a medical doctor (8), or a lawyer (7) (p. 24).
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In 1648, the “Treaty of Westphalia” ended “The 30 Years’ War”, marking a
noteworthy cultural shift from Christianism to nationalism, in which religious orthodoxy
was renounced in favor of objectivity and rationalism, science, and free investigation. As
such, German took the place of Latin, lectures replaced the canonical texts, and elective
courses were offered that prompted a certain degree of professional freedom for students
to pursue knowledge in personally reflective manners (Ford, 2002, p. 27). Essentially,
the curriculum at the University of Halle, and others soon following was designed to train
German officials and bureaucrats to lead and train others for secular improvements, and
the people of Prussia. Interestingly, the University of Halle is infamous for also granting
the first professional PhD (medicine) to a woman in 1754 (p. 27). Largely under the
influence of the powers of Kantian reasoning, and other modern thinkers of the times, the
nationalistic universities of the 17th and 18th centuries marked the beginning of the
practical and scientific purposes of university education for all of Europe, and the
cessation of theology as the center of the institutional mission.
Prior to the 1800s, knowledge was largely categorized and filtered across the
seven liberal arts domains (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music, logic, grammar, and
rhetoric), and changes in the “English College” replicated curriculum were slow to
materialize (Lattuca, 2001, p. 5). In the 1820s, the University of Virginia and Harvard
University were the first American institutions to develop academic departments, a sign
of things to come for higher education in the intellectually young nation. Meanwhile,
Benjamin Rush and Noah Webster have been identified as being instrumental in pushing
this more objective and practical notion of the modern university in the United States by
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gradually diversifying the curriculum at schools like Harvard, but it wasn’t until a certain
revolution took place that their visions of a nationalistic university would firmly take
hold. The dawn of manufacturing, commerce and engineering that arrived with the
industrialization age in the United States, and the passage of the Morrill Land Grant Act
in 1862 lead to the opening of the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, the first college for
science and engineering in Troy, NY in 1824 (p. 29). The Morrill Land Grant Act
promoted the utilitarian mission that changed secondary education by making way for the
many land grant institutions that now dot our country’s landscape, which primarily
focused on agriculture and the “mechanic arts”.
In the decades between the Civil War and World War I, the newly instituted
“elective system” of the American universities allowed higher education institutions to
better respond to the advanced in occupational training and technology; or in short, to
transition from “general universities to “research” universities (Lattuca, 2001, p. 7).
From this point forward, higher education in the United States became more economic,
personal and commercial as disciplinary specialization and organization gradually
became the desired operational mantra for the University. But it wasn’t until the middle
of the 20th century that secular, state supported schools focusing on practical education
became the dominant form of higher education in the new west. Eventually, World War
II, and the subsequent passage of the American GI bill led to major curricular
transformations, as our country’s leaders worked to address the military, scientific, and
economic shortcomings of post World War II America by “scientizing” and economizing
our various educational models (Ford, 2002, p. 36).
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Today, the modern university (Ford’s 3rd stage) is best represented by the
penultimate example of a neoliberalist-based institution at work, the for-profit University
of Phoenix (Ford, 2002, p. 32). Representing the primary organizing principle of
contemporary society, the University of Phoenix was founded in 1976 as a for-profit
institution, obligated by law to maximize their profits for its investors. Thus defined, the
curriculum of the economy-based institution is predominately developed by faculty and
industry together for “industrial usefulness” (p. 32). In this day and age, practical
education now means learning that can be “reinforced the next day on the job”, and the
emphasis of most if not all curricula has now been shifted towards the production of
human capital to meet the needs of local, regional, national and now, global economies.
Although the University of Phoenix, and other for profit institutions like it, certainly
represent what may be argued as the extreme example of the economization of the
university, many other secular universities in the United States have incorporated the
University of Phoenix capitalistic mantra into their operations; an observation also
articulated in the various works of Stanley Aronowitz, Henry Giroux, and Bill Readings,
most notably.
Disciplinarity Becomes Formalized: Academic Majors & Departments Arrive
In returning to the conversation regarding the evolution of the disciplines, Ford’s
inquiry also identifies one additional historical occurrence that, in his view has had a
major impact on modern, career-oriented universities and their hyper reliance on specific
disciplines for their economic identity and sustainability. According to Ford, in 1910 the
University of Berlin began the tradition of organizing knowledge in terms of academic
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disciplines in an attempt to improve “conceptual clarity” of the various knowledge
domains and intellectual pursuits (2022, p. 39).
Because academic disciplines function as independent units, free from the
findings and operative assumptions of other disciplines and free from the facts of
the real world, their “truths” cannot be contradicted or modified by the truths
uncovered by other academic disciplines or by the events of the world itself (p.
40).
In other words, it might well be argued that the exponential development of specific
disciplines of study so that “a few intellectually talented individuals could pursue
knowledge as a means of spiritual realization“ (p.39) at the University of Berlin has led to
the subsequent proliferation of myriad schools of specialized and technical thought and
professions. Although this may be viewed as a “pro-postmodern” development because
it appears to avoid/prevent the formation of one central and authoritative metanarrative,
this perception is actually an opaque one that holds credence only if subversive elements
of power, legitimation, capitalistic economics and authority can be effectively removed
from their particular discourses, and subsequent modes of inquiry. In the modern
University, save for the few remaining critical and inventive interdisciplinary and
postdisciplinary programs of study that are shaped by permeable boundaries, the highly
comminuted and disciplined disciplines are not readily utilized or visualized as being
equally valuable or revealing “pieces of the puzzle” for the developing of subjective
ontologies and epistemologies. In Julie Klein’s assessment, the University of Berlin’s
innovative efforts bequeathed us disciplines shaped and constrained by “impermeable
boundaries”, that are “generally associated with tightly knit, convergent communities,
indicating both stability and coherence of intellectual fields” (1993, p. 188). Each
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modern discipline has thus been formally and historically disciplined to compete for
authority, power, legitimation, public admiration and resources (both material and
financial) in vain attempts to exert multiple and competing modern metannaratives of
“truth”; each expressing valid and often scientific claims to metaphysical reality and
practical utility. Again, Ford’s account proves effective at describing the double-edged
(performative) sword that haunts the various specialized disciplines (2002).
Academic disciplines, although not without their virtues, function today in ways
that are harmful to the earth and to human communities. The university of the
future will have to organize scholarship and teaching in some other manner (p.
40).
In the modern Dysacademic university, each discipline strives and exists for the
right and the opportunity to discipline its disciples in its ways of thinking, seeing, and of
being; all at the expense of other, different ways of knowing that might allow for a free
and open transcendence of being and thinking. Almost every academic major on campus
today has a highly structured, closed, and predetermined curriculum that students must
follow on their path to “intellectual enlightenment”. The classes that comprise these
highly specialized and ordered curricula (often designed for economic purposes) are
taught by myriad specialized professors in a fragmented and partitioned manner, with
little attention paid to vertical and horizontal coherence, critical analysis, and cross
comparison of the various elements, knowledges, and theories contained within the
curricula. Pedagogies are even altered to “match the course”, and infrequently have the
opportunity to see, think and discuss how the various knowledge fields connect,
disconnect, and challenge each other.
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To Steven Fuller, “disciplines mark the point at which methods are
institutionalized”, and the accompanying disciplinary boundaries that mark off territory
and inhibit traveling amongst the various spaces, “provide the structure needed for a
variety of functions ranging from the allocation of cognitive authority and material
resources to the establishment of reliable access to some extra social reality (1993, p.
126). In a nutshell, this sentiment embodies Serres’ passionate concern for our natural
world and underlies his call for a “new contract” capable of resituating our selves in
Earth’s grand scheme of things (1990/1995b, p. 35). I for one, do not see the
University’s comminuted identity as an example of a critical and transformative
postmodern fragmentation of disciplinary thought and epistemes that can challenge
established hierarchies of power and knowledge; but rather, that the modern University
has multiple, disconnected, and predatory metanarratives of thought adjacent to, yet
separated by prophylactic and impermeable barriers that prevent and hide points of entry,
all competing for “the center” of the educational discourse, and for metanarrative
dominance. Because higher education now seems to rely largely upon a quasi-scientific,
compartmentalized disciplinary and foundational model (behavioristic psychology,
curriculum guidelines, accreditations standards & objectives) fueled by neoliberalist
initiatives and ideology to essentialize knowledge, truth and reality, it is my observation
that the contemporary customer of the educational factory that is “higher education” is
being duly denied her/his epistemological and axiological rights, human potential, and
ultimately, a free, critical and personal existence.
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In brief, disciplinarity embodies the potential and real affects that the inorganic
(the institution) can have upon the organic (the self situated in the inorganic
Dysacademia). For Foucault, the “organic structure” that I am calling Dysacademia can
be characterized by an internal “transformation of structure into character” in which
disciplinarity disciplines the knowing self into a disciplined disciple of a certain
knowledge set and practice (1966/1970, p. 227). And as Aronowitz, Ford, Readings,
Giroux, and others have duly pointed out, the reproductive cycle that “is” disciplinarity is
typically waged on the playing fields of economic and material security, advancement
and productivity for both the sovereign and individual subject(s), alike; a point that has
been introduced prior to this, and one that will be taken up for further discussion in later
sections of my analysis. Thus duly noted, we now turn to the archaeological and
genealogical analysis that Michel Foucault has provided regarding the discourse of
disciplines, and our subsequent disciplinary sustenance.
Disciplinary Societies & Disciplines
In Discipline & Punish, Michel Foucault introduced his readers to the “political
technology of the body”, or for brevity purposes what he called, “biopower” (Foucault,
1975/1977, p. 137). To Foucault, biopower represents a pattern of governance whereby
the subject is no longer governed by something outside the self, some “other”; but rather,
is now governed by the psychologically regulated expectation to exercise the power that
governs the self, most often at the subconscious level (1975/1977).
Discipline is no longer simply an art of distributing bodies, of extracting time
from them and accumulating it, but of composing forces in order to obtain an
efficient machine (p. 164).
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Primarily using the modern judicial and penal systems to articulate his conception of
biopower, Foucault also makes many direct and discrete references to the presence of this
corrective dynamic at work in the military, hospitals, and even in schools. In
contemporary American schools, it can without doubt be argued that the state’s biopower
over the “educated” student is no longer external, no longer an extension of a supreme
and open sovereignty; but rather, a type of internal power that is characterized by the
subjects (students) governing themselves through self-surveillance, behavior
normalization, and passive ontological receptiveness. In setting the stage for their critical
discourse concerning the discipline of accounting, Hoskin and Macve amplify and extend
Foucault’s ideas on discipline in order to identify the various institutional practices that
“engender a disciplinary way of seeing” (1993, p. 29). In particular, Hoskin and Macve
pay particular attention to the binary meanings of discipline that I have provided at the
beginning of this chapter, in order to “play with” the difference between discipline as a
form of knowledge, technology and power, and also with the Foucaultian notions of
biopower and political technology of the body in order to explicate the inherent and
subversive connections found between power and knowledge, and the discursive
connection that the knowledge-power relation has to educational transformation (p. 29).
In expanding upon the performative and binary capacity of discipline, Foucault
differentiates between discipline’s biopower over/on the subject, as has already been
discussed, and the evolution of a much more profound and more metaphysical affective
quality of discipline that permeates most, if not all levels of our society. Here, Foucault
differentiates between the physical, negentropic and solitary locality of discipline
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associated with the prison-industrial complex, and the subtler, yet also more commanding
disciplinary mechanism that he calls the “disciplinary society” (p. 209). Inherent in the
development of our disciplinary society, are several subaltern dynamics that have
profoundly impacted the formation, utility and the social roles of the various academic
and professional disciplines. By introducing the “functional inversion of the disciplines”,
Foucault contends that as our society has moved away from the more corporeal practices
of discipline, the central purposes of the disciplines have evolved from
negative/corrective purposes (like neutralizing dangers, or fixing disturbed populations)
to more positive roles designed to increase the possible utility of individuals (1975/1977,
p. 210). In short, the disciplines gradually began to function as techniques for making
useful individuals; and so they emerged from the outer, excluded margins of society and
gradually took their place as more essential and industrial functions for the overall good
of society. In linking the economies of power with disciplines, and thus with subjective
utilities of those that the disciplines discipline Timothy Lenoir’s account connects to
Foucault’s analysis (1993).
Disciplines are dynamic structures for assembling, channeling, and replicating the
social and technical practices essential to the functioning of the political economy
and the system of power relations that actualize it (p. 72).
Furthermore, Lenoir is quick to point out that discipline has both inorganic and organic
affects, that it is not merely about institutions and professionalization, but above all else it
is also fundamentally and urgently about human bodies. Disciplines produce
knowledge…disciples (bodies) learn that knowledge in a disciplinary fashion…becoming
disciplined in seeing, thinking, speaking, and dreaming about other forms of knowledge
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and invention…thus further contributing to the perpetuation of the disciplinary ways of
knowing that started the cycle (1993).
Disciplines are institutionalized formations for organizing schemes of perception,
appreciation, and action, and for inculcating them as tools of cognition and
communication. At the same time, as embodied practical operators, disciplines
are political structures that mediate crucially between the political economy and
the production of knowledge (p. 72).
In using an archaeological approach to investigate disciplinary power found in our
own higher educational systems, Hoskin and Macve argue that “the first institutions that
were ‘disciplinary’ in this double sense were elite colleges in the late eighteenth century,
where the power-knowledge innovation lay in bringing together for the first time three
educational practices: constant rigorous examination, numerical grading of examined
performance, and an insistent presence of writing by students and around students”
(1993, p. 29). According to Hoskin & Macve, top-level institutions of learning in early
19th Century America took their disciplinary and pedagogical leads from West Point,
which in turn, had copied the methods and curriculum employed at the French Ecole
Polytechnique (p. 31). In 1817 Sylvanus Thayer, the fourth superintendent of West
Point, returned from a research trip in Europe concerning current educational trends and
brought back with him enlightened “ideas” that have since effectively altered the
educational history, character and landscape in the United States. Specifically, Thayer
returned with the notion that a scientific curriculum and a disciplinary pedagogy, based
on “the constant deployment of writing, examination, and grading” were needed for
educational improvements and reform. Upon his return to West Point, Thayer began to
use numerical marks to grade all aspects of learning, and at the same time added a
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powerful managerial dimension that he didn’t find in France—a CEO like presence at the
head of the school system that kept track of behavior and grades from behind closed
doors. Specifics aside, Hoskin and Macve argue that Thayer’s pedagogical and curricular
imports were directly responsible for the evolutionary change in “how” education was
perceived, and thus carried out at institutions following his lead (1993).
Such institutions disciplined students to learn in a new systematic way, under
constant examination for grades; but also they prove to be the sites where new
disciplinary forms of knowledge were pioneered, forms that constitute the basis
for the modern explosion of academic disciplinary knowledge (p. 29).
Today, one need not look very hard or far to see the influences that science and
technology have had upon our various curricula and its central emphases, the
proliferation of specialized academic majors, and economic initiatives and ideals that
characterize our social times—science and technology rule. Perhaps more disturbing for
critical pedagogues and those concerned with the current state of learning, standardized
outcomes, and objective visions of truth and knowledge that now dominate our
educational landscape concerns the role and power that educational psychology now has
in much of our educational endeavors. Social science has been “naturalized” over the last
century (Abbott, 2001), and thus gradually accepted as a standard, core foundation of all
things that are educational.
Concomitant with the development of specific disciplines designed to construct
“useful individuals” for the economic engine of the state, came the double tendency to
increase both the number of disciplinary institutions and to discipline the existing
apparatuses into unique and specialized professional entities (Foucault, 1975/1977, p.
211). Following WWII the burgeoning capitalistic opportunities associated with the
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advancement of science and technology worked in concert with Cold War politics and
economics, and the increasing desire of the social sciences to gain more credibility by
becoming more “empirically objective”, to induce profound social and cultural effects on
the purpose, identity and utility of higher education in the West (Abbott, 2001; Ford,
2002). The net effect of this industrio-social transformation can be evidenced by the
gradual fragmentation of the primary disciplines into many secondary and tertiary ones.
Suddenly, the 20th century college/university student had a plethora of professional
occupations to pursue, mostly under the guise of an academic major designed to meet a
certain economo-professional interest, or perceived socio-political need. Disciplinarity
was born…no correct that…disciplinarity was now fully-grown.
Neoliberal Influences & The Disciplining Of The Citizenry
The inherent and inescapable developments (the functional inversion of the
disciplines and the increased number of disciplinary institutions and professional entities)
that have contributed to the evolution of what Foucault has described as a “disciplinary
society” (Foucault, 1966/1970; 1977), and thus to our comminuted and dyscratic
pedagogical condition, are also inextricably and undeniably linked to another major
cultural phenomenon that now shapes much of the contemporary University’s identity
and operative functions. The increasing proliferation of capitalistic and vocational
influences upon the University’s mission over the last century that have been expertly
described in the writings of Giroux (1999, 2003), Readings (1996), Aronowitz (2000),
and Ford (2002) has dramatically altered the utilitarian intention, visionary focus, and
thus, the pedagogy and curricula of many postsecondary institutions in the United States.
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Together, the various and complex interconnected genealogical factors involved with the
cultural, social and political transformations associated with the fragmentation of the
disciplines and neoliberal influences have worked to drastically alter the values and
purposes of higher education today by shifting the emphasis towards disciplinary
expertise and specialization, specific job training, career mobility, economic
performativity, and legitimacy; and thus away from intellectual transcendence,
democratic and social urgency, and authentic personal freedom. Stanley Aronowitz
incorporates a structural analysis of the shifts in the contemporary University’s function
that reflect the sentiments expressed herein (2000).
The wider social role of the University is now up for grabs. It is no longer clear
what the place of the University is within society nor what the exact nature of that
society is, and the changing institutional form of the University is something that
intellectuals cannot afford to ignore (p. 2).
Perhaps the convoluted and enfolded discourses surrounding discipline,
disciplines, disciplinarity and their inherent connection to Dysacademia can best be
represented with Lyotard’s contentions that “in the context of delegitimation, universities
and the institutions of higher learning are called upon to create skills, and no longer
ideals”, and “the transmission of knowledge is no longer designed to train an elite
capable of guiding the nation towards its emancipation, but to supply the system with
players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its
institutions” (1979/1984, p. 48). Added to this sad and counterproductive industrial
based development is Norbert Wiener’s observation that the pursuit of higher education is
no longer driven by a “deep impulse” to transform and grow intellectually, but rather by
the desire to attain a certain “social prestige” (1954, p. 133). In short, the disciplined
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gdisciplines’ disciplinary training of subjects in higher education, and the subsequent
production of highly trained and disciplined objects of human capital represent the
penultimate example of performative subjectivity.
In “Higher Education, Inc.”, critical theorist Henry Giroux does just that—
critically illustrates contemporary society’s neoliberal impact on higher education by
brining to light the “hidden curriculum” of higher education, and by drawing numerous
uncanny congruencies between Wall Street and the Ivory Towers (2003). Perhaps most
indicative of the subtle, but perceptible transformation, that Giroux is attempting to
articulate can be found in the changing role of the University president (2003).
The new breed of university presidents is characterized less by their ability to take
risks, think critically, engaging important progressive social issues, and provoke
national debates than they are for raising money, producing media-grabbing
public relations, and looking good for photo shoots (p. 170).
But perhaps the most disturbing and penultimate example of the impending neoliberal
conservative threat on academic freedom that both Apple and Giroux highlight can be
witnessed in the administrative desires of James Carlin, a multimillionaire ex business
executive, who as chairmen of the Massachusetts’s State Board of Education, in 1998
launched a four fold attack on the academic professorate (as cited in Giroux, 2003, p.
175). Specifically, Carlin attempted to convince other policy makers and the public that
1) higher education should model itself after successful corporations, 2) that professorial
tenure should be eliminated, 3) that faculty members had too much democratic power to
shape university decisions, and 4) that all “non essential research” not central and
relevant to the market economy of the state of Massachusetts was to be condemned.
Corporatized…neoliberalist…dangerous.
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According to University of Chicago sociologist Andrew Abbott, as American
colleges continued to follow the techno-industrial and consumerist model of growth,
academic disciplines gradually developed as social constructions designed to support
geographical and cultural initiatives (2001, p. 125). The reasons for this evolution are
many and complex, but include the sheer number and decentralized nature of American
universities and colleges, the rapid expansion of faculty positions to staff the institutions
and run the myriad academic majors that have proliferated in the Post WWII era, and the
increasing trend for professional schools to require arts and science degrees as
prerequisites for admission (p. 125). In time, the gradual blending of graduate and
undergraduate programs (on the same campuses), the need for schools to have
comparative advantages (different, specialized programs for recruitment of top students)
for economic viability, the development of professional subsystems (organizations,
meetings, journals, languages, etc.) led to the eventual disciplinary fractilization of the
disciplines into separate and disparate fields of study. Abbott takes this evolutionary
growth a step further by positing that in effect, a dual institutionalization was started
whereby the specialization and alienation of discipline subsystems led to special doctoral
training programs, which in turn, led to highly specialized undergraduate degree
programs that had strong economic ties. This, the college major, according to Abbott is
“the most consequential single disciplinary structure-in terms of extent and impact”
(Abbott, 2001, p. 127). Ironically and amazingly to Abbott, this reflection has never been
the subject of serious pedagogical debate amongst scholars critiquing our higher
education system. Of course it is not very hard to imagine what the primary driving force

115
behind this process might be--the technico-scientific thirst of the ruling corporate and
political classes, and their well rooted financial connections to major degree programs
and other higher education initiatives (Apple, 2001; Giroux, 2003).
Foucault’s second point regarding the evolution of disciplinary societies concerns
the idea that as the disciplinary establishments increased in number, their operational
mechanisms had a tendency to “de-institutionalize”; or rather, to fragment into smaller,
more flexible methods of control by increasing the number of disciplinary institutions,
each with unique and specialized professional identities and utilities (1980, p. 211).
Sometimes, these new, specialized and fragmented disciplines although remaining closed
to blatant external control, added to their internal and specific function a role of external
surveillance in an attempt to increase their mobility, adaptability and credibility to those
outside the disciplines. Thus, as each specific “neodiscipline” gained momentum and
credibility, they also created their own degrees, experts, and codes of behavior,
professional associations, academic journals, research paradigms, and languages. In
short, they created their own professional identities, replete with specific inclusion and
exclusion criteria for anyone who desired entry, or access to the sought after knowledge.
Naturally, the creation of a neodiscipline also necessitated the development of some
structural control, a hierarchy that recognized leadership, and a mission that summarized
its own particular metanarrative; yet this needed to be done without sacrificing the
intellectual and professional autonomy of the infantile association. This actuality may
best be evidenced by the extreme proliferation of local, regional, national and
international professional societies, academic journals, and accreditation agencies
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(especially in the natural sciences) that now exist as separate and disparate entities
underneath the larger umbrella of academia; a discourse that will be taken up for further
analysis in Chapter 3. As a direct result of this Foucaultian recognition of disciplinary
proliferation, the resultant sub-disciplines that have been spawned are now well defined
and shaped by their own particular languages and codes of behavior that together,
embody the construction and survival of Foucault’s disciplinary societies, and their
revitalizing systems of “truth”.
Defined as “a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation,
distribution, circulation and operation of statements”, Foucault’s “regime of truth”
conception is a discursive formation that illuminates the body of practices and the
presence of discourses that a certain society constructs, perpetuates and accepts as true
(1980, p. 133). For as Foucault has reminded us, “there can be no possible exercise of
power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and on
the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through power
and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth” (1980, p. 93). Or
in Lenoir’s interpretation, the inherent and recursive connections that exist between
knowledge-power-discourse-discipline imply that “disciplines are essential structures for
systematizing, organizing, and embodying the social and institutional practices upon
which both coherent discourse and the legitimate exercise of power depend”, not only in
negative/repressive fashion, but also in positive/constructive ways that offer potential for
new truths, and thus for new discourses, as well (1993, p. 73).
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Foucault’s third historical point that has shaped our disciplinary society involves
the redistribution of state-control of the mechanisms of discipline (Foucault, 1975/1977,
p. 213). Although blatant sovereign control was gradually waning throughout the 17th
and 18th centuries, specifically in France in England, control was not being lost
altogether, it was merely being redistributed and reconstituted to different divisions of the
state, via different mechanisms like schools. Specifically, Foucault argues that the
transition from the King’s army to the organization of a centralized police force by the
state was the next step in organizing various branches of local and state control, which of
course was still controlled by the ultimate magistrates, the Kings. In this manner then,
“all the radiations of force and information” spread from the center outward, towards the
circumference and into the various localities under the guise of local control. The major
difference that this aspect of the evolving disciplinary mechanism brought was the
increasing concern for detail that the newly created police force developed. No longer
was the state merely interested in large, gross acts of felonious behavior (murder, tax
evasion) or revolution (political dissension), they were now more interested in
‘everything’ that happened among their subjects on a much broader scale (Foucault,
1975/1977).
It is an apparatus that must be coextensive with the entire social body and not
only by the extreme limits that it embraces, but by the minuteness of the details it
is concerned with. Police power must bear ‘over everything…it is the dust of
events, actions, behavior, opinions—‘everything that happens’; the police are
concerned with ‘those things of every moment’, those ‘unimportant things’. With
the police, one is in the indefinite world of a supervision that seeks ideally to
reach the most elementary particle, the most passing phenomenon of the social
body (p. 213-214).
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Perhaps more problematical than the topographical splitting of the various
knowledge fields into disciplines that Foucault and Ford described, is the discursive
relation between power and knowledge that have resulted as a result of our disciplinary
practices. For Lyotard, the concurrent development of language games and specialized
discourses that have surfaced in modern times as the various fields have become more
advanced, more special, and thus more powerful is a thorny and complex political issue
that bears attention (Lyotard, 1979/1984, p. 8). To Lyotard, language games thus become
responsible for the construction of hypomobile (less than normal movement) and
impermeable barriers keeping those not in possession of the appropriate language
apparatus “out” of the game; which subsequently leads to the “occidental” (knowledge
and power being two sides of the same question) development of the “knowledge-power”
duality that dictates “how” knowledge is generated, “what” knowledge is worthy, and
“who” gets to make knowledge decisions (p. 9). In effect, “power seems to be what
changes or maintains disciplinary boundaries, thus advancing or preventing new
knowledge production” (Messer-Davidow, et al, p. 12). Inevitably, the postmodern
awareness that power and knowledge are inextricably linked to each other, and are thus
largely constructed and controlled by socially constructed disciplinary practices leads to a
concomitant recyclable production and regulation of knowledge and authority that
parasitically feeds off of various language games. Timothy Lenoir elaborates further on
Foucault’s “discourse as a political commodity” as it pertains to disciplinarity by
connecting elements of structure, control and discipline into a coherent exposition of his
analytical purpose (1993).
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It is this aspect of control and policing, not in an external or repressive sense, but
rather through the internalization of patterns of discourse, structures of
knowledge, and modes of practice to which I want to relate the present discussion
of discipline. If my interpretation is correct, disciplines are essential structures for
systematizing, organizing, and embodying the social and institutional practices
upon which both coherent discourse and the legitimate exercise of power depend
(p. 73).
Hoskin & Macve (1993) have analyzed the meaning and roles that disciplinary language
has had upon the practice and learning of disciplinary knowledge, and thus upon the
formation and sustenance of the related discourses that shape and characterize the
disciplines and their disciplinary professionals. In their analysis, two principles are
always at work in modern power systems. The first, Grammatocentrism, conveys the fact
that “power and knowledge become increasingly exercised through writing”, while the
second, calculability, infers that everything is subject to constant examination and
grading (Hoskin & Macve, 1993, p. 32). In a disciplinary society, both inorganic
institutions and organic subjects are grammatocentric, or centered on writing in a world
where the written word takes precedence over the spoken word. J. H. Miller has
elaborated upon the inherent power of the written mark to create a communicative force,
a notion that resonates strongly with Foucault’s disciplinary body and with
grammatocentrism. According to Miller, written marks have the performative effect of
creating a secret transference from meaningful marks to a physical force, an event that
has the double power to constrain and invent (2001, p. 90). Constraining in that the
written word too easily becomes accepted as an authoritative utterance, or “T”ruth,
inventive in that it offers the potential to also open up new thoughts, words, and
expressions of “t”ruth for the person making the mark. In returning to disciplinary
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grammatocentrism, disciplines make their marks by exerting their truths, their versions of
reality, and their “T”ruths in various media, texts, accounts, analyses, evaluations,
budgets, and other objective forms that serve as the center of the educational endeavor
designed to reproduce disciples of the discipline. And as Lenoir states, the performative
aspect of discipline can indeed be positive if new utterances, voices, and visions are
allowed to sprout from within the scope of disciplinary practice, and this does often occur
on various levels and in various places; but it is more common and recurring for the
negative power of discipline to dominate by preventing and preempting the open
invention of new, creative modes of thought and action. This, the preponderant existence
of the negative aspects of disciplinary practice is what motivates the current analysis.
Managerialism Takes Over The Ivory Towers
Educationally, the increasing disciplinarity of our system has combined with the
increasing influence of the social sciences on our pedagogy and curricula to construct the
idea of calculability, the cloak that hides the invisible technology of the mark.
Calculability, according to Hoskin & Macve, doesn’t “just put a number on performance;
it puts a value on you, the person”, it provides a measure of success, of objective change,
and theoretically of learning (1993, p. 32). In this regard then, the central question for the
disciplined self, as well as for the various disciplines becomes “how does one prove
him/herself”? With the performative power of accountability…by performing well and
often…by being objectively evaluated and documented by those in control, and of course,
by the self. Thus is born managerialism, an amalgamated expression of
grammatocentrism, calculability and accountability that is most often carried out as
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“action at a distance” (Hoskin & Macve, p. 32). Managerialism’s subsequent effects on
the fundamental educational utility of the University have been elaborated upon in great
detail by Bill Readings (1996), Stanley Aronowitz (2000), and Marcus Peter Ford (2002),
the central points of which have been presented in previous sections of the current text,
but the poststructural underpinnings of this concept requires further scrutiny.
Managerialism is grammatocentric in that it is perpetually accomplished with a
continual and ordered set of written directives, truths, and languages that shapes its
discourse and associated metanarratives, and it observes the notions of calculability and
accountability because it is always concerned with examining and grading the subjects
and objects of its production (student tests, papers and reports, and presentations,
manuscripts and teaching of the professorate). Obviously, grammatocentrism brings to
mind the poststructural analysis that Foucault and Derrida have performed on language,
the games they work to construct, and the overall structure of signs that shape and define
our knowledge and interpretation. In The Order of Things (1966/1970), Foucault spends
a great deal of time and effort attempting to explicate the connections that have evolved
between the sign and the signified, and between the different levels of language that
history conceals. According to Foucault, the 17th century initiated a change in the way
the language was both used, and understood, because prior to this point the arrangement
of signs was a binary process and thus defined as the “connection of a significant and a
signified”. Leading up to the Renaissance period, language was understood on three
interrelated and discursive levels, all based upon the single being of the written word, 1)
in its raw and primitive being as a written expression of marks, a unique and absolute
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layer of language, 2) commentary, “which recasts the given signs to serve a new purpose”
and exists “above” written language, and 3) the text, “whose primacy is presupposed by
commentary to exist hidden beneath the marks visible to all” (p. 42). However, the end
of the Renaissance snuffed out this complex interaction of elements because of two
evolutionary events that would shape the formation and dissemination of knowledge for
years to come, and forced the knower to ask, “How a sign could be linked to what it
signified?” (Foucault, 1966/1970).
Because the forms of oscillating endlessly between one and three terms were to be
fixed in a binary form which would render them stable; and because language,
instead of existing as the material writing of things was to find its area of being
restricted to the general organization of representative signs (p. 42).
The classical age of the 17th and 18th Centuries thus saw the disappearance of the
“profound kinship of language”, and language became nothing more than representation
or signification, the seen and the read were no longer interwoven. Things became
simpler, more ordered, and more rational during these times; “the eye was thenceforth
destined to see and only to see, the ear to hear and only to hear” (Foucault, 1966/1970, p.
43). During the Classical Age, in which science and Cartesian thinking dominated the
intellectual landscape, language only had value as discourse, and mystical uncertainty
was frowned upon; representation meant everything, and everything had its place in a
rational order of things, language gave signifying functions to things, not knowledge (p.
59). As language continued to be constructed through disciplinary modes of inquiry, and
as science continued to exert its epistemological dominance on other forms of knowing,
the social construction of knowledge began to become increasingly fragmented as each
discipline gradually and separately constructed their own discursive language games,
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signifiers, signs, and eventually, separate and competing regimes of truth. Timothy
Lenoir summarizes this historical process and connects it to the current exposition of our
disciplinary society, by describing it as a “discursive formation” in which the
“historically conditioned system of representation” can be best understood with the
realization that objects and concepts were socially coproduced in discourse, and did not
have an a priori existence that defied language (1993, p. 74). Thus noted, the Classical
Era’s penchant for creating essential signs and marks with an assumptive historical and
natural pre-existence provided the foundation for our understanding of a natural and
ahistorical world of knowledge. Naturally, the move by modern age Universities to
promote and promulgate disciplinary specific knowledge only made matters worse, as
multiple languages, discourses, and metalanguages burgeoned and competed for political
power and epistemological authority in the Western world. And, as Foucault points out,
this a priori assumption of knowledge and truth had (has) an extremely commanding
effect on the construction of knowledge, the intellect, and eventually the self
(1966/1970).
This…delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines the
mode of being of the objects that appear in that field, provides man’s everyday
perception with theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can
sustain a discourse about things that are recognized to be true (p. 158).
In effect then, grammatocentric managerialism founded upon language games and
discursive formations have taken over the Academy and its disciplines on many
interconnected and interdependent levels—most notably, the design of the curricula, the
production and advancement of scholarly knowledge (whose knowledge, what
knowledge is of most worth, what counts as knowledge?), the teaching and learning
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experiences (just what are “best practices”; when is learning complete?), and the
performance appraisals of the professorate (just what is “effective teaching”?) by
dictating the language and marks used, and by setting a certain order of things. Or as
Hoskin & Macve suggest in their piece on disciplinarity in the field of accounting, the
explicit materialization of managerialism in the Academy today has led to what they call
grammatocentric panopticism; an apt Foucaultian extraction that effectively describes the
political commodity that shapes and characterizes the modern University, and a term that
will be taken up for further analysis in the next chapter on control societies and
accreditating procedures (1993).
By extension of the simple originating practices in administrative coordination,
managerialism can know and control the furthest reaches of organizational space
and actively construct new scales of organization complexity and size; at the same
time, it penetrates every tiny corner of organization (p. 33).
The Capitalization of Knowledge: Blurring The Lines
Obviously, the precise depth and breadth of disciplinarity’s effects have/will/do
vary between, and amongst the various disciplines of the academy. In general, and I say
this with sincere humility, the natural, technological and harder “social” sciences have
experienced the most pronounced neoliberal-disciplinary effect(s), while the arts,
humanities, and “softer” social sciences can arguably be seen to have been less affected.
That presumed, Etzkowitz & Webster’s articulation of the academy’s “2nd revolution”
bears inclusion into the current discourse because of its pertinence to the performative
and neoliberal arguments being made currently (1998, p. 21). According to their
analysis, the medieval University’s first large-scale evolutionary change occurred in the
Post WWII days when government sources became the primary means of financial
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support for the Academy. Today’s University however, is undergoing its “second
revolution” in which “academic-industrial relations and the growth of commercialization
of academic science have become major items on any science policy agenda” (p. 21). In
a nutshell, the 2nd revolution has built upon the first revolution and can be represented by
the translation of research findings into intellectual property, marketable commodities,
and economic development initiatives—the capitalization of knowledge. This synoptic
statement in the Introduction of Capitalizing Knowledge highlights their central thesis,
one that resonates strongly with the current articulation of Dysacademia, as well (1998).
In particular, universities and firms have become more alike in that both are
involved in translating knowledge into marketable products, even though they still
retain their distinctive missions for education…These relations, formerly the
special interests of a small coterie of academic institutions and firms, have formed
the basis of a general model of how to create knowledge and wealth
simultaneously in the late twentieth century (p. 8).
To be clear, Etzkowitz, Webster, and Healey are not arguing that this revolution is
new, or that it can be pinpointed to a specific time or place in our historical chronology,
but rather, that the critical issues requiring a deconstructive discourse now reside in the
recognition of the “intensification of this process” and the “increased reliance of industry
on knowledge originated in academic institutions” (1998, p. 2). In fact, the authors go on
to say that because the stakes are so high with the corporatization of knowledge, that its
effects and manifestation have now become so prevalent and diffuse amongst the various
types of institutions, that even liberal arts professors and administrators have become part
and parcel of the game. In what was once considered a “linear model” for the flow of
knowledge, academic scientists produced knowledge for the distribution and
consumption across the various niches of society, including the private/corporate sector.
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Now however, the model can be seen as one being more “spiraled”, with a reverse flow
from industry to academia. This drastic change in knowledge production roles thus
induces an iterative effect in which “industrial innovation opens up new basic research
questions, suggesting academic involvement in industrial innovation enhances the
performance of basic research” (p. 6).
Although there appears to be some data suggesting that academics with industrial
connections publish more than their peers without like support and resources, the spiral
models of academico-industrial relations is much more complex and multifarious than it
may appear on the surface. Specifically, the myriad influences that industrial and
corporate America have had upon the University have combined with the ever decreasing
public support from governmental sources to produce debilitating, conflicting and
compound affects on the mission of higher education, and thus, its social and cultural
utilities. Academic scientists’ efforts and workloads are now regularly and acceptingly
centered on foundation work, patent development, consulting, product R & D, and other
economically based initiatives for the production of knowledge deemed valuable and
vital by private, outside forces. Perhaps most notable among the secondary, domino-like
effects of this revolution, at least as it pertains to the current discourse anyway, is the
increasing specialization required by “capitalized academics” in order to meet the
economic and technological needs of corporate America (in contrast to the social, ethical
and cultural needs, which needless to say, are typically not as linear, and disciplinary
specific as product development). For Etzkowitz, Webster, and Healey then, Capitalizing
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Knowledge is intended to convey the economic and symbolic processes that now govern
the modern Neoliberal University and its constituents (1998).
It refers to the translation of knowledge into commercial property in the literal
sense of capitalization of one’s intellectual (scientific) assets; more generally, it
refers to the way in which society at large draws on, uses, and exploits its
universities, government-funded research labs, and so on to build the innovative
capacity of the future (p. 9).
Chaos of Disciplines: Specialization Becomes The Norm
In Chaos of Disciplines (2001), sociologist and academic scholar Andrew Abbott
discusses and analyzes the specific history, development and current condition of the
social sciences, and then applies his discourse to the relative state of other academic
disciplines. Chiefly, Abbott lays blame on the fairly recent development and reliance
upon the specialized PhD—academic major reproductive cycle, and the standard
emphasis on academic majors and all of their financial and administrative underpinnings
as being the primary disciplinary structures responsible for preventing a true, interstitial,
or consilient curriculum (2001, p. 127). As such, it can quite easily be argued that many
of today’s college graduates merely symbolize a departmentalized, specialized and highly
technocratic “product” that has been sold a bill of goods, an object that has been
subsequently duped into believing that they have paid for, and received in full the tools
and knowledge necessary to create a substantive and critical ontological and
epistemological foundation. A foundation that has traditionally been intended to provide
the means necessary to transform each participant into active and productive citizens in a
democratic, postmodern society, rather than a foundation of critical and open
epistemological and ontological awareness and invention. In arguing for a more
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epostmodern and poststructural approach to the production and dissemination of
knowledge, Julie Klein comments on the effects that a fragmented disciplinarity have had
upon the “higher educated masses” (1993).
As disciplines have differentiated into increasing numbers of autonomous
subunits that train practitioners and provide specialist identities, goals, and
techniques, only a few departments now claim to represent fully the range of
specialties categorized under a single disciplinary label (p. 189).
Abbott, a self professed “eclectic”, uses his professional experiences wherein he
has attempted to eradicate the intellectual boundaries between interpretative and
positivistic work in sociology and kindred fields as his central them for the Chaos of
Disciplines. Although largely based on sociology and the other social sciences, Abbott’s
work regarding the history of American academia and its industrial, economic,
intellectual and social roles in our society shed considerable light on the current status of
today’s academic utility. In Abbot’s words, the aim of this particular text is more general
than sociology, in and of itself (Abbott, 2001).
While a principled defense of eclecticism and indeed of a certain form of
relativism is the personal aim of the book, understanding recent developments in
sociology is its substantive one (p. xii).
Abbott is clear to elucidate that he’s not intent on challenging the foundational
uncertainties of epistemologies (“there is indeed not one sociology, but many”), and
seems to intentionally avoid an immersion into the development and/or perpetuation of
the grand metanarrative argument, but does set out to challenge the way scholars in his
field interact (Abbott, 2001, p. 4). In his view, too many sociologists betray a common
pattern, or a “universal knowledge upon whose terrain the local knowledges wander”, and
it is this behavior Abbott contends, that prevents meaningful and productive
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epistemological cohesion or mutual understanding (Abbott, p. 4). To be clear, Abbott is
not advocating a marginilization of sectarian sub disciplines or alternative
epistemologies, he is merely calling for his colleagues to pay more attention to the larger,
but implicit framework that such local knowledges end up making together. Knowing
this, it is easy to see how Abbott’s interests concur with those of the philosopher of
science Steve Fuller, as he works to deconstruct the disciplinary boundaries that constrain
and define science. For Fuller, “social epistemology” characterizes the paradigm he
works out of because of his fundamental contention that “disciplines mark the point at
which methods are institutionalized, or, so to speak, the word is made flesh” (1993, p.
126).
Thus said, Fuller, like Abbott, studies the construction, maintenance, and
deconstruction of disciplinary boundaries because they provide the performative structure
needed for “a variety of functions ranging from the allocation of cognitive authority and
material resources to the establishment of reliable access to some extra-social reality” (p.
126). Academic disciplines and their offspring, professional associations, have all been
socially and historically constructed and formed by cognitive authority, language games,
marks, and rules of order that govern the production and dissemination of knowledge, the
legitimation of the discipline, and the perceived economic utility of the respective
disciplinary/professional production. Foucault looks at history and its role in “giving
place” to analogical organic structures like disciplines, and rather than looking at history
simply as a linear occurrence of happenstance, identifies it as “the fundamental mode of
being of empiricities, upon the basis of which they are affirmed, posited, arranged, and
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distributed in the space of knowledge for the use of such disciplines or science as may
arise” (1966/1970, p. 219). In situating science (in particular) as a discipline sans an
ahistorical essence then, Fuller suggests that the strategy for subverting existing
disciplinary structures is to “show their long-term lack of discipline”, their ahistorical
essence, and lack of “natural” foundation (p. 127). Likewise, it is Abbott’s contention
that any discipline can actually be represented by self-similar fractal patterns and chaos,
and that there is actually much less to disagree about amongst, and between the different
disciplines that are competing for metanarrative authority. Or in Fuller’s terms, since
philosophy has shown that “there is no epistemically privileged way of conferring
epistemic privilege”, the provinces of possibility are open for subsequent deconstruction
and reconstruction of knowledge (1993, p. 127).
Presented from the ground up then, from the perspective of the individual
disciplines, Abbott calls for a curriculum that has less boundaries and one that illuminates
the existing fractal connections between different types of knowing; an idea that will be
extended in detail in Chapter 4. For Julie Klein, the ability to engage in “boundary work”
is a pre-eminent theme in the studies of disciplinarity, and as such represents the
opportunity(s) to cross, deconstruct, and reconstruct the boundaries that artificially
separate one discipline from another (1993, p. 186). By “permeating” across and through
the margins that have fragmented disciplinary groupings, taxonomic categories, and
larger institutional constructs, the wandering and permeating self can render inoperative
the power that discipline has on the social production of knowledge, and thus work to rewrite and fragilely reconstruct the various disciplinary histories and the status of
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discipline as a category of knowledge (p. 186). By recognizing and accepting the
poststructural contention that disciplines “don’t really exist” in the natural world, or in
some pre-compartmentalized a priori natural history, disciplinarians must also accept the
idea that all disciplines are in Lenoir’s words, just a “discursive formation” that changes
over time. Viewed as such, cross/inter/post disciplinarity works from the premise that
there exist multiple spaces within and amongst the various disciplines for “cracks,
blurring, and crossing” (Klein, 1993). Accepted as such, the disciplined disciplinarian
must also realize the paradoxical nature of the disciplinary structures that govern the
production and dissemination of knowledge in the various academic and professionals
fields. Klein addresses this point directly in asking, “what counts as a discipline?”
(1993).
Close scrutiny of epistemological structures reveals that most modern disciplines
embrace a wide range of subspecialties with different features. Unidisciplinary
competence is a myth, because the degree of specialization and the volume of
information that fall within the boundaries of a named academic discipline are
larger than any single individual can master (p. 188).
In like fashion, Abbott subtly plays with the dilemmas associated with
postmodern debate by calling for the development and progress of alternative voices and
knowledge (local and smaller knowledges) on one hand, while simultaneously cautioning
against knowledge becoming, in effect “re-disciplined”. Because Abbott feels that a
divergent and fragmented epistemology risks losing sight of any relation to the bigger,
larger framework of our social and human conditions, his arguments for a more chaotic
yet quasi-connected approach to knowledge can be seen to effectively mirror the
consilient notions put forth by Edward Wilson (Abbott, p. 5).
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My interest in that larger implicit framework is both theoretical and practical. On
the one hand, I feel that an understanding of it will clarify the relations between
various subsets of social science and sociology. Knowing the framework
simplifies—perhaps even explains –those relations (p. 5).
As Andrew Abbott has articulated, the economically induced proliferation of
specialized and myriad PhD programs in the last 20-30 years has only compounded the
evolutionary fragmentation of specialized disciplines, and their offspring microdisciplines, even further. When combined with the various ingredients that have given
rise to disciplinarity and the metaphysical restraints associated with disciplinary
boundaries and the discipline, itself a profound “stasis” can be witnessed in the Academy.
This stasis then, is a direct result of the disciplinary practices that form the discourse of
disciplinarity, and as such, often and readily prevent the disciples from moving into new,
unexplored and unmarked spaces that may prove advantageous for the production of new
non-disciplinary knowledge and being. Sadly then, the disciplinary nature of this
disciplined stasis gradually becomes synonymous with safety, security, and comfort; a
state of consciousness that often precludes one from venturing outside the space for fear
of losing the original space. Michel Serres captures this paradoxical moment best by
informing us that although invention and wandering may best represent the definitive
exemplifications of intelligence, and thus the true path to authentic learning, he also
points out that when one vacates one’s space and gets too far away from the center,
he/she is doomed to lose one’s space (Serres, 1991/1997).
The Discursive Power Of Space: Taking Space & Preventing New (Inter) Spaces
Thus perceived, drifting away from the center space that “is” accepted, normal
and disciplined knowledge brings with it the risk of being excluded from the safe space
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that is already being occupied (within a discipline); of not being considered, being
ignored by those who subsequently hold, or take the space. Only the brave and foolish
leave the sacred space that “is” disciplined already, only the erudite. Of course, the
sacred spaces that the various disciplines occupy require the continual perpetuation of the
discourse that has allowed them to originally take and hold the particular authoritative
spaces; the various metalanguages, codes, marks and metanarratives that have worked to
define and shape the discourse must be reproduced. The power-knowledge connection
must be continually reconstituted with the production of new, useful knowledge that
further legitimates the discipline that produced the knowledge. And too, the occupied
space(s) must be legitimated, credible, and accountable for the metanarratives that it
possesses and disseminates. How better to remain connected to the center than by having
a certain level of “external surveillance”, membership, and belonging that legitimates not
only the professional positions that occupy the space, but the disciplinary infrastructure
that supports the respective professions, too. New and existing disciplinary associations
like schools and professions, generally don’t desire to be overtly controlled by sovereign
forces representing them, for it will inevitably squelch the disciplinary production of
disciplined knowledge, yet they don’t necessarily want to set themselves adrift on the
margins of society either, and risk losing their occupied space. Thus recognized, the
maintenance of a disciplinary society also requires “some” element of control—
grammatocentric panopticism.
In the discursive process that governs the economic production of knowledge
then, disciplinarity can be seen to marginalize the potential “internodal” inquiry and
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mobility that Abbott (2001), Klein (1993), Wilson (1998), and others call for, while
simultaneously preventing unique, local and personal constructions of knowledge that are
capable of providing a material contextuality, subjectivity and partial objectivity for each
individual consumer/practitioner. From a disciplinarity perspective, “the genealogical
insight offered here is that knowledge does not grow naturally but is selectively produced
in order to realize socially defined goals”, and that “disciplines, as arising from and
involving material practices, are contingent organizing schemes that distinguish knowers,
knowledges, and truths” (Messer-Davidow, et al, p. 7-8). In the end, perhaps it is the
Lyotardian language games that best systematize and organize our society; while at the
same time also characterizing and perpetuating the disciplinary fragmentation of
knowledge that started in the Classical Age. If this is true, and it is obviously my intent
to present the case that it is, the disciplinary comminution of knowledge will inevitably
lead to an intellectual ineptitude of sorts, one that renders E. O. Wilson’s higher
education challenge a formidable obstacle for educators and those concerned with our
social and cultural well being, alike.
Lyotard has deconstructed the innate connection that he sees existing between
science and cultural power by reminding us that scientific knowledge “does not represent
the totality of knowledge”, but rather that it ”exists in conflict and in addition to other
narrative ways of knowing” (1984, p. 7); a notion reinforced by Timothy Lenoir in his
piece on “The Disciplining of Nature and the Nature of Discipline” (1993). In
considering Western culture’s hyper reliance and blind faith in scientific knowledge in
combination with the perception that other forms of knowing have been marginalized and
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repressed because of their perceived subjectivity and minimal economic value, one might
wonder where this situates our current society. Lenoir pins the source of this dilemma on
the power of discursive formation (1993).
The discursive formation is, accordingly, a historically conditioned system of
regularity for the coexistence of statements. Configuration, coexistence, and
grouping of statements are crucial to the discursive formation. In Foucault’s
terms, it is not through reference to some object anterior to the discursive
formation that statements acquire their meaning. Objects and concepts are
coproduced in discourse (p. 74).
As is the case between many contemporary professionals and academics across
the disciplines that have become specialized experts in their respective fields, the
everyday educated person is thus both an object and a concept produced by the discourse
that is disciplinarity. Being denied a more meaningful episteme and understanding of the
world’s chaotic culture, its many structural and organizational complexities, and its many
interconnected nodes of significance and interpretation both within and outside the
various scientific disciplines, the contemporary educated elite has been coproduced by
the combined effects and affects of disciplinarity and neoliberalism. If this notion that
nature is indeed constructed by the disciplines and by those that work within them is to be
embraced, then knowledge must be viewed as more than just information, more than
objectively testable material, and much more than mere fragments or sound bites from the
various fields that purport to have the objective version of reality. In a Lyotardian vein
then, perhaps we must more critically embrace the sentiment that since we are living in
postmodern times, we must therefore address knowledge in a more complimentary
postmodern manner. Thus stated, this exposition will be the focus of Chapters 4 and 5.
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A “university as corporation” discourse can thus be seen operating as a
conglomeration of effects working dioptrically between society and the university, in
which corporate/neoliberal influences have combined with academic and professional
disciplinarity, and the promulgation of a Foucaultian disciplinary society to result in
Dysacademia in the Ivory Towers. Understood as a direct sequalae of neoliberal
machinery that characterizes our postmodern economic, social, cultural and political
conditions, and seen as a condition that feeds openly off our current disciplinary structure
in order to meet the “supply and demand” needs of our economy, Dysacademia has
become its own discursive formation. Henry Giroux’s analysis of the neoliberalist
agenda, and its technocratic effects on higher education, the student-consumers, and thus
society at large sympathetically reflects the concerns put forth by other scholars
concerned with our social coherence (Giroux, 2003).
In the neoliberal era of deregulation and the triumph of the market, many students
and their families no longer believe that higher education is about higher learning,
but about gaining a better foothold in the job market. Colleges and universities
are perceived—and perceive themselves—as training grounds for corporate berths
(p. 167).
One evolutionary byproduct of the disciplinary-neoliberal discursive formation that can
be found in contemporary academic institutions has been the gradual and pronounced
production of educational technocrats (itself a modernist concept) that values specialized
expertise and technique over a broader, wiser and more holistic approach to knowledge
and life (Doll, 1993, p. 24). In contrast to our “uniquely powerful and powerfully
unique” disciplinary system (Abbott, 2001, p. 128), European university systems
developed intermediate institutions to help structure the larger interactional fields of the
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university because they realize that most complex interactional fields tend to break up
into clusters of entities that develop internal identities. This recognition thus provides a
better small framework-large framework platform for students, who are then able to see
and connect the two frameworks with a more consilient perspective and understanding.
Even Albert Einstein expressed concern with the growing trend towards overburdening
our young students with specialized knowledge. To Einstein, highly specialized and
technical education, if not countered with diversity and depth, would preclude a more
well-rounded and harmonious enlightenment (Einstein, 1936/1982).
I want to oppose the idea that the school has to teach directly that special
knowledge and those accomplishments which one has to use later directly in life.
The demands of life are much too manifold to let such a specialized training in
school appear possible. The development of general ability for independent
thinking and judgment should always be placed foremost, not the acquisition of
special knowledge (p. 64)…It is essential that the student acquire an
understanding of and a lively feeling for values. He must acquire a vivid sense of
the beautiful and of the morally good. Otherwise he—with his specialized
knowledge—more closely resembles a well-trained dog than a harmoniously
developed person (p. 66).
In my admittedly limited experiences, I have noticed that far too many of the
college and university graduates that I have encountered in my local space are relatively
ill-prepared to carry out the meaningful analysis and problem solving skills needed for
confronting the critical social, scientific, and political issues that define and characterize
our (post) human condition in inventive and creative manners. With respect to Lyotard’s’
observations on the dualistic purpose of higher education, I am concerned that today’s
academy may not be producing enough of the second type citizen that he mentions--the
type of educated elite that is capable of maintaining the “internal cohesion” of our
society. Rather, it has been my collective experiences as an educator, program director,
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student advisor, and student recruiter that has led me to the impression that too many
general university students today enroll for specific job training skills and knowledge,
and the associated lure of economic and social security that higher education promises.
In fact, a recent study conducted by The Chronicle of Higher Education supports
Norbert Wiener’s “social status” claims and Giroux’s corporate-neoliberalist claims by
reporting that 92% of the public sees higher education’s most important role today as
“preparing undergraduates for a career” (Selingo, 2003, p. A10). Additionally, this fairly
inclusive study shows that 90% of all respondents consider higher education to be
principally responsible for “providing education for adults to qualify for better jobs”.
Ironically, respondents also urged universities to focus less on research and economic
development, and to focus more on general education, teacher education, leadership and
responsibility, indicating a paradoxical understanding of just what university education is
“for”. How universities should reconcile the public’s perceived need to decrease
initiatives designed to spur local and regional economic growth, educate students more
for the economic work place, and to focus more on civic, social and personal
responsibilities and general intellectual growth at the same time, is a very interesting and
complex social impression that begs further research and analysis.
Take for example the recent and complex hyper realities associated with our
current post 9-11 society. How many of the thousands of “educated” university students
entering the work force each year are truly capable of critically analyzing and genuinely
understanding the complex, multifaceted, and nebulous factors associated with this
horrific and mind boggling event? My intent here is not to essentialize the modern
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college graduate into an intellectual or social midget, but the standard responses I
received during those days, weeks and months following the events of 9-11 can
essentially be reduced to simplistic, fairly juvenile, monolithic, and in their minds at
least, “rationale” causes that place the blame for the events of 9-11 on “psychotic”,
“ignorant”, and “jealous” middle eastern terrorists. Not only do these responses reflect a
bothersome lack of cultural sensitivity, and an ignorant, biased essentializing of the evil
“other” that brandishes all Middle Eastern peoples as threats to our national security, but
also a critical lack of awareness regarding relevant current and historical world events,
politics, power, and global interrelations. Most undergraduate students that I encountered
during these times have either, never given any real consideration to world events outside
our local, regional, or global barriers up to the moments immediately preceding the
events of 9-11, or were effectively incapable of understanding, or even entertaining the
role(s) that our nation’s foreign and economic policies (both overt and covert) might have
on “non-Western” cultures. As a result of this “cultural ignorance”, many of my students
perceived any attempt at a discourse surrounding these factors as “unpatriotic”,
“unbiased”, or “flaky”.
Another relevant example involves the issues pertaining to global economic
expansion, ecological sustainability, and our [post] human futures. Many, if not most of
the students and young adults that I have been involved with assume that recycling their
beer bottles and newspapers is “all that is needed” by our society to counter the hyper
consumptive appetites of the Western economic machine that is gradually devouring our
natural resources. As such, those who actually do recycle their waste containers are
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inclined to think that they are doing “their part” to solve this complex and multifaceted
problem (which, ironically is actually seen as simple and over exaggerated in their eyes).
Inextricably bound as cogs in the apparatus of consumption and its associated free market
policies, much of today’s citizenry (including those with higher education degrees) are
unqualified to critically deconstruct their respective roles, impact and eventual effects
in/on our current neoliberal society dominated by consumption, production, and the
mythical American right to material acquisition. Bigger. Better. More. As long as I can
afford it…it’s my American right!
In effect, far too many undergraduate students of today’s University are not
academically capable of inventing the knowledge necessary to deal with the issues that
we, as a historical society/culture, have left for them to confront; they either don’t have,
or aren’t allowed the opportunity to live, work and exist from within, or without a
Thoureauvian consciousness. Global capitalization and the associated diminishing
natural resources and increasing pollution/contamination of our ecosphere; post cold war
and pre postmodern war (terrorism and the “Axis of Evil”) plutonium propagation; the
human genome project, cloning and stem cell research; the ecological, social, economic
and health complications associated with worldwide rain forest deforestation; and the
scientific and technological invasion upon all forms of culture, including the impending
development of artificial intelligence, pre-determined sex selection, and autopoietic
robots are just a few of the extremely complex and pressing knowledge issues facing our
current and future generations. Discussing, participating in, or attempting to develop
resolutions to these contemporary problems, as well as various others, requires both

141
breadth and depth of knowledge; it requires a transdisciplinary and transideological
approach that embraces multiples, heterogeneity, complexity and invention.
Contrastingly, it is inhibited, thwarted even in the contemporary modern university
governed by myriad disciplinary societies that are increasingly being fragmented and
(dys) altered by state and external sources of control. In this light then, contemporary
college graduates of the neoliberal-disciplinary discourse may be (are) ill prepared to
demarcate and clarify the various knowledge claims that philosophy, science and art (on a
more global level, inclusive of the humanities, music, etc.) construct of our world, and
thus may not be inclined to think openly, critically and reflexively about issues requiring
a certain “chaoplexic” approach (Arnott, 1999, p. 49). By “chaoplexic”, Arnott is
coalescing the properties and principles of chaos and complexity theories (of which, I
will further elaborate on in Chapter 4) into a postmodern appreciation for the notion that
as things appear to get more chaotic, they actually show deeper signs of complexity and
organization.
Perhaps more disturbing is the awareness that not only are many of today’s
university subjects ill equipped to deal with critical issues such as our Post 9-11 society,
or our ecological sustainability, but that many of them are also fundamentally and
apathetically detached from the reality of our present and future ecological, social,
cultural and political complexities that we/they will encounter. They have been
disciplined in other ways, towards other means, and for different utilities. If this
observation proves to have any merit whatsoever, the internal cohesion of our society that
Lyotard is concerned with, may indeed be in for a long bout of turbulence and misery.
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The epistemological and ontological transformations that do occur in far too many
students today, is actually not a transformation at all, but rather a continuation of the
docile process initiated in earlier educational experiences. This “atransformation”
(signifying “lack of”) that does occur can be denoted by what Foucault’s biopower; a
subconscious power that transforms the curious and free thinking subjects into objects of
(self) disciplinary technology, a mass marketed and commodified product artistically
crafted to operate in today’s self-centered, neoliberal, and materialistic society; and most
likely, one that inaudibly subverts students to the “hidden curriculum” of higher
education elaborated upon by Henry Giroux (2003), Eric Margolis (2001), and others. In
short, the perceived “hypomobile” and “acritical” (meaning in this sense, a lack of critical
mass) condition of the contemporary student ought to be problematical for all those
concerned with our contemporary posthuman condition, our collective and individual
political and social futures, and the ethico-ecological sustainability of our kind. For
Wilson, a truly effective and consilient-like curriculum that disciplinary scholars argue
for, should allow every college student, public intellectual and political leader to be
capable of answering a complex, yet simple and critical question (1998).
What is the relation between science and the humanities, and how is it important
for human welfare? (p. 13).
Thus said, the disciplinary hyperfragmentation of the University curriculum
coalesces with performativity for excellence, a competitive and exclusive homogeneity of
ideas and values, and neoliberal-corporate influences to effectively and drastically alter
the inorganic makeup of the University institution, and its organic constituents.
According to Aronowitz, the particular role shift that our modern University has
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undergone is due specifically to the decline of our nation’s cultural mission; a mission
that revolves around economic productivity and the global proliferation of Amerocentric
market initiatives, a mission that will inevitably have even further impact on our culture
with the advent of the European Union, the WTO and the WMF (2002, p. 3). Further
still, the culturally stimulated inorganic transformation of both the structure and role of
the modern University, have compounded and exponentially proliferated their effects to
produce profound and subsequent affects, or sequalae for the organic constituencies of
both the University community and society at large. Dysacademia has produced the
dysacademic. Specifically, the application of Michel Foucault’s genealogical and
archeological analysis of disciplinary societies to the fragmentation and authority of
discipline specific knowledge and authority (1966/1970; 1975/1977), and Lyotard’s
notion of performativity (1979/1984) regarding educational excellence, legitimacy, and
the ongoing and increasing corporatization of the University can be seen as etiological
factors in the production of dyserethesia, dysgnosia, and dyslogia in the organic elements
of the University. In effect, modern academic disciplines are disciplining our citizenry
according to disciplinary practices that are fundamentally influenced by neoliberal
initiatives and ideologies, largely put forth by corporate and governmental America.
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CHAPTER 3
WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE? DISCIPLINE, SURVEILLANCE, CONTROL &
ACCREDITATION IN THE IVORY TOWERS
One can envisage education becoming less and less a closed site differentiated
from the workplace as another closed site, but both disappearing and giving way
to frightful continual training, to continual monitoring or worker-school kids or
bureaucrat-students. They try to present this as a reform of the school system, but
it’s really its dismantling. In a control-based system nothing’s left alone for long.
Gilles Deleuze (1990/1995, p. 175)
The more classification there is, the less evolution there is, the more classes there
are, the less history there is, the more coded the sciences there are, the less
invention and knowledge there are, the more administrating there is, the less
movement there is…Parasitic growth has brought everything to a standstill.
Michel Serres (in Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 94-5)
Controlling The Discourse From The Outside
As I listened to NPR during my morning drive into campus one day in the fall of
2003, I happened to catch the tail end of a story concerning higher education that troubled
my sluggish and slowly emerging consciousness. After contacting the local NPR station
for more information, I learned that Congressman Jack Kingston (R-Georgia) had
introduced a Bill that was designed to “ensure fairness in higher education and protect
college students from one-sided liberal propaganda.” Specifically, Kingston wrote and
formally introduced an "Academic Bill of Rights" to safeguard a student's right to "get an
education rather than an indoctrination" (Press Release, October 22, 2003). According to
Kingston’s myopic and philistine logic, "College is a time when you form your own
opinions about the issues that affect our society…if our students are not shown the whole
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picture, they are being cheated out of a true education. University professors should be
teaching our kids how to think not what to think." Paradoxically, this paranoid
bureaucrat seems to think that by controlling what academics say within the walls of the
ivory tower, he can ensure a non partisan, multi-ideological educational experience for all
students; one that automatically awakens each student’s political and social
consciousness from its currently repressed comatose state of being. After all, the political
partisanship of liberal and democratic thought that so predominates the halls and
classrooms of academia by its resolutely liberal professorship is, in addition to being a
widespread problem, “an abuse of students’ academic freedom”. As such, Kingston sees
his Academic Bill of Rights as a necessary vehicle to “take politics out of the university
curriculum” by putting an end to unequal funding of student organizations that host guest
speakers with biased liberal perspectives, and instituting hiring quotas policies based on
party affiliation. Skeptical academics take comfort though; Kingston assures us that his
particular vision of academic freedom, convoluted as it is, is not supposed to “dictate any
academic curriculum” but rather, to “challenge Universities to voluntarily adopt
ideologically-neutral hiring processes and academic policies”. Can anybody say
“control”?
A University In Ruins?
Widespread budget shortfalls, increasing private and public partnerships between
universities and the corporate world, the renewed pleas from conservatives to squelch
academic freedom and eliminate tenure, and the increasing neoliberal fragmentation and
technocratization of the curriculum--these are just a few of the many current challenges
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that threaten to destabilize the historical, intellectual, ethical and socio-cultural missions
of the American University. In University in Ruins, Bill Readings goes so far as to say
that, because of the decline in our national cultural mission, the wider social role of the
University as an institution is “now up for grabs”, and thus that both the place and nature
of the contemporary university are now nebulous and awkward for those intellectuals
vested in our academic and social futures (1996, p. 2). In short, it is Reading’s critical
contention that the University has fundamentally and resolutely succumbed to the
capitalistic demands associated with the Western neocolonial globalization project, and
thus, it no longer participates in the historical project for humanity that once served as the
original legacy of medieval Enlightenment, that being “the historical project of culture”
(p. 5). This “university as corporation” discourse candidly operates as a chief feature of
the neoliberal machinery that now characterizes our postmodern economic, social,
cultural and political conditions.
As such, a critical discourse surrounding the modern university has been
constructed from multiple fields in an attempt to maintain a counter discourse of hope
and restitution that honors the original and critical missions of higher education (Apple,
2001; Aronowitz, 1998; Berube & Nelson, 1995; Ford, 2002; Giroux, 1999 & 2003). For
Giroux, higher education’s “hidden curriculum” symbolizes the “creeping
vocationalization and subordination of learning to the dictates of the market, a
phenomenon that can now be seen as an open and defining principle of education at all
levels” (1999, p. 16). As the modern University continues to become increasingly
corporate in its acceptance and production of a consumer culture, a perceptible similarity
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can now be seen between those dynamics of control and surveillance (standardized tests,
certified outcomes, objective quality, teacher deskilling) that define our public schools,
with comparable processes now operating across many levels of postsecondary
education. To be more specific, the University’s increasingly open love affair with
school and program accreditation, educational standards of excellence, the production of
quality “educated objects”, and the various forms of internal and external control that
work to define and characterize the modern educational system have made it increasingly
difficult to differentiate it from primary, middle and secondary school education.
(Dys)Affecting The Intellect & The Senses
In blending various critical discourses put forth primarily by Michel Foucault and
Gilles Deleuze that deconstruct the social mechanisms of discipline, surveillance and
control, it is the intent of this chapter to address the various bureaucratic and industrial
mechanisms of power and control that the inorganic Dysacademic University now relies
upon to discretely surveil and control the various organic academics and professional
disciples it houses. In effect, the controlling University operating as the penultimate
example of what Hoskin and Macve call “grammatocentric panopticism” (1993, p. 33)
can thus be diagnosed as the primary etiological factor for the production of “dysgnosia”
(abnormality of the intellect), and/or “dyserethesia” (impairment of sensibility) in its
objects (primarily, the professorate). Secondarily, this chapter will also examine the
resultant affects that the power-control mechanisms associated with grammatocentric
panopticism have on the reproduction of technocratic and ideologically limited objects of
desire—the students, or what Stanley Aronowitz has called “techno-idiots” (2000). In
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extending the previous discourse concerning disciplinary societies into the current one,
centered on the Deleuzian transition to a “control society”, Foucault’s analysis of
disciplinary societies provides a seamless segue for the theoretical transition I intend. In
recalling that disciplinary societies have been characterized by Foucault by 1) a
functional inversion of the disciplines for political and economic utility, 2) an increase in
the number of disciplinary institutions for unique and specialized professional entities,
and 3) a redistribution of state control mechanisms of discipline from overt sovereign
manifestations to more subtle and local means (Foucault, 1975/1977), and that Hoskin &
Macve’s grammatocentric panopticism relies upon accountability, calculability and
managerialism (1993). I hope to set the stage for my current contention that academic
accreditation has become the ultimate Deleuzian control mechanism for the 21st century
University.
Accreditation As A Recursive Formation
In deconstructing the discourse surrounding educational excellence and
pedagogical value, I intend to show how contemporary higher education’s self-reliance
upon accreditation as the marker of quality and excellence mirrors, and even in some
cases duplicates Foucault’s articulation of disciplinary societies. And because of the
close theoretical and practical proximity, I also aim to demonstrate how the accreditation
process symbolizes academia’s conversion from a Foucaldian disciplinary society to a
Foucaultian-Deleuzian control society; replete with complex and connected apparatuses
of surveillance, external and internal control, performativity and legitimacy, and of
course, discipline. In so doing, I will briefly highlight the historical, administrative, and
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contemporary trends associated with general, institutional accreditation in American
higher education; and then attempt to weave these events with current university
initiatives to accredit myriad specific programs of study with external agencies designed
to “improve educational quality and professional preparation”. Lastly, I will intersperse
my own particular experiences with undergraduate accreditation in athletic training
education, as they appear to be relevant and capable of strengthening the central
arguments.
Central to the analysis of the complex and multifarious mechanism that is the
modern university, is the increasing organizational reliance that is being placed upon
program and institutional accreditation processes. Long thought of as just a minor
nuisance by many academics with little to no “teeth, accreditation initiatives increasingly
dominate the current vernacular and consciousness of many University administrators,
particularly in the myriad service professions and techno-science fields. For
administrators interested and vested in “educational excellence” and the external
perception of educational quality and economic value, program accreditations have
become very powerful and telling markers that now perform substantial roles in public
relations, marketing and annual reviews of most if not all institutions of higher education
in the United States. Essentially, a program that is accredited by an external agency has
been automatically deemed to have reached a certain level of effectiveness, excellence,
credibility and thus also professional and economic value in the eyes of department
Chairs, Deans, Provosts, Presidents, and now even, the public consumer. Witness the
utility and expansive “reach” that the Council for Higher Education Accreditation, a
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private, nonprofit national organization that coordinates accreditation activity in the
United States, has over 3,000 college and university members ([CHEA], February,
2003b, p. 1). According to CHEA, they are the primary advocates for “voluntary
accreditation and quality assurance to the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Department of
Education”, and the “primary national voice for voluntary accreditation to the general
public, opinion leaders, students, and families”. One may find it ironic that, although
they are a “voluntary” external service that legitimizes educational quality by providing
authoritative data and information regarding various accrediting agencies, they also
“report” to the U.S. Congress and Department of Education. The CHEA also informs us
that although its accreditation services are indeed “voluntary”, educational institutions
must be accredited by some externally accredited, accrediting agency if its students wish
to be eligible for Federal Title IV financial assistance. Although, accreditation “may be
voluntary”, membership in the accredited club is fairly inclusive and it appears as though
non-membership doesn’t pay as 6,421 institutions and 18,713 programs were accredited
in the United States, as of their August, 2003 report (CHEA, 2003a, p. 1). Thus noted,
the discursive formation that “is accreditation”, and its power to control and surveil the
Academy begs for a poststructural analysis capable of revealing its inherent connections
to disciplinary and control societies.
Reading’s “ruing of the University” contention may be better appreciated by
scrutinizing the momentum taking shape with the increasing formal regulation of
academic programs, specialized disciplines, and professional degrees. Otherwise known
as accreditation, the move to standardize, regulate and control the content, pedagogy,
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future outcomes, and overall “quality” of various higher educational programs has
become increasingly fashionable amongst educational administrators, disciplinary
professionals, local and regional policy makers, and students-consumers, alike. Indeed,
Readings’ cynical prophecy has been fulfilled today when one realizes that powerful
accreditating agencies like the Southern Association for Schools & Colleges (SACS),
which rather mandatorily accredits all institutions of higher learning in the Southern
United States, now requires every academic program to produce a “quality enhancement
plan”(QEP) in order to document its relative excellence and utility (2003). Although
most of the research published on accreditation refers to state and regional accreditation
processes that are involved with colleges and universities (like SACS), otherwise known
as “general accreditation”, much of the theory, philosophy, and practicality of the
accreditation machine can also be applied to specific degree accreditation processes that
are now extremely popular for educational administrators and public policy pundits,
alike. Invented by, and still somewhat unique to the American academy, general and
disciplinary accreditation has been part of higher education regulation for over one
century in the United States with roots in the American desire to “privatize” higher
education, with external, non-governmental control (Blauch, 1959; SACS, 1963; Selden,
1960). Ideologically, it was thought that American universities could escape the
sovereign control that European universities suffered by excluding the central
government from the administration and shaping of the academy by using nongovernmental influences to monitor and control educational quality.
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Ironically, the early advocates of accreditation thought that this non-sovereign
process would also free them from political and ideological interests of the state, thus
providing them a certain degree of freedom and neutrality (Blauch, 1959, p. 3; SACS,
1963, p. 2). Accreditation it was thought, was the responsibility of “qualified educators”
not statesmen, and so it was important for all involved in higher education to be aware of
the meaning, purpose and effects of accreditation (SACS, 1963, p. 2). Because
accreditation was presented as “a symbol of respectability in the academic world”, it was
deemed that everyone associated with the university must in effect be both conversant in,
and supportive of the apparent positive goals and benefits of achieving and maintaining
accreditation. In fact, CHEA even reports that their standards are “developed or changed
through a process of public consultation involving, e.g., faculty, administrators, students,
practitioners in specific fields, governing boards, and members of the public” (2003a, p.
3); a well meaning and comprehensive ideal for sure, but realistic and actual as a praxis
of utility remains to be seen. Interestingly, some of the explicit “roles” of accreditation
listed by the SACS report (1963, p. 1), and others (National Commission on Accrediting
Report, 1965; National Commission on Accrediting, 1966) provide fertile ground for the
creation of a hierarchy of “school quality” that will help students and parents with their
selections, and future employers select employees based on the “quality” of their
university training; sentiments that have since been reinforced by CHEA (2003b). After
all, if “qualified reviewers” do not formally accredit a school, how can it be any good at
delivering quality education to the masses? If a particular discipline fails to produce and
write a quality QEP that demonstrates and dictates it utility of excellence, how can it be

153
of any educational value? How can a particular program, or institution adequately and
effectively prepare citizens for the industrial work force, if not first validated by external
sources empowered to judge quality and value?
In a 1963 report printed by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools
(SACS), entitled “General Accreditation in Higher Education”, accreditation was initially
defined as “the recognition accorded to an institution which meets criteria or standards of
achievement established by a competent agency or association for educational activities
of the nature and level being offered by the institution” (p. 1). Updating this definition a
bit, CHEA has described accreditation as “a process of external quality review used by
higher education to scrutinize colleges, universities and educational programs for quality
assurance and quality improvement”, and proudly note that “institutions and educational
programs seek accredited status as a means of demonstrating their academic quality to
students and the public and to become eligible for federal funds” (2003b, p. 2).
According to Blauch’s synoptic, yet authoritative and Tyleresque work, a fully developed
accrediting procedure includes four steps; 1) establishment of standards or criteria, 2)
inspection of institutions by competent authorities to determine whether they meet the
established standards or criteria, 3) publication of a list of institutions that meet the
standards or criteria, and 4) periodic reviews to ascertain whether accredited institutions
continue to meet the standards or criteria (Blauch, 1959, p. 3). Conceptually,
accreditation was deemed necessary for demonstrating the respectability and soundness
of educational programs by a) discovering and propagating good educational practices, b)
improving the overall educational process, and c) strengthening the educational
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institutions themselves (SACS, 1963, p. 1). In updating the ideological mission of
accreditation, CHEA’s recognition standards now include 1) advancing academic quality,
2) demonstrating accountability, 3) the encouragement of purposeful change and needed
improvements, 4) the employment of appropriate and fair procedures in decision-making,
and 5) a continual reassessment of accreditation practices (2003, p. 2). Aside from one
stated foundational CHEA principle regarding the desire to maintain core academic
values central to higher education and quality assurance (2003b, p. 2), noticeably absent
from these rather vague, extremely subjective and contextually sensitive “missions” and
standards of accreditation are any authentic references to the individual student, society,
civics education, intellectual transformation, critical democracy, or cultural advancement-issues and entities that have historically embodied the more critical roles and purposes of
higher education from the Enlightenment era up to modern times (Readings, 1996).
One text that did provide information beyond that of state and regional general
accreditation was Lloyd Blauch’s Accreditation in Higher Education (1959), a text that
painstakingly chronicles the nature and evolution of state, regional, and various
professional accreditations in the United States. Blauch’s manuscript includes specific
chapters on the historical processes involved in the accreditation (with the year the
accreditation process started) of such fields as bible college education (1947), education
for design (1948), forestry education (1933), journalism education (1946), landscape
architectural education (1920), library science education (1926), music in higher
education (1928), religious education (1946), just to name a few of the more interesting
professional specialties. For the record, the oldest known educational accreditation
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process known in the United States belongs to the field of osteopathy, beginning with six
accredited programs in 1897. Predictably, the highly specialized and disciplined
professional fields of law (1900), medicine (1904), and dentistry (1916) followed shortly
thereafter; while fields more representative of the social sciences like teacher education
(1927), social work (1932), and psychology (1947) lagged behind considerably (Blauch,
p. 224-8). As of this writing, the college that I teach in (one of six in the university)
currently has 19 different program accreditations that purportedly “validate” the quality
and effectiveness of the professional pedagogy of those who teach in those respective
programs, to those outside the university with an interest in the various events and
phenomena occurring inside the Ivory Towers.
Accreditation As A Disciplining Society
Using Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary societies then, it can be asserted that the
subtle and historical mechanisms that bolster a disciplinary society can also be seen in
operation amongst the accreditation processes of many, if not most higher education
programs; a contention confirmed by Bloch’s 1959 text on accreditation in higher
education. Foucault’s first point, regarding the ‘functional inversion of the disciplines’,
can thus be seen in the incredible proliferation of sub-disciplines and highly specialized
professional degrees that most institutions now offer to their consumers (students). The
fragmentation of the curriculum into myriad majors and academic programs of study can
be viewed as an industrial side-effect of our modern infatuation with the processes,
knowledge and advancement of technoscience and all of its wondrous capitalistic
potential, with a concurrent de-emphasis on the less marketable and practical humanities

156
and social sciences. Viewed as economically viable and thus valuable, accreditation
serves as the primary agent of professional and economic legitimization in the modern
university. Viewed as such, it can thus be logically surmised that accredited knowledge
can be readily and easily converted into capitalized knowledge—ready for delivery and
pickup. If the academic discipline is economically valuable and marketable to the public
(job market) and corporate sectors (highly trained potential employees), it must then be
validated as a quality educational program that disciplines its students in the ways of the
disciplinary professional field.
In its 1966 report on its organizational “Role and Function”, The National
Commission on Accreditation (NCA) report specifically reinforces this notion, “the
development of new professions goes hand in hand with the increase in knowledge and
the advancement of technology” (NCA, 1966, p. 49). As more advanced and specialized
programs of study were gradually borne in our Post WWII Disciplinary University, the
opportunity for accreditation control also proliferated as a necessary means of regulation,
legitimation, and professional surveillance. A quick look at the mission and vision
statements, various curricular programs, stated learning outcomes, and number of
accredited programs of most modern universities and colleges in this country reflects this
contention wholeheartedly, and thus can be seen as evidence of growing neoliberal
control and influence in higher education. Accreditation thus assumes its legitimating
role in the various academic disciplines by certifying the quality of both the instruction
and curricula of the academic (professional) discipline, and by guaranteeing specific and
objective value-laden learning outcomes for all of its students. Approved and surveilled
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Quality Enhancement Plans, which in turn are designed to ensure academic quality and
excellence, have thus become the biblical blue print for guaranteeing educational
performativity.
The 1966 NCA report also addressed the perceived emergent need and pressure to
expand from the present 28 professional education-accrediting agencies (p. 48). This
historical recognition clearly brings to light Foucault’s second issue, ‘the swarming of
disciplinary mechanisms’. In short, along with an increase in the number and type of
“new knowledges” came a perceived need to qualify these new professional fields, or
rather, it was felt that it was necessary to provide external surveillance in the guise of
accreditation in order to authenticate the new programs of study. According to the
authors of the NCA report, the increasing pressure for recognition of new professional
accrediting agencies stemmed from two sources: “1) the steady growth in the number of
groups rightly recognized as professions, and 2) the extension of professional programs
in the direction of supporting technical occupations and the extension through the
graduate level”. It was also a consensual thought at that time that as new professions
emerged outside the realm of teaching, so too did the need for some type of external,
quality control by respected authorities; “as the disciplines prepare persons for
professional work other than teaching, their professional societies become more
conscious of the advantages of accreditation” (p. 50). As the CHEA proudly reports in
its August, 2003 “Fact Sheet”, this dream has since become a reality as there now exists
18, 713 specialized accredited programs in the United States, and “engendering employer
confidence” remains one of four fundamental “purposes of accreditation” (2003a, p. 2).
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The state-control of the mechanisms of discipline, Foucault’s third factor of
disciplinary societies, is perhaps most relevant to the current discourse regarding the
recursive nature of accreditation. Originally, one large central agency, the National
Accreditating Agency (NCA), actively worked to perpetuate the purpose and function of
accreditation to other non-teaching fields as ‘required’ evolutionary steps, necessary to
ascertain quality and credibility. Today, other “non-governmental” agencies like the
CHEA and SACS have somewhat diluted the NCA’s hegemonic hold over educational
control, but organizational competition hasn’t lessened the bureaucratic processes
associated with accrediting endeavors, in fact it has probably accelerated it somewhat.
Ironically, the NCA’s concern for increased surveillance and control (a.k.a, quality
assurance) was seen to be even more pressing when it came to degree programs that
served as feeder programs for government and industry; even admitting that, “pressures
may actually be exerted by the employment agencies” in its 1966 report (p. 49). In the
preface to his 1960 text entitled Accreditation: The Struggle Over Standards in Higher
Education, author William Selden explicitly confirms accreditation’s role in the struggle
for control over academic standards in higher education by comparing it to the like
struggle for control and influence in civil government (1960, p. x). Indeed, CHEA
advocates itself as “the primary national voice for voluntary accreditation and quality
assurance to the U. S. Congress and Department of Education”, and professes to serve as
“the authoritative source of data and information about regional, national, and specialized
accreditors” (2003b, p. 1). This “big brother watching” view was also brought to light in
the 1963 SACS statement on accreditation in higher education, as it attempted to distance
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the accreditation process from governmental watchdogs. Ironically though, SACS
effectively treaded on its own proverbial tongue in this paradoxical passage that shouldn’t
go unnoticed by those concerned with the discursive power of external surveillance
(1963).
At the same time there is no inclination to protect the spread of obnoxious
ideologies, which might occasionally fan across institutions. Policies governing
the teaching of communism or related dogmas, and procedures for applying them
are determined by governing boards. These matters are not normally within the
province of the Commission on Colleges. However, in the final analysis it is
ingrained in the philosophy of the Commission that we must “stand ready to
protest in the name of academic integrity when the educational effort is hampered
by political interference, stifled by authoritarian fiat or in any way menaced by
those who would subvert the search for truth” (p. 4).
Ironic indeed, perhaps even paradoxical that SACS would operate under the premise of
“protecting truth” by subverting political interference, while simultaneously exerting
another purported “truth”, all in the name of “academic integrity”. As I will demonstrate
over the remainder of this particular chapter, this historical precedent can be seen then, as
just one political interference replacing another. Today, SACS requires that institutions
“place primary responsibility for the content, quality, and effectiveness of its curriculum
with its faculty” (2003, p. 9), a reversal of policy that ostensibly supports academic
freedom, but one that has somewhat and simultaneously undermined the standards and
guidelines associated with many of the 18,000+ specialized program accreditations that
govern the various curricula and pedagogies of the myriad academic disciplines (a
consideration that will be revisited later).
Certainly then, the sense of urgency and pressure expressed by the NCA in their
1966 report, coupled with the sociocultural proliferation of highly specialized and
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fragmented disciplines (now made for and from accreditation molds) can be seen as
Foucaldian operations of the ‘swarming of a disciplinary mechanism’, and also as a
variegated form of ‘state-control over the mechanisms of discipline’. In fact, all four
declared “purposes of accreditation” put forth by the CHEA in 2003 reinforce the
tendencies of accreditation to be based on elements of state control, discipline and
neoliberalist policies. Looked at through the lens that refracts accreditation as a
discursive formation then, the CHEA’s “purposes” of accreditation can all be
deconstructed to reveal minimal to moderate levels of control and surveillance,
depending upon the position of the viewer: 1) assuring academic quality for students and
public (just how is quality measured across the various disciplines? How does one
qualify/quantify compassion, critical consciousness, ethical behavior, sociological and
civic connection, or interpersonal respect?), 2) access to Federal funds as the
accreditation of institutions and programs is required in order for students to gain access
to federal funds (if accreditation is “voluntary”, why are federal funds tied to it then?
Political interference comes to mind), 3) easing transfer for students among colleges and
universities (the codes that are needed to be deemed “acceptable” come in the name of
credits from accredited agencies, automatically ensuring “quality”, and 4) engendering
employer confidence when evaluating credentials of job applicants and providing
financial support to current employees seeking additional education (the corporate
interests are obvious here, but it is indeed ironic that many corporations still complain
that they have to retrain many of their new employees and that far too many of them lack
creativity and critical thinking skills) (2003a, p. 2).
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In effect, accreditation’s discursive power works to create a discourse that defines
and calls for a commitment to certain metalanguages, codes of thought and behavior, and
ultimately metannaratives that produce disciplinary truths and realities that in turn, shape
the subsequent discourses. With a discerning eye then, one can see delicate examples of
a Foucaultian biopower at work in the microphysics of the accreditation discourse, as it
inevitably exerts a conspicuous hegemonic authority over students’ professional identity
formation and awareness, over the actual pedagogical process used and evaluated, and
ultimately of course, over the specific curriculum itself. For example, the accreditation
discourse that I operate out of for athletic training education requires that I teach a very
specific, detailed, and comprehensive list of over 1,500 cognitive, psychomotor and
affective competencies and clinical proficiencies deemed necessary to become a qualified
“entry-level athletic trainer”. Included in this exhaustive list, which by the way I must
document that I teach and evaluate “over time” for each student, are such qualitative and
esoteric skills and abilities as the ability to communicate with patients, think critically,
and act professionally.
So dominant, so powerful, so subversive is accreditation induced Foucaultian
biopower that very few objects in the system (students and teachers) actually have the
opportunity to discover what it means to experience genuine ontological and democratic
freedom, to explore life’s many complexities and contextual, non-essential realities, or to
invent their own worldly knowledge and phenomenological understanding. Perhaps most
importantly though, overbearing accreditation standards and outcome evaluations can
severely hamper the power and freedom of those involved in carrying out the accredited
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program—the program directors and teachers who become disciplined and controlled by
the respective accreditation standards and guidelines. Jack Kingston’s “Academic Bill of
Rights” then, can thus be seen as a type of accrediting biopower that exerts
epistemological, ontological and axiological authority over its subjects; so much so in
fact, that university subjects inevitably become objects of hegemonic discipline and
control. Where’s the academic freedom in that, I wonder?
Consequently, state regulating agencies, local school boards, and disciplinary
societies in custody of such authoritative biopower (accreditation standards) can
effectively surveil and control their subjects by determining normal, standardized, and
acceptable modes of behavior, knowledge and even subjective identity (Foucault,
1975/1977, p. 136). Even though SACS (which accredits the university I currently teach
in) mandates that the primary responsibility for the content, quality, and effectiveness of
its curriculum lie with its faculty, in this case me, the specialized accrediting agency that
governs Athletic Training education programs (Commission on Accreditation for Allied
Health Education Programs, or CAAHEP) circumvents and undermines and supercedes
most of those principles by dictating the majority of the tasks required and expected of
me in order to “produce excellent entry-level professionals”. In effect then, my particular
viewpoints, experiences (both didactic and practical), knowledges and philosophical
inclinations as they relate to athletic training and higher education are largely decentered
and marginalized by the authority that is accreditation.
Speaking from personal experiences with program accreditation for undergraduate
athletic training education, nearly everything in the program is scrutinized at multiple
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levels, and based on some omniscient, authoritative knowing by those in control: the
admissions standards, the technical standards for admissions and retention, the exact
degree name printed on the diploma, who can/cannot teach within the program, the
pedagogical methods employed, the type of learning documentation required, the
philosophy and mission of the program, what “counts” as effective outcomes, the content
and skills inclusive in the program, and even the projected professional behaviors &
attitudes that are deemed “necessary” to practice in the field of athletic training. All of
these standards and guidelines mind you, have been pre-determined and ordained by
various educational “experts” from the field of athletic training whom I suppose, possess
higher knowledge than any of the professionals running and teaching in the field itself.
Although, the agency that accredits athletic training has consulted the teaching body for
input regarding “some” of the required content, no such input was sought for the other
methods of control embedded within the standards and guidelines such as teaching and
learning methods, and professional behaviors. As a result of being enmeshed in the
discourse that is athletic training education, the 15+ years of real world experience and
insight that I have attained in the various professional settings as a practicing athletic
trainer, and the 10+ years experience and study that I now have with teaching, program
coordination, curriculum and other pedagogical fundamentals are effectively
marginalized and somewhat silenced in lieu of the controlling standards and guidelines I
am forced to follow in order to maintain our program accreditation.
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The Functional Reduction Of The Teaching & Learning Bodies
This “functional reduction of the body” (of the program directors, teachers and
the students) that accreditating processes exert can thus be seen then to exert a complex
psychosomatic authority over the subjects (those “subjected” to the authority); one that
limits the ability of the objects (subjected long enough, one becomes an object in the
discourse; unable to remove him/her self from the objects under analysis in the discourse)
to think, to question, to interpret, and to live their own, independent professional and
personal lives (Foucault, 1975/1977, p. 164). The functional reduction of the body
diminishes, limits, and ignores the local and contextual dynamics of practicality that are
involved with both the teaching of, and the practice of the various disciplines especially
as it relates to the various disciplines within the allied health field, where the essential
goal revolves around the competent and compassionate delivery of health care services.
And, as it regards professional preparation, the duly accredited director/teacher is often
forced to teach his/her students how “to do” the profession (become an object), rather
than how “to be” the professional (to maintain oneself as his/her own subject). As
Lyotard has prophetically stated, the “death of the professor” becomes actualized in that
the instructor no longer needs to be subjectively involved, they only need to serve as
objects in the discourse, as pawns in the game, as remedial interlinkages between the
authoritative source and the passively, receptive students (1979/1984). Although directed
at the hidden curriculum found in primary, middle and secondary public schools, Julie
Webber‘s expansion on this concept can easily and rightfully be applied to the rigid and
overly standardized processes that structure the discursiveness of accreditation (2003).
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School policy only recognizes the objectivity of its curriculum, and these
contradictions force students to conform to rote discipline in unrealistic ways.
There is an overwhelming emphasis on “knowing” in the cognitive sense, but not
“believing”, so that “doing” becomes a worthless, repetitive gesture on the part of
students who can see nothing in education that speaks to them as people (p. 13).
In context with my experiences with a contemporary program accreditation in a
technical, specialized and disciplined allied health field, I often feel as though my
primary duties are to teach my students how to “do athletic training”, how to become
“effective objects” for the disciplined profession. As such, it has become increasingly
difficult for me to teach my accredited, disciplined, and controlled students how “to be
athletic trainers”, how to be competent, local, contextual and critical subjects of their own
volition with compassion, energy, and commitment to lifelong learning, the perpetual
expansion of thought and skill, and the indispensable nature of health care service
provision. A subtle difference illuminated only by semiotic distinctions perhaps, but
seasoned professionals who have worked in real world healthcare settings with a
compassion and commitment to helping people in need, or those who have supervised or
educationally mentored shallow, technocratic and materially focused young emerging
professionals/students, will acknowledge that a very powerful and meaningful peculiarity
exists between “doing” and “being”. In extending this discourse beyond my own
particular discipline, I imagine that teacher educators working under the similarly
controlling auspices of NCATE accreditation constraints feel similar frustration when it
comes to the complex and largely qualitative processes that make up teacher education.
Teaching future teachers how to “be” teachers, is much more important and challenging
than merely teaching them how to “do” teaching; a process that invariably must be made
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more exasperating and complex by the standards and guidelines that teacher accreditation
requires and institutes over its practitioners. In short, this powerful aspect of the “hidden
curriculum” that accreditation puts into effect becomes a powerful and central
characteristic of Dysacademia, and eventually colonizes the individual identity and
epistemological foundation of its organic constituencies. Over time, repeated
subordination to the disciplinary “exercises” of those in power constructs a selfsurveilling subject that no longer requires the physical presence of the authority figure in
order for the hegemony and repression to continue (Foucault, 1975/1977, p. 161).
Accreditation in this sense then can be seen to cause the dysbulic (weakness of the will)
and dyserethetic (abnormality of the intellect) object to operate under what Foucault calls
a “technology of the self” (1975/1997, p. 220). As such, the subjects of such a discourse
are held hostage and prevented from seeing, experiencing, or reaching any sort of
meaningful and distinctive self-appropriation, thus becoming objects of accreditation’s
discursive formation
In athletic training, merely teaching students how “to do” athletic training
potentially and typically translates into young professionals who, although they may
prove highly capable of rote and mechanistic demonstrations of knowledge and skill, also
demonstrate extreme difficulty analyzing intricate clinical problems, generating sound
clinical reasoning skills, and inventing their own technical and clinical rationales for
effective intervention. In short, the accredited production of specialized technocrats in
athletic training are accustomed to, disciplined to, and thus amenable to memorizing
“cook book recipes” for evaluation, treatment and rehabilitation strategies, and not very
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capable of understanding the deeper and more critical “why” and “how” issues that are
involved with the actual delivery of healthcare services. Although these comments and
observations are specific to my field of athletic training and sports medicine, I do not
believe that other similarly accredited academic programs are immune to this pedagogical
problem. Just how does NCATE, for example, assure that its like-disciplined future
teachers can adequately deal with the complex psycho-social-cultural-political-economic
issues that they will face every day in the classrooms of America’s heterogeneous
populated schools? How do justly disciplined and accredited physical education teachers
(also accredited by NCATE) learn to deal with the many complex postmodern issues
relating to gender identity, class, and sexuality that they habitually see and experience
with their students in the gymnasiums of our nation’s primary, middle and secondary
schools? To Michel Serres, such “standardization through control” critically hinders the
student from demonstrating what he calls the only true intellectual act, that being “the
ability to invent” (1991/1997, p. 92-3). Simply stated, the more required competencies
and proficiencies that there are, the less time and space there is for invention—for both
teacher and student. William Reynolds elaborates further on Foucault’s
“governmentality” concept by unequivocally connecting pedagogy and curriculum to the
discourse of power, self-surveillance and technology of the body. Here, Reynolds’
analysis of self-surveillance is worth quoting at length because of its obvious relevance to
the discourse surrounding the biopower that accreditation exerts over its subjects
(Reynolds, 2000).
Instead of inflicting pain, the new techniques instill controlling habits and valuesustaining self-images, the intent was/is the increase of universalizable, efficient
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subjugation and control. These techniques proliferate in all institutions involving
the management of large numbers of people: the convent, the school, the barracks,
and the university…The aim of this technology is not mere control, as in the
effective impositions of restrictions and prohibitions, but rather pervasive
management gained through enabling as well as restrictive conceptions,
definitions, and descriptions that generate and support behavior-governing norms
(p. 35).
In his critique of those responsible for the current pedagogical travesty we call
education, Noam Chomsky uses the term specialized class, to represent the power
sources that control and operate an “education for domestication practice”—the state
(Chomsky, 2000, p. 22). Typically, this specialized class includes a small group of
privileged people (politicians, policy makers, school administrators, curriculum directors,
and, of course teachers) empowered to make very important and complex decisions for
the benefit of the respective community, including those repeatedly excluded from
membership in the specialized class. The economically stimulated technical hyper
specialization of the disciplines previously described, has combined with the more
recently popular perception of pedagogical necessity for program and degree
accreditations have pushed the Tylerian-Behaviorist paradigm of education even further
into the consciousness of university educators, program directors and administrators,
alike. So, not only are higher educators involved in the most “industrial” and marketable
fields now told “what” to teach (“whose knowledge?”) for each discipline, but also they
are now being told in large part “how to teach” (being disciplined). As it regards
accreditation then, those “authorities and qualified educators” who formulate the
standards and guidelines that accredited educational programs are required to pursue can
be seen as representing the “specialized class of higher education”, the authoritative
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sources of knowledge, truth, and value. In harmony with Foucault’s biopower, Chomsky
implies that the state is subversively and directly complicit in the production of “docile
bodies” who, because of their participation in a “pedagogy of stupidification” (p. 22), are
largely incapable of invention, independent and critical thought, and/or reaching a state of
self-actualization; or what Foucault called “subjectification” (Foucault, 1975/1977, p.
138). In the current discourse, disciplined accreditation of the technically specialized
disciplines propagates a pedagogy of stupidification that subjectifies the students to
Dysacademia. Dysgnotic (abnormality of the intellect) athletic trainers disciplined “to
do” athletic training, in time transform into dyscratic disciples (weakness of the will) that
no longer see or feel the need to “do” anything different, or to “become” anything other.
Power, Control & Academic Knowledge
In Education and Power, Michael Apple situates his arguments by boldly alerting
the reader to the capitalistic reality and Marxist war cry that, “profit is more important
than people” (1995, p. 4). As Apple articulates the inherent connection between power
and knowledge, and the reproductive processes that our educational system perpetuates
with the presentation and possession of “official knowledge” (p. 41), by working under
the assumption of a “neutral method of education” (p. 11), and by reproducing
“workplace resistance” in its objects of repression (p. 23), he deftly constructs the deep
and imbedded social roles of the school. Specifically, it is Apple’s intent in this text to
show how schools naturally generate certain kinds of cultural, economic, social and
political reproduction by maintaining the political hegemony of the ruling and industrial
classes (p. 38).

170
Central to this critical thesis is the notion that knowledge is actually a form of
capital, and as such, that schools act as one of the primary modes of production of
cultural commodities needed by a society (Apple, 1995, p. 41). Translation—this
economically driven initiative and dynamical process has been instrumental in the Post
WWII proliferation of the scientifico-technical knowledge fields in schools at all levels.
By focusing on the production of technical knowledge in schools, especially at the
postsecondary level, one can see how schools are complicit in maintaining a distinction
between mental and manual labor (p. 45). With the exception of “maintaining core
academic values central to higher education and quality assurance”, it is interesting and
bothersome to note that direct or implicit references to social, cultural, natural, or
humanistic endeavors are conspicuously absent from the Council for Higher Education
Accreditation’s stated purposes, recognition standards, or principles (2003b). In short, if
not in possession of the technical knowledge of a specific discipline, one can’t move up
the economic or social ladders of life, thus producing a hegemonic control over the
cultural values and language that are perpetuated in school curricula. Witness the
increasingly corporate influences over the various curricula, operating procedures, and
expected educational outcomes of the modern University; prime examples of hegemonic
control over the cultural capital needed for our neoliberal society. Resultantly, this
corporately driven accumulation and control of technical and disciplinary knowledge also
ensures that minorities, females, and the poor will get tracked into manual labor fields for
the industrial labor force (p. 46-7). In a perpetually hegemonic cycle then, state,
corporate and most recently, educational leaders can be seen as socializing education and
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scientific research for capital and economic growth—especially at the postsecondary
level. In the end, human and physical resources, significant monies, and other incentives
and initiatives (increased faculty lines, teaching assistants, and high funded labs and
schools) are being increasingly funneled into the academic research and service
disciplines that can contribute to the “cultural capital” of the state, region and nation,
while the disciplinary fields and professions that are not seen as being as culturally
capitalistic are marginalized, reduced, and largely under funded (read: humanities, arts
and social sciences). Perhaps the most notable example of this trend can be seen in the
increasing number of scientific labs named after high tech and biotech companies, and
university business schools being named after wealthy private, or corporate donors. For
example, Georgia Tech University recently withdrew the “DuPree” heading from their
business school after he failed to honor the $25 million donation that got his name on the
stationary and building (Saporta, 2004, p. F1).
As public primary and secondary schools across the nation come under increasing
attack from state and federal education policy makers “to prove their effectiveness”, they
have been forced to standardize their curriculums, their methods, and their evaluations in
earnest attempts to objectively document the pedagogical outcomes that have been
deemed necessary by the state. No longer is this phenomenon isolated to pre-university
institutions. Increasingly, academic programs and higher educational institutions alike
are being asked to objectively document specific learning outcomes in order to “justify”
their pedagogical effectiveness, and thus their economic utility. Thus appreciated, the
dramatic increase in formal ideological control and surveillance seen in our public
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schools can be paralleled with recent conservative and neoliberal policies and initiatives
designed to nourish and sustain our local and global economies, world position, and
capitalistic globalization efforts. And as disciplinary accreditation is largely found to
subsist in the service, natural science and technology sectors of the academy, it can be
seen then as a modus operandi that reinforces the neoliberal and corporatized nature of
the modern University that Aronowitz (2000), Giroux (2003; 1999), and Readings (1996)
lament in their critical scholarship. Further evidence for the incestual connection
between Aronowitz’s metaphorical “Knowledge Factory”, and the importance placed on
disciplined and accredited majors of study can be seen in the significant expansion of
specialized academic majors, faculty lines, and other material resources in the
technology, science, and business fields, with a concurrent reduction in academic
programs and support structures that do not fit the needs, goals and functions of the 21st
Century global economy landscape. In short, classical and liberal educational programs
that promote critical intellectual mass, epistemological flexibility, and ontological
freedom, but contribute less readily to our economy have been largely marginalized in
favor of more capitol-industrial degree programs. Lyotard viewed this as the
“performativity of education”, an insight that views education’s primary mission to be
one inherently connected with the local, national, and global economies (1979/1984, p.
79). The silver lining in this situation, if there is one, is that very few if any formal
disciplinary accreditation programs now exist for the classic liberal arts disciplines, a
reality that academics in those fields are delighted with, I’m sure. But, because SACS
now requires a Quality Enhancement Plan outlining a specific plan for educational
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excellence for every academic program on a campus that it intends to accredit, the
gauntlet seems to have been dropped on the humanities and liberal arts based programs,
as well. As the University is becoming increasingly corporate in its acceptance and
production of a consumer culture, a perceptible equivalent is gradually evolving between
the causes and effects that can be seen associated with public school control, and the like
processes gestating in postsecondary education as a result of its increasing love affair
with program accreditation, standards and external control.
In The Poverty of Postmodernism, John O’Neill elaborates further on this
sociological discourse—the social control described by Foucault, Chomsky, and others—
by describing it as a “quasi-medical function”, or more specifically as a “therapeutic
state…whose function is to pacify clients, or to produce docile citizens” (1995, p. 40).
Overzealous accreditation processes, in my field of athletic training for sure, can be
charged with doing just this--producing book smart, grade producing, docile students;
incapable of clinical reasoning, of inventing their own knowledge, or even of how to
begin to construct knowledge in the absence of an “expert” (teacher) to dispense the
necessary knowledge and insight. Walter Lippmann coined a descriptive, but bothersome
idiom to represent what might be called a control society’s citizens—the “bewildered
herd”. This expression, abounding with all of its visual and contextual robustness, does
however effectively embody the converse of Chomsky’s specialized class (cited in
Chomsky, 2000).
This specialized class carries out the “executive functions,” which means they do
the thinking and planning and understand the “common interests,” by which they
mean the interests of the business class. The large majority of people, the
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“bewildered herd,” are to function in our democracy as “spectators,” not as
“participants in action” (p. 22).
Of course, the specialized class also administers the various features of pedagogy and
curriculum from within the paradigmatic constructs of existing ontological, political,
economic, and ideological systems—in short, the political interference that SACS
purportedly intended to prevent way back in 1963 with their initial mission statement. As
postmodern and poststructural theorists have so eloquently pointed out, all systems are
constructed with hidden agendas and ideologies, and all systemic language games, or
texts seek to essentially replace another, an accreditation is no exception—it is indeed a
socially constructed system wrought with political interference and hegemonic
discourses. In deconstructing the accreditation system, it may be seen that many, if not
most are infected more by the unknown, than by political and economic ideologies. In
short, attempting to consolidate and standardize all of the conceived cognitive,
psychomotor and affective knowledge and skills necessary to practice a particular
profession is a bit short sighted, arrogant, and epistemologically dangerous. The
discourse of accreditation then, denies the existence and exploration of what Serres calls
the “multiplicity of multiples”, specifically as it applies to alternative forms of inquiry,
medical practice, professional behavior, and therapeutic intervention (1995). To Foucault,
this hegemonic dynamic represents a type of disciplinary power as it shifts analyses of
power from the “macro” realm of structures and ideologies, to the “micro” level of bodies
(Foucault, 1980).
In thinking of the mechanisms of power, I am thinking rather of its capillary form
of existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals,
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touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their
discourses, learning processes and everyday lives (p. 39).
In other words, the parasitic reproduction of official knowledge, normalcy, class
entitlement and the perpetuation of the social condition, lamented by Serres and others,
are alive and well today, even in the various professional and academic disciplines, the
latter of which were once thought to be “off limits” to such types of control (Serres &
Latour, 1990/1995).
The more classification there is, the less evolution there is, the more classes there
are, the less history there is, the more coded the sciences there are, the less
invention and knowledge there are, the more administrating there is, the less
movement there is…Parasitic growth has brought everything to a standstill (p. 945).
In athletic training education, the majority of the accreditation requirements mandated for
us to follow are put forth by a small band of athletic training educators with limited scope
of practical experience, little to no knowledge of curriculum and pedagogy outside of the
behaviorist paradigm, and some who might even say “behind the times” with their own
particular level of professional competence and clinical proficiency. In this sense, one
can say that athletic training accreditation is indeed loaded with ideologically generated
and sometimes mythical constructs that are purported to represent the pinnacle of athletic
training education and practice. Sadly lost in this complex web of power, political
ideology, and reproduction is the intended focus of educational practice—students,
teachers and ultimately, society itself. Becoming indoctrinated in this matter, with
limited and ideologically motivated knowledge and a somewhat perverted notion of truth
and democracy entitles the thriving herd member to the possibility of progressing
onward--into the specialized class, or rather as a “quality” professional member of a
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discipline (Chomsky, 2000, p. 23). If one passes through the control mechanism called
accreditation, he/she can call himself or herself an athletic trainer. If they don’t, they
can’t. It is the same for physical therapy, education, medicine, law, etc., etc.
In athletic training, as with other allied health care fields like medicine, nursing, and
physical therapy, bewildered and dysgnotic clinicians who are unable to invent one’s own
knowledge, unable to generate critical thought with unique and challenging cases, can
indeed be very problematic and worrisome for everyone immersed in the system we call
health care. Accreditation standards can not teach or direct me how to prepare future
clinicians how to think critically, how to invent their own knowledge, or how to work
towards a state of professional or personal subjectification. Accreditation guidelines
cannot teach me how to “be” an athletic trainer, or how to teach others how to “be” an
athletic trainer. This sort of “professional ontology” comes from real world experience
that no one person, no organization can quantify, classify, standardize, or regulate for
distribution to others. Being a competent and compassionate allied healthcare
professional comes from caring about people, their problems, and their pain, from
ontological and practical modesty, and from an insatiable desire to enhance one’s
professional and personal knowledge base. Learning how to be a professional derives
itself from the ability and essential awareness of the need to continue constructing and
inventing the knowledge needed to encounter unique and challenging medical problems.
Professionalism comes from process, not product, not standards, not guidelines, and
certainly not from a form, report, or other official pedagogical parchment of authority.
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Critical professionalism comes from process, from experience, and from wandering, not
from a pre-packaged and accredited production of quality.
Nothing’s Left Alone For Long In A Control Society
Additionally, accreditation processes are historically renowned for their
propensity to constantly “re-invent” their procedures, standards and guidelines in an everpresent effort to be “progressive” in the name of quality assurance; in an effort to keep up
with the latest innovations from behavioral and educational psychology, and from
educational administration. Take note of principles number 2, 3, and 5 of CHEA’s
recognition standards (outlined previously on page 146) for evidence of the need to
continually “re-invent the wheel”, or to what Hoskin and Macve have termed
“calculability” (1993, p. 32): “demonstration of accountability”, “purposeful change”
and “needed improvements via ongoing self-examination, and continual reassessment of
accreditation processes” (2003, p. 2). Looked at differently, these procedural aspects of
pedagogy and administration can also be seen as a manifestation of a Deleuzian control
society in that, “In a control-based system nothing’s left alone for long” (1990/1995, p.
175). In accreditation, nothing’s left alone for long either-new standards, new guidelines,
new reports, new documentation, and new, improved ways of demonstrating quality
assurance. In short, the complex and stultifying process of academic program
accreditation can be seen then as a Deleuzian mechanism of control, in that it limits
growth, heterogeneity, flexibility, locality, multiplicity, and individuality as it relates to
curriculum, teaching, evaluation and administration.
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Poststructural philosopher Gilles Deleuze gives credit to Foucault, the “father” of
disciplinary societies and their principal technology, confinement, for being one of the
first to recognize that we were actually in the midst of leaving disciplinary societies
behind (1990/1995, p. 174). As has been presented heretofore, disciplinary societies
operate “by organizing major sites of confinement in which individuals are always going
from one closed site to another, each with its own laws” (1990/1995, p. 177). But, as
Deleuze points out we have been gradually entering a society of control, one
characterized by “new weapons”, technology, communication, and varying other forms
of social control (1990/1995).
We’re moving toward control societies that no longer operate by confining people
but through continuous control and instant communication. People are of course
constantly talking about prisons, schools, hospitals: the institutions are breaking
down. But they’re breaking down because they’re fighting a losing battle. New
kinds of punishment, education, health care are being stealthily introduced (p.
174-175).
Chiefly, disciplinary societies were confined by molds, while control societies are
modulated by different ways of doing business, school reform, technological
advancements, and other social transmutations that “never allow us to finish anything”
(Deleuze, 1990/1995, p. 178-9). Central to a Deleuzian control society are codes, or
passwords that allow access to and rapid dissemination of digital information that
inevitably work to provide the infrastructure of our society. In school settings these
codes are everywhere, from student tracking data, grades, GPAs, standardized
achievement tests, IQ tests, SAT scores, and other “objective” outcomes that purportedly
signify learning, intelligence, ability and character. As in the business world, these
control codes exist as commodities that are bought, sold, traded, and used as capital for
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advancement, and/or denial into the specialized class. Naturally then, the corporate
University described by Readings, Giroux and Aronowitz qualifies as a Deleuzian micro
control society, a contention supported by Reynolds in his “Readingsonian” critique of
the “ruined University” (2003c).
Schooling is being replaced by continual vocational education, and schools and
universities are encouraged to compete for the ‘best’ results in terms of
excellence. Many universities include the “techo-bureucratic” notion of
excellence on their logos (p. 91).
Accreditation agencies use codes too--outcome data like learning portfolios,
graduation rates, national certification/licensing exam data, graduate and professional
school placement, job placement are all essential parts of the codes that are routinely
collected by accrediting agencies to evaluate and validate the external quality of an
accredited program; codes of excellence. As such, accreditation codes serve as pivotal
control modulators for the respective accrediting agency and help give shape and
structure to the grammatocentric panopticism concept introduced by Hoskin & Macve
(1993, p. 33). As such, proper administration, tracking and reporting of the requisite
grammatocentric codes of quality and excellence can either help, or hurt the respective
program director that is inevitably responsible for management of the desired outcome
codes needed to attain and sustain program accreditation. If the program director
obediently follows the mandatory accreditation processes and edicts as a complicit and
docile body, the students should be guaranteed a quality educational experience that
meets the standards and values of the external judges. And of course, if the collected
codes are deemed to be of acceptable quality, the students producing the codes will
automatically become conscientious, reflective and critical practitioners in their
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respective disciplinary endeavors. However, as Deleuze prophetically pointed out, things
in a control society are not that easy and predictable—things always change—
accreditation standards and guidelines seem to be in a perpetual state of reform, always
promising “best practices”, and “continual quality assessment” (1990/1995).
One can envisage education becoming less and less a closed site differentiated
from the workplace as another closed site, but both disappearing and giving way
to frightful continual training, to continual monitoring or worker-school kids or
bureaucrat-students. They try to present this as a reform of the school system, but
it’s really its dismantling. In a control-based system nothing’s left alone for long
(p. 175).
In addressing Herbert Spencer’s age old and timeless pedagogical question, “what
knowledge is of most worth?” (cited in Marshall, Sears & Schubert, 2000, p. 2), it is
unquestionably the accrediting agency’s knowledge that counts most in this repressive,
mundane and predictably banal micro society that now relies on “credible” learning
outcomes, measurable objectives and standards to control educational progress and
effectiveness. The knowledge that counts in control societies can thus be seen as
continual and restrictive modulators, or codes, that have been preferred by those in
charge, those deemed expert enough to judge, and thus to accredit, control and discipline
others. Those in power remain in power by enforcing what Lyotard calls their own
language games, and by repressing the upstart entities by re-establishing and reverting to
what is “normal” and acceptable operating procedures of the ruling class (Lyotard,
1979/1984, p. 10). In accreditation processes, the powers of decision don’t want to hear
about what they have left out, what they may not know, or what the minority may think
or know—they have the answers, the codes, the language that is needed to assess and
ensure quality.
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In accreditation vernacular, these codes are expressed as “standards &
guidelines”, and usually include required “competencies and proficiencies” that have
been deemed necessary for disciplinary expertise and practice. Together, the standards,
guidelines, and various knowledge domains that the various accrediting bodies put forth
construct the ruling and controlling language games that those seeking the ordained status
of accreditation must meet and follow with utmost accuracy and compliance. Sadly, this
directly implies that through language games, the function of our schools is to
indoctrinate our students into becoming part of this self-serving and domesticated system,
and thus to reinforce the two poles of control societies—signatures standing for
individuals, and numbers or rankings standing for the individual’s position in a mass
(Deleuze, 1990/1995, p. 179-180). Accredited programs provide the signature for the
subjected and disciplined student by providing them with the necessary language games
and codes needed to enter the respective specialized class. This signature typically comes
in the form of a degree from an accredited institution, and/or academic program, which in
turn, provides admission to the appropriate licensing, certification, or proficiency exam
governed by the profession (athletic training certification exam, medical boards, teaching
PRAXIS, etc.), while mass rankings are developed with the codes used by accrediting
agencies to track the number of program graduates passing the respective entry-level
competency exams (to externally assess the quality of the academic program). Foucault
made similar observations about the functioning of disciplinary power in educational
institutions (1975/1977).
The activity which ensures apprenticeship and the acquisition of aptitudes or
types of behavior is developed there by means of a whole ensemble of regulated
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communications (lessons, questions and answers, orders, exhortations, coded
signs of obedience, differentiation marks of the “value” of each person and of the
levels of knowledge) and by means of a whole series of power processes
(enclosure, surveillance, reward and punishment, the pyramidal hierarchy) (pp.
218-219).
To improve upon this condition, and to lessen the impact of a potentially
monstrous and socially debilitating bewildered herd, Chomsky challenges teachers to
become intellectual seekers of the truth; to become more consilient in their knowledge
base and understanding of the true complexities and objective interconnectedness of
knowledge (2000). For disciplined instructors in specialized fields teaching at the
university level, this means that they must be allowed to incorporate their real world,
professional experiences (provided that that they have any), with their own personal
intuition; and that their pedagogy be allowed to adapt, to evolve, and to transcend as
knowledge increases, and as social priorities change. For Deleuze, “our ability to resist
control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every move…we
need both creativity and a people” (1990/1995, p. 176). In Serres’ parlance, teachers must
embrace the “third instruction”, one which attacks the laziness, passiveness, and
absurdness of “the center”, one that embraces the synthesis of multiple forms of knowing
and the uncertainty that accompanies the invention of new knowledge (Serres,
1991/1997, p. 38). In effect, education at all levels should work to create an educational
process that promotes a Freireian state of conscientization, a Foucaltian subjectification
in both personal and professional realms, or one in which students are allowed to
“invent” their own knowledge base and to create their own identity and representation of
their world. Subjectification in a Deleuzian sense is resistive and counter-controlling, it
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“eludes both established forms of knowledge and the dominant forms of power”
(1990/1995, p. 176). Thus situated, authentic subjectivity may be the only constructive
way to challenge the status quo ideology, to attack the utter lack of true democracy that
exists in our schools, and to restore hope and democratic freedom for future generations;
a consideration that will subsequently be the theoretical focus of Chapters 4 and 5 of the
current discourse.
To Chomsky, the state (policymakers, school boards, superintendents, principals)
represents the specialized class, while teachers are the leaders of the bewildered herd. As
it pertains to the current discourse then, the specialized class can be seen as the
accrediting agency and those who control it, while the program directors and instructors
working within the structure of accreditation are empowered to control the bewildered
herd. In this type of hegemonic pedagogy, the bewildered herd simply needs to be
controlled…to be kept in line…to merely be treated as spectators of knowledge and
reality because they are too stupid to run their own affairs. Thus, the herd is in critical
want of the specialized class to make sure that they won’t have the opportunity to act on
the basis of their “misjudgments” (Chomsky, p. 23). In short, to play the game one has to
play by the rules of the specialized class; they must learn the boundaries and terms of the
discourse that accreditation has formulated, and subsequently follow the accrediting
agency’s standards and guidelines for quality in order to be deemed “quality”. In effect,
they must become a binary part of the discourse of pedagogical control and surveillance
that produces “students who are economically competitive but paradoxically monolingual
(Reynolds, 2003b, p. 74). As Reynolds points out in his articulation of “The Perpetual
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Pedagogy of Surveillance”, it is extremely ironic that “the trajectories being developed by
the discourse in pedagogy are antithetical to the primary justification for the type of
knowledge and thinking required by the global marketplace” (p. 74).
Becoming indoctrinated in this matter then, with limited and economically
motivated knowledge and a somewhat perverted notion of truth and democracy entitles
the thriving herd member to the possibility of progressing onward--into the specialized
class, or rather as a “quality” professional member of a discipline (Chomsky, p. 23). If
one plays this discursive game right, the bewildered herd member may move into the
specialized class eventually; but success brings with it a compromise of sorts, as the now
promoted herd member must now be accomplice in perpetuating the system that
oppresses the remaining bewildered herd members. The specialized signature must now
distinguish its mark on society by separating him/her self from those that are not
members of the specialized class. In short, they must reproduce. In any case, one has to
wonder just “who makes up the specialized class” that determines what knowledge, what
methodologies, and what type of pedagogies are the best suited for achieving the “best
outcomes” for the various accredited disciplines.
From this vantage point, it can be argued that any realistic desire to use the words
“education” and “reform” in the same breath, requires us to start with such a critical first
step; that being to soften the effects from and reliance on the accreditation process as the
ultimate judge of educational quality and credibility. We, the teachers, the pedagogues,
must resist the administrative temptation to give into accreditation as the enlightening
guide that will lead us to a simple and effective pedagogy. We, as a collective society
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must lighten the dependence and faith that we seem to have bestowed upon the
accrediting process as the unquestionable “marker of educational quality”. In short,
educators, employers, politicians, and educational administrators must become better
critical consumers of external control mechanisms, and the potential restraints and
modulators that accompany their structure. In laying the responsibility for taking these
steps squarely on the shoulders of the true pedagogical agents, the teachers, Chomsky
acquiesces with this suggestion for a critical and democratic education (Chomsky, 2000)
It is the intellectual responsibility of teachers—or any honest person, for that
matter—to try to tell the truth. It is a waste of time to speak truth to power, in the
literal sense of these words, and the effort can often be a form of self-indulgence.
If and when people who exercise power in their institutional roles disassociate
themselves from their institutional settings and become human beings, moral
agents, then they may join everyone else. But in their roles as people who wield
power, they are hardly worth addressing. It is a waste of time…A good teacher
knows that the best way to help students learn is to allow them to find the truth by
themselves. It is the obligation of any teacher to help students discover the truth
and not to suppress information and insights that may be embarrassing to the
wealthy and powerful people who create, design, and make policies about schools
(p. 21).
After all, shouldn’t we more fully embrace Serres’ pedagogical contention that “the goal
of teaching is to have teaching cease”? (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 22). For those
who believe in or adhere to Serres’ educational philosophy, the question then becomes,
just how can the formal, top down teaching that largely defines our current educational
condition really cease when students are not taught how to “invent their own
knowledge”?
As an athletic training educator and program director of an accredited program, I
too am complicit in my own Foucaldian-Deleuzian control system—I am now forced to
surveil and discipline my own pedagogy according to the system that I am now part of—
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an accredited educational program in the university. Whether I like it or not, I have
become part of the discourse that is control, discipline and surveillance; I have formed
the object of which I speak, and as such, I have become “attached to and retrospectively
formed by the discourse surrounding it” (Pinar et. al., 1995, p. 463). Logical and
unavoidable, I had to become part of the discourse that is accreditation in order to better
understand its discursive structure, and to gain access to the various language games that
shape the discourse it has generated. Additionally, I have become acutely aware of the
academic grim reaper that the accreditation discourse introduces, in that I am now
profoundly leery of succumbing to Lyotard’s “death of the professor”. Because of my
personal and professional attachment to the discursive formation of accreditation, I now
realize that I must find constructive ways to avoid being “killed”, to prevent the
detransformation of my pedagogy, and to resist simply throwing out a cookbook
curriculum with simple linear steps to disciplined success. At the same time though, I
must maintain my intricate connection to the discourse by preserving our program
accreditation, while simultaneously honoring my professional commitments by
continuously working to promote the various values, ideals and knowledges needed to
practice athletic training. I must be an accredited disciple, yet I must also resist the
necrotic spaces that control and discipline my mission, my self, and my consciousness.
In borrowing the term “oppositional postmodernism” from Foster, Reynolds summarizes
the complex and exhaustive challenges that discursive practices present to pedagogues
(2003b).
The problematic is to avoid totalizing theoretical positions yet at the same time
amplify some type of viable oppositional discourse/practice. The question
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becomes, Can we develop a type of “oppositional postmodernism” (Foster 1983)
that doesn’t’ fall into a totalizing discourse, a new orthodoxy, or a fatalistic,
nihilistic position? (p. 83).
If along the way, the disciplined and controlled student (or leader) steps out of
line, seeks critical change outside the controlled spaces, or “accidentally” becomes
critically conscious, he or she will not make it through the game. He or she will remain
one of the herd members. If I, as a program director, were to strongly and critically
challenge certain aspects of my respective accreditation process to the specialized class
who controls my destiny to a certain extent, I would be sure to suffer difficult and
stressful repercussions when my next accrediting cycle arrives. For sure, I would be
subject to increased scrutiny as my reviewers read (surveil) my self-study, annual reports,
and the myriad reams of papers and documents that I must continually produce,
reproduce and update, visit my sites, and interview my students, faculty, and clinical
instructors. Therefore, I must fly under the radar of the surveilling accrediting agency,
while at the same time holding true to my particular principles of higher education and
athletic training education. I believe, as did Deleuze that “subjectification, events and
brains are more or less the same thing”, and that “what we most lack is a belief in the
world” (1990/1995, p. 176). Educators must work persistently and tirelessly to find
creative, promising and reconstructive ways to “precipitate events that elude control and
engender new space-times “ (Deleuze, p. 176). If the academy genuinely intends to
immobilize the technocratic intellectualism now paralyzing the academy, with its
pathological production of dysgnosia and dyscrasia, it must find ways to counteract the

188
discursive formation that is accreditation, and it must resist the increasing neoliberalcorporate influences that now define its character and mission.
So, whose knowledge and whose methods are of most worth in today’s
University? The knowledge put forth by specialized classes that rule the accreditation
machines, of course. The state after all, or in this case the “external control that is not the
state”, has all the answers needed for teaching students how to “be” professionals. The
state/specialized class has no need, or interest, in the various contextual localities and
multiplicities that make both the teaching and practicing of athletic training exciting,
open, and unpredictable, uncontrollable, unstandardizable. In summing up his complex
and polymorphous conception of discipline, Foucault attempts to demonstrate that it is
not something simple, something concrete, nor is it something unitary, while at the same
time demonstrating how power and discipline can, and do, operate within the
accreditation process (1975/1977).
‘Discipline’ may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it
is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of
instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a ‘physics’
or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology. And it may be taken over either by
‘specialized’ institutions, or by institutions that use it as an essential instrument
for a particular end, or be pre-existing authorities that find in it a means of
reinforcing or reorganizing their internal mechanisms of power (p. 215).
It is my contention that schooling, at any level must be based first on Serres line
of reasoning that invention is its’ central purpose, not reproduction and meaningless
debate; and that it must be connected to the larger socio-cultural mission of education,
regardless of what the chosen discipline is/will be. Disciplinary, and thus professional
development should be secondary and subservient to the self and socio-cultural inventive.
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In order to do this, to invent, students must be shown a way to a “third place”. That is,
all parties in the pedagogical relation, both student and teacher must be allowed to endure
the pain, the discomfort, the uncertainty, and most importantly an open
“boundarylessness of self” that accompanies a critical ontological evolution into the third
place (Serres, 1991/1997, p. 43). For this to happen, teachers, intellectuals, and
administrators must reach out and interact with students as subjects viably interconnected
with the purposes of education and democracy, rather than merely treating students as
passive, economically oriented objects knotted within the disciplinary process of a
controlled education. Teachers must of course possess and exhibit a profound and
genuine level of professionalism relevant to their professional and academic fields, and
they must surely adhere to academic and professional standards that subsume both the
discipline’s knowledge base with the teachers’ professional experiences; but much, much
more is needed at this critical juncture of our social and natural histories.
To be clear, I am not calling for pedagogical anarchy or professional nihilism in
any manner, shape or form. Standardization of knowledge, of method, of delivery and
thought is unethical, unprofessional, and counter productive to the larger mission of the
University writ large. And above all, university educators of all disciplines must be
allowed and encouraged to teach students how “to be” citizens with varied professional
lives and purposes, not just merely how “to do” their chosen profession. Young
professionals must be critically and ontologically connected to the larger problems of
society, and to what is required to live “in” a democracy, not just live “off” of a
democracy. All educators, regardless of their impassioned field of study and particular

190
scholarly specialization should take serious heed in their responsibility to help foster and
develop what Berger calls a “sociological consciousness” in all students (Berger, 1965).
Most educators do just this, they educate; but for those operating from within the
restrictive framework of accreditation, this project is certainly more difficult and anxiety
ridden. From this vantage point, it can be argued that any realistic desire to use the words
“education” and “reform” in the same breath, requires us to start with such a critical first
step; that being to soften the effects from and reliance on the accreditation process as the
ultimate judge of educational quality, value and credibility. We, the teachers, the
pedagogues, we must resist the administrative temptation to give into accreditation as the
enlightening guide that will lead us to a simple and effective pedagogy. We as a
collective society must lighten the dependence and faith that we seem to have bestowed
upon the accrediting process as the unquestionable “marker of educational quality”. As
Deleuze says, “we must fight the “widespread progressive introduction of a new system
of domination” (1990/1995, p. 182). Rather, we ought look to those professionals in the
various fields that exude a true and genuine professionalism in all its various
manifestations for guidance as to how to teach students how to “be”. Better yet, we the
members of the academy should embrace and seek out further and more complex
professional experiences relative to our field of study, and to our society writ large as the
central foci of curricular and pedagogical guidance. Technical competence and
professional expertise are not enough; not for our society and its myriad challenges and
problems, and not for what is required to “be” a professional, in any disciplinary field.
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In short, educators, employers, politicians, and educational administrators must
become more critical recognizers, consumers, and resistors of external control
mechanisms, and the potential restraints and modulators that accompany their structure.
As William Reynolds puts it, we must all become more concerned with “wideawakeness” by moving away from the habitual perception that long-term control and
power have upon us as subjects in the system (2003a, p. 66). To do this, to become more
wide-awake, Reynolds suggests that we 1) actively “move towards a passionate
engagement with social criticism”, one capable of deconstructing the various myths,
paradigms, and modes of thought that structure our consciousness, and 2) pay heed to the
language games that we play, and more importantly are part of, and 3) become more
engaged in a critical, transformative, and connected praxis of pedagogy (p. 66-68). If
academics want to maintain their rightful places as intellectuals in the academy, they
must work to open up spaces of freedom, deconstruct boundaries that impede thought,
and effectually challenge the various questions “swirling around the institution of
standards and accountability” (p. 69). In laying the responsibility for professional and
personal “wide-awakening” squarely on the shoulders of the true pedagogical agents, the
teachers, Chomsky assents with those sentiments put forth by Reynolds, Readings,
Aronowitz, Ford, and others for a critical and democratic education (2000).
It is the intellectual responsibility of teachers—or any honest person, for that
matter—to try to tell the truth. It is a waste of time to speak truth to power, in the
literal sense of these words, and the effort can often be a form of self-indulgence.
If and when people who exercise power in their institutional roles disassociate
themselves from their institutional settings and become human beings, moral
agents, then they may join everyone else. But in their roles as people who wield
power, they are hardly worth addressing. It is a waste of time…A good teacher
knows that the best way to help students learn is to allow them to find the truth by
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themselves. It is the obligation of any teacher to help students discover the truth
and not to suppress information and insights that may be embarrassing to the
wealthy and powerful people who create, design, and make policies about schools
(p. 21).
After all, shouldn’t authentic educators fully embrace Serres’ pedagogical contention that
“the goal of teaching is to have teaching cease”? (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 22).
Then again, just how can formal teaching cease if the control, surveillance and
disciplinary practices associated with much of our educational endeavors persists at its
current levels, or constantly changes in order to promote the perpetual quality
enhancement plans that “regulating” agencies such as SACS now mandates?
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CHAPTER 4
UNDISCIPLINING THE DISCIPLINES: REHABILITATING DYSACADEMIA WITH
POSTMODERN THEORY
Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, mapping,
even realms that are yet to come.
Deleuze (1980/1987, p. 4)
We have lost the world. We’ve transformed things into fetishes or commodities,
the stakes of our stratagems; and our a-cosmic philosophies, for almost half a
century now, have been holding forth only on language or politics, writing or
logic.
Serres (1990/1995b, p. 29)
Dyskinesia, Dyslogia & Closed Spaces
In the preceding sections, I have been intending to articulate various institutional,
social, cultural and political forces and how they have historically interacted and
contributed to Dysacademia—an inorganic, yet pathological manifestation now seen to
be inflicting the modern University’s character, mission and effective social utility. In so
doing, I have also attempted to illustrate various autobiographical links to this complex
historical-cultural phenomenon in an effort to openly situate the local, contextual and
subjective nature of this particular critique. For the record, my analyses and subsequent
presentation of Dysacademia are “not” intended to represent an essential or global
phenomenon, infecting all endeavors related to postsecondary education, everywhere in
the Western world; they merely represent things as I see and as I have experienced them.
However, I do see Dysacademia as a prominent and far-reaching epidemic that requires a
systematic analysis and deconstruction if we ever hope to develop effective prophylactic
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(acting to prevent disease) measures capable of preventing it from mutating into a
pandemic situation with a life, energy, and reproductive capacity capable of long lasting
sustenance. If an effective intervention strategy is not devised and implemented soon in
the postmodern University, those concerned with the fate of higher education face the
dire risk of confronting a viral pathology that has the very real potential to become
resistant to any prescription, or treatment that may be cultivated.
As documented in Selingo’s 2003 study on higher education in The Chronicle of
Higher Education, there now exists an inordinately high percentage of students entering
the college and university ranks with deep-seated industrial and capitalistic notions of
what a college degree signifies, what its utility is, and what the primary goal of
graduating from college should be—a good paying job, and the rightful entry into a
higher social class. Yes, most colleges still have core requirements steeped in the
traditional liberal arts curriculum that are designed to induce a certain level of moral,
civic and critical awareness in our educated elite; yes, many colleges are experimenting
with various pedagogical manifestations of interdisciplinary curricula in an attempt to
hold on to the liberal arts and humanities; and, yes critical, transformative institutions of
higher education still exist in this country, and they are doing their best to turn out critical
and reflexive citizens for our democratic society. But the fundamental problem that
describes and hampers the typical Modern University lies in the bare fact that these
positive and exemplary instances seem to be in the ever increasing minority, and the
majority is now made up of general education institutions, on-line, virtual universities,
and money making “degree stampers” who increasingly appear to resemble businesses
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more so than they do inventors of individual subjectivity, transformation and intellectual
complexity. I am not alone, nor am I original in this particular mode of thinking and
level of concern, either. Lyotard (1979/1984) prophetically warned us of this pending
development back in 1979, while Giroux (1999; 2003), Readings (1996), Aronowitz
(2000) and Ford (2002) are amongst those who have been loud and clear with similiar
concerns in the subsequent decades, and as such have effectively helped to keep this
discursive exercise alive. In fact, The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching has taken up this cause in earnest by publishing research regarding American
undergraduate education, and its failure to instill genuine moral and civic responsibility
in its collective student body (Colby, Ehrlich, Beaumont, & Stephens, 2003).
The consequences of this cultural climate include a growing sense that Americans
are not responsible for or accountable to each other; a decline in civility, mutual
respect, and tolerance; and the preeminence of self-interest and individual
preference over concern for the common good. Goals of personal advancement
and gratification too often take precedence over social, moral, or spiritual
meaning (p. 7).
Central to my theoretical exposition of Dysacademia has been an archeological
and genealogical analysis of neoliberalism, power/authority, disciplinarity, and control,
and how each of these inorganic socio-cultural phenomena have coagulated and
interacted to affectively produce various states of “dys” (dysbulia, dyscrasia,
dyserethesia, and dysgnosia) in the organic constituents of the University—the students
and the professorate. Thus viewed, it is my specific contention that the modern
Dysacademic University can now be seen as a closed site governed by disciplinary modes
of thinking and seeing, controlled by authoritative and legitimate disciplinary and
administrative practices and professional paradigms, and predominantly shaped by
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neoliberal and corporate initiatives designed to optimize local, national and now
international markets and modes of production, that together have (dys)formed higher
education into a location designed primarily for specialized, technical and “legitimate”
economic training. All of these factors work in concert to drastically alter the pursuit,
production and possession of knowledge, and thus also, the construction and identity of
the subjective and independent knower. Sliding into this “epistemodic” space has also
been a concern for Michel Serres as he considers the power, relations and irony that
scientific knowledge has with law, reason, and judgment (Serres, 1990/1995b).
Solitude slides so quickly toward inventive delirium and error that the site of
knowledge production is never a relation between an individual and his object,
but rather one between a growing body of researchers checking on one another
and a carved out specialty, defined and accepted by them (p. 21).
In this segment of The Natural Contract, Serres goes on to communicate the “tacit and
stable contracts” that bond the knower/learner to the disciplinary enterprise (in this case,
science), and its particular discourse(s), and languages of authority. Here, Serres
summarizes the inherent connections that readily exist between disciplinarity, control,
and performative neoliberalism in a rather lengthy passage that best illustrates the
pathogenesis of what I have called Dysacademia, and its subsequent and authoritative
affects on the knowing subjects (1990/1995b).
Let’s just list the successive incarnations of this subject: beginning in infancy, the
individual enters into relation with the community, which is already bound by this
contract; well before starting to examine the objects of his specialization, he
presents himself before accredited examining boards, which decide whether or not
to receive him among the learned; after having learnedly worked, he presents
himself once again before other authorities, who decide whether or not to receive
his work into their canonized language. There can be no knower without the first
judgment, no knowledge without the second (p. 21).
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Although he is referring specifically to the “business” of science in these
passages, Serres’ remarks can readily and easily be applied to any discipline, or academic
program of study in the modern University (those that imbibe the qualities and character
of the Dysacademic university described previously, and particularly in the works of
Aronowitz and Readings). In this vein then, it may be helpful to think of the subject as
any college/university student, and the successive incarnations as the four, or five, year
program of study typically undertaken in a modern University by the subject. To begin
with, we are reminded that over 90% of all entering freshmen choose an academic major
based primarily on job and earnings potential (Selingo, 2003, p. A10). Realized as such,
“entering into relation with the community” can be seen to represent the choosing of and
immersion into, a specific academic major that holds economic and social promise, and
typically one that is also governed by a certain “disciplinary contract” that dictates and
disperses the official knowledge, language, and truths associated with the respective
disciplinary field. As subjects progress through the highly structured and sequenced
disciplinary curriculum, the number and type of open spaces for inventive and original
thought gradually and progressively begin to close down. Thus, each subject’s
successive incarnations become less, and less “spacious” as time passes on for each
subject. In reflecting upon the historical and social factors that have led to this “space
closing”, Colby et al’s analysis clearly reflects the central arguments presented herein
(2003).
Science and scientific inquiry emerged as the dominant model for learning in
college, including moral and civic learning. Free, open, and scientific inquiry
would promote intellectual and social progress…Despite the considerable
advantages of the new arrangements, the internal dynamics of specialized
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academic disciplines unintentionally created deep divisions in campuses, often
isolating students and faculty into groups based on discipline, major, or school,
with little opportunity for cross-disciplinary conversations (p. 30).
Ironically, this closing down of the disciplinary spaces can actually be seen to
occur long before the subject “starts to examine the objects of his specialization” on
his/her own terms, or subjective dispositions. Simply put, it is critically ironic that the
more each subject progresses through the sequenced Dyscurriculum, the “less” space
there is for each subject to wander, struggle, and invent their own subjective space and
worldview; things have already been “figured” out for them to some extent or another,
and so wandering off into other adjacent and distant spaces is largely viewed as a
meaningless folly with little academic value. Although a student in a highly specialized
field like athletic training may in fact be learning more advanced and practical
knowledges and skills relative to the field of athletic training in their later academic
years, they are not typically encouraged or motivated to wander and struggle in the open
spaces outside their major academic field. Because of the extreme technocratic and
economic value now placed on one’s chosen major field in the Postmodern University,
those “other” academic spaces capable of informing and transforming the subject in
“other” cultural and social ways (i.e., the liberal arts courses that typically fulfill the
“academic core” requirements at most institutions) have become marginalized, under
appreciated, and even ignored by our culture. As a result, subjective epistemological and
ontological experiences and development in most “non-athletic training spaces” gradually
and progressively close down as subjects advance through their respective disciplinary
college curricula.
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In effect then, although the subject may be on the verge of becoming highly
competent in his/her chosen field, he/she is simultaneously becoming habitually
subjected to the affects of Dysacademia, in that he/she is gradually developing various
states of “dys” subjectification. The subjects thus become objects produced by the
Dysacademic system; in effect, they are objected to a dyseducation. Once the subject
successfully passes through the disciplined, structured, and now typically accredited
curriculum, he/she are then re-subjected to “accredited examining boards” in order to
ascertain if they have become sufficiently, or proficiently “learned” enough to become a
member the specialized Chomskian disciplinary class. If they have learned (been trained)
well enough, they become entitled to the cultural capital that is so valued by today’s
neoliberal society—a well paying job and esteemed position in a higher level of the social
hierarchy. But in the end, one must wonder if all postsecondary graduates actually
become higher educated? Are today’s baccalaureates now citizens capable of dealing
with the critical social, cultural and political issues that face our current and future
generations? Or as Aronowitz laments, are they merely “techno-idiots” trained to
produce “something” that fundamentally and myopically works towards the enhancement
of our nation’s gross domestic product? (2000). Judging by the sentiments put forth by
Colby, et al., there are grave concerns over what “is”, and what “is not” happening on the
campuses of America’s higher education institutions (2003).
We are concerned with the development of the whole person, as an accountable
individual and engaged participant in society—local, state, national, and global.
Responsibility includes viewing oneself as a member of a shared social structure
and as a fair target of evaluative attitudes, such as praise and blame (p. 18).
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Although some institutions of higher education are seeking ways to stimulate
political engagement as well as other kinds of civic participation and leadership,
we have found that this aspect of civic responsibility is less attended to in higher
education, even among schools with strong commitments to moral and civic
learning (p. 19).
Sitting Still & Paying Attention
By dictating who can and cannot enter the respective specialized class (by
conferring degrees, awards, and honors), the disciplinary and control-surveillance based
mechanisms of the modern University expressly take hold of the subject by functioning
as disciplinary and professional “gate keepers”. The control and surveillance
mechanisms don’t stop there however—depending upon the chosen disciplined field, the
learned object is continually subjected to disciplinary scrutiny as his/her work is
appraised for acceptance/rejection into the respective canonized language. In our current
neoliberal epoch, the canonized language that Serres alludes to can be viewed as either
the traditional canons associated with scientific/academic knowledge, or those canonized
languages now generated by performative and economic modes of production (i.e., is it a
valuable commodity or fetish?). This contractual recognition thus re-highlights the
significance of Herbert Spencer’s timeless question regarding “whose knowledge is of
most worth”, while simultaneously illustrating the decentered position and space that the
individual, knowing subject now occupies in the Dysacademic institution. Thus (dys)
situated, the knowing subject paralyzed in a controlling and disciplinary structure of the
modern University becomes ill with additional “dys” conditions, most notably
“dyskinesia” (impairment of the power of voluntary movement, Miller & Keane, 1983, p.
348), and “dyslogia” (impairment of the power of reasoning, Miller & Keane, 1983, p.

201
348). The submissive and docile nature of disciplined pedagogy that induces dyskinesia
and dyslogia is aptly captured by Serres’ analysis of the contractual relationships our
society has come to rely upon for disciplinary knowing and being (1990/1995b).
Thus experienced by the former individual subject, me or you, an obedient
receiver or transmitter and a possible inventive producer of knowledge, the
process of knowing runs from trials to cases to causes, from judgments to choices,
and so never leaves the juridical arena (p. 21-22).
With this critical awareness in hand, the current chapter will change course of the
discourse by putting forth a counter narrative of expectation and potential for more open,
uncontrolled, and inter/anti disciplinary ways of knowing and learning for the individual
subject(s). In medical parlance, the care provider cannot merely treat the symptoms of
dyskinesia and dyslogia, or else they will simply return, stronger and more robust than
ever. Rather, the care provider attempting to extinguish Dysacademia must fully
scrutinize and treat the root causes of these interconnected pathologies in order to
resolutely purge the patient of its pain, discomfort, and eventually its various
dysfunctions (symptoms).
If this is indeed the case, that the socio-cultural role of the University has
unashamedly shifted towards neoliberal principles of market value, commodification and
technocratic expertise and away from intellectual diversification and maturity, then the
majority of young citizens entering our complex, post human/ modern /disciplinary
/colonial /911 /structural world as professional policy makers, politicians, business
leaders, educators, and eventually parents, are lacking a certain critical mass required to
confront the immediate and long-term posthuman conditions staring the collective “us”,
right in the face. Something needs to change before the negentropic (negentropy in a
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closed system is dangerous due to the structural constraints that define and objectify the
system) and closed modern University system self implodes upon itself, and subsequently
obliterates our civilization, our humanity, and our ecosphere in the process.
Impermeable Membranes, Language Games, & Antiosmosis
In The Postmodern Condition (1979/1984), Jean Francois Lyotard examines the
status of science, technology and the arts, and the typical ways that knowledge and
information are portrayed and shared in the Western world from a postmodern
perspective. This landmark text centers on the development, implementation,
perpetuation and deconstruction of knowledge, and their relation to power and authority,
by way of what Lyotard calls a “metanarrative”. In particular, Lyotard critiques the
sociological and historical development of knowledge, language games, narratives &
subsequent metanarratives, performativity, disciplines, modern systems theory, and
interdisciplinarity. In brief, Lyotard contends that language games, the base form of
communication involved in truth assertions that drive all human communication (p. 15),
and knowledge, a pragmatic competency in playing a particular language game (p. 53),
are inextricably linked and coalesce to create small narratives that serve as authoritative
bases for understanding reality (p. 23). In time, the smaller, micro narratives that persist
and gain legitimacy merge to construct larger macro, or metanarratives that signify
authoritative claims to truth and reality. Essentially then, the various languages and
discourses that drive the constructed metanarratives function to circumscribe the
epistemological contract that Serres analyzes; a phenomenon perhaps best epitomized by
the hegemonic authority that science quietly enjoyed without distraction prior to
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postmodern and post positivistic deconstruction of the metanarratives upon which it had
been founded (p. 31-32). Lyotard expands the conversation regarding our condition by
exposing the postmodern delegitimization of science’s modern metanarratives that has
occurred recently, and in doing so demarcates postmodern science as being
“discontinuous, catastrophic, nonrectifiable, and paradoxical” (p. 60).
Within this context Lyotard expresses his somewhat paradoxical views on the
disciplines, and their resultant effects upon the development and disbursement of
knowledge in the various subjects of learning and inquiry. In one sense, he argues for a
post disciplinary structure whereby working at the limits of what rules permit in order to
invent new moves, might allow the development of new rules and thus, new games, yet
he simultaneously critiques and remains leery of any narratives that have the potential to
turn into metanarratives (Lyotard, 1985/1990, p. 100). In order for this to occur, one kind
of inquiry would not be able to dominate others as the “way” to knowledge, and thus, the
structure of research and curricula would be resituated in order to maximize the
multiplicity of small narratives. For Michel Serres, classic epistemology in the “modern”
sense is thus unattractive, unoriginal, and lazy because it merely reproduces and
repackages old ideas and information with “ultra technical vocabulary that breeds fear
and exclusion” (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 24); and thus, an “authentic epistemology
can be seen then as the art of inventing, the springboard for passing from the old to the
new” (p. 14). To Foucault, “the challenging of all phenomena of domination at whatever
level or under whatever form they present themselves—political, economic, sexual,
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institutional and so on” represents the essential purpose and critical foundation of
philosophy (cited in Bernauer & Rasmussen, 1988, p. 20).
In referring to that fragmented disciplinary and controlling University that I have
previously described, systems scientist Ervin Laszlo comments on the awkward social
and professional quandaries that can occur at the water cooler or copy machine, in simple
terms that most professionals can appreciate with honest and candid reflection (1996).
The literary historian specializing in early Elizabethan theater may not have much
in common with a colleague specializing in Restoration drama, and will find
himself reduced to conversation about the weather when encountering an expert
on contemporary theater (p. 2).
And as Laszlo points out, the consequences of this modern educational paradigm are that
knowledge is largely pursued in isolation, thus presenting fragmentary and isolated
pictures of our perceived reality, rather than being pursued in depth and integrated
breadth, which would give us a more coherent and continuous picture of the various
structures and organizational hierarchies of knowledge (p. 2). Karin Knorr Cetina (1999)
addresses this concern and extends the discourse surrounding it further, by positing that
we live in an “epistemic culture” structured and organized largely around the production
of expert scientific knowledge. If Knorr-Cetina’s assertion is indeed true, and I believe
that it is, then knowledge must be viewed as more than information, more than testable
material, and much more than fragments or sound bites from the various fields; while it
must also be realized that “science” has effected the construction and sustenance of
impermeable barriers that prevent the osmotic transfer of knowing, ideas, and
information in and amongst the various knowledge domains. While we have previously
articulated some of the genealogical and archeological factors that have influenced the
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fragmentary and solitary nature of today’s academic disciplines, and thus the discourses
that shape, constrain and define them, there are additional and deeply allied ingredients
that must be investigated if we are to fully understand how academia can be seen as a
closed space.
In extending this discourse beyond that of science alone, and into the economic
and philosophical spheres Lyotard deconstructs the innate connections that exist in our
modern society between science and cultural power by reminding the reader that
scientific knowledge “does not represent the totality of knowledge”, and rather that it
”exists in conflict and in addition to other narrative ways of knowing” (1979/1984, p. 7).
In considering the typical consumer’s strong hyper reliance and blind faith on scientific
knowledge, in combination with the perception that other forms of knowing are
marginalized and oppressed because of their perceived subjectivity and minimal
economic value, one might wonder just where this situates our current society and what
“it really knows”. In short, who really controls what counts as knowledge and what
doesn’t, and, how does one gain access to the performative and legitimized fields of
knowledge that are deemed valuable and critical to society? Perhaps more importantly,
does there not exist any sort of “middle space” when it comes to knowledge, its
production, or its possession?
For Lyotard and other postmodern/poststructural theorists, the topographical
splitting of the various knowledge fields into specialized disciplines is not the central
concern. Rather, the various language games, semiotic chains and specialized discourses
that have concurrently been constructed to uphold and enforce notions of power and
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authority stand as the focal alarm point; especially with the socially legitimated economic
and scientific fields that now dominate our social consciousness (Lyotard, 1979/1984, p.
8). To Lyotard, disciplinary language games thus become responsible for the
construction of hypomobile and “antiosmotic” barriers keeping those not in possession of
the appropriate language apparatus “out” of the game; which subsequently leads to the
“occidental” (knowledge and power being two sides of the same question) development
of the “knowledge-power” duality that dictates “how” knowledge is generated, “what”
knowledge is worthy, and “who” gets to make knowledge decisions (p. 9). Inevitably,
this postmodern actuality leads to a concomitant recyclable production and regulation of
knowledge and authority that feeds off of various language games and marginalizes
“internodal” inquiry and mobility, while preventing unique, local and personal inventions
of knowledge that are capable of providing a material contextuality, subjectivity and
partial objectivity for each individual consumer. In the end, perhaps Lyotard’s language
games best distinguishes and perpetuates the disciplinary fragmentation of knowledge
that now exists in our culture; a “comminution” of knowledge that will inevitably
(already has?) lead to an intellectual ineptitude of sorts, and one that effectively renders
E. O. Wilson’s challenge for higher education a serious and formidable obstacle for
educators and concerned citizens alike.
It is here specifically that Lyotard’s theoretical position seems to comply with the
post structural approach I intend to propose, but with one additional caveat—Lyotard
seems to contradict his post disciplinary views in other sections of The Postmodern
Condition. Specifically, Lyotard seems to reject any interdisciplinary organization of
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knowledge, as it implies to him a “common measure”; or, the development of new
language games and metanarratives, which of course, reifies existing narratives and
eventually, metanarratives (Lyotard, 1979/1984, p. 50-53). In “defining” a poststructural
structure as “an ordered multiplicity of ordered multiplicities”, Michel Serres’ poetic
thoughts can be seen to effectively soften Lyotard’s extreme, and perhaps somewhat
nihilistic poststructural concern with a more modest appreciation for the power and
epistemological infinity of “multiplicities” and fragile syntheses of thought (1982/1995a).
The work of transformation is that of the multiple (p. 101).
It is not an everyday occurrence when there is a potential meeting between refined
branches of knowledge, overt phenomena, and everyday language. We need to
conceive the multiple as such…we need it in the social sciences and the
humanities (p. 103).
In my view, higher education ought provide the same critical and philosophical
foundation for all of its subjects; the ability to challenge, to deconstruct, to operationalize,
and to appreciate multiple problematic perspectives should be endowed in all college and
university graduates; regardless of their chosen field of study, or subsequent professional
line of work. But for this to happen, the history of academia and its power to reproduce
must first be understood and appreciated as a chaotic, yet incestual process and system.
Andrew Abbott, a self professed “eclectic”, has attempted to eradicate the
intellectual boundaries between interpretative and positivistic work in sociology and
kindred fields as his central them for the Chaos of Disciplines. Although largely based
on sociology and the other social sciences, Abbott’s work regarding the history of
American academia and its’ industrial, economic, intellectual and social roles in our
society shed considerable light on the current status of today’s academic status. In
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Abbot’s words, the aim of this particular text is more general than sociology, in and of
itself (Abbott, 2001).
While a principled defense of eclecticism and indeed of a certain form of
relativism is the personal aim of the book, understanding recent developments in
sociology is its substantive one (p. xii).
Abbott is clear to elucidate the fact that he does not challenge the foundational
uncertainties of epistemologies (“there is indeed not one sociology, but many”), and
seems to not want to contribute to the development and/or perpetuation of the grand
metanarrative argument, but does set out to challenge the way that scholars in his field
interact (2001, p. 4). In his view, too many sociologists betray a common structural
pattern, or a “universal knowledge upon whose terrain the local knowledges wander”, and
it is this behavior that prevents meaningful and productive epistemological cohesion or
mutual understanding. To be clear, Abbott does not advocate for a marginilization of
sectarian sub disciplines or alternative epistemologies, but rather he calls for his
colleagues to pay more attention to the larger, but implicit framework that such local
knowledges end up making together with proper deconstruction and reconstruction
methods and modes of inquiry. In short, Abbott is implicitly playing both sides of the
modern-postmodern debate by calling for the development and progress of alternative
voices and knowledge (local and smaller knowledges), but without allowing them to
become so divergent, so fragmented, that they lose any relation to the bigger, larger
framework; which in his case, is the social and human condition. In Abbott’s concise
way, he mirrors the consilient significance put forth by Wilson (Abbott, p. 5).
My interest in that larger implicit framework is both theoretical and practical. On
the one hand, I feel that an understanding of it will clarify the relations between
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various subsets of social science and sociology. Knowing the framework
simplifies—perhaps even explains –those relations (p. 5).
According to Abbott, as American colleges continued to follow the technoindustrial and consumerist model of growth, academic disciplines gradually developed as
social constructions designed to support geographical and cultural initiatives (2001, p.
125). The reasons for this evolution are many and complex, but include the sheer number
and decentralized nature of American universities and colleges, the rapid expansion of
faculty positions to staff the institutions and run the myriad academic majors that have
proliferated in the Post WWII era, and the increasing trend for professional schools to
require arts and science degrees as prerequisites for admission (Abbott, p. 125). In time,
the gradual blending of graduate and undergraduate programs (on the same campuses),
the need for schools to have comparative advantages (different, specialized programs for
recruitment of top students) for economic viability, the development of professional
subsystems (organizations, meetings, journals, languages, etc.) led to the eventual
disciplinary fractilization of the disciplines into separate and disparate fields of study.
Abbott takes this evolutionary growth a step further by positing that in effect, a dual
institutionalization was started whereby the specialization and alienation of discipline
subsystems led to special doctoral training programs, which in turn, led to highly
specialized undergraduate degree programs that had strong economic ties. The college
major, according to Abbott is “the most consequential single disciplinary structure-in
terms of extent and impact” (2001, p. 127). Ironically and amazingly, and as pointed out
by Abbott this observation has never been the subject of serious pedagogical debate. Of
course it is not hard to imagine what the primary driving force behind this process might
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be--the technico-scientific thirst of the ruling corporate and political classes, and their
well rooted financial connections to major degree programs and other higher education
initiatives (Apple, 2001; Giroux, 2003).
Chaos & Consilience In The Disciplines
As is the case between many contemporary professionals and academics across
the disciplines who have become specialized experts in their respective fields (see
Lazlo’s “water cooler” comments), the educated object of Dysacademia is also being
denied a more meaningful episteme and deeper understanding of the world’s chaotic
culture, its’ many structural and organizational complexities, and its’ many
interconnected nodes of significance and interpretation both within and outside the
various scientific disciplines. In short, the modern University’s dyskinesia is effectively
inducing dyserethesia in far too many of the objects of Dysacademia. In a Lyotardian
vein then, perhaps we must more critically embrace the sentiment that since we are living
in postmodern times, we must therefore address knowledge in a more complimentary
postmodern manner.
Based upon Wilson’s courageous work regarding the disciplinary fragmentation
of knowledge presented earlier in chapter two, consilience is one conceptual framework
with the potential to resonate with the work of Lyotard, Serres & other critical theorists,
and so I will re-present Wilson’s theoretical argument in this chapter in order to explicate
his educational implications, and in an attempt to exfoliate the “good” parts of his model
that can be seen to partially support my present theoretical argument. But because
Wilson calls for biology to serve as “the center” of all knowledge, and for reductionistic
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thinking to be the dominant mode of inquiry for all knowledge domains, postmodern
theorists can/will/have attack(ed) Wilson’s translucent framework, accusing him of
creating a new “metanarrative” that governs truth and objective reason. And, as I have
previously articulated in my analysis of Consilience in Chapter 2, its postmodern
potential is/will be effectively diluted and disabled. In the end then we need something
more than consilience…we need something else. In recognizing this, I will then
introduce and extrapolate the central tenets of open systems theory, chaos theory and
cybernetics in an attempt to construct a postmodern framework for my alternative
educational paradigm in hopes of articulating a thought and action process capable of
rehabilitating Dysacademia, and its various sub maladies.
Consilience: Why It Won’t Rehabilitate Dysacademia
In his controversial text, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, Wilson
reintroduces Consilience as a term first presented by William Whewell in his 1840
synthesis The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences (Wilson, 1998, p. 8). As reported by
Wilson, Whewell describes Consilience as a ‘jumping together’ of knowledge by the
linking of facts and fact-based theory across disciplines to create a common groundwork
of explanation”. The author suggests that Consilience might actually be an intellectual
spin-off from the Ionian Enchantment (an expression coined by physicist and historian
Gerald Holton)-a belief in the unity of the sciences, or a conviction which is far deeper
than a mere working proposition that the world is orderly and can be explained by a small
number of natural laws (Wilson, 1998, p. 9). It is apparent to me that the word may have
its roots in Webster’s definition of the word conciliar, meaning, “of, relating to,” or
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perhaps from conciliate, meaning, “to bring into agreement” (Merriam-Webster, 1997, p.
167). Whatever the source, Wilson has constructively developed a critical philosophy
calling for the unity of all knowledge.
Drawing on the physical sciences and biology, anthropology, psychology,
religion, philosophy, and the arts, E. O. Wilson demonstrates why the goals and
accomplishments of the original Enlightenment era are surging back to life, and how they
are again beginning to mold our exciting and profoundly complex world. Professor
Wilson believes that the Enlightenment thinkers of the 17th and 18th centuries (The
Marquis de Condorcet & Francis Bacon, in particular) were mostly right in developing
scientific assumptions that contributed to a lawful world. In a strikingly parallel
sentiment to those put forth by Doll (re: the scientific misapplication of Newtonian and
Cartesian principles) in 1993 (Doll, 1993, p.2), the author makes the point that the current
and ongoing fragmentation of knowledge and the resulting chaotic status in the discipline
of philosophy, are not reflections of the “real world”, but are instead man made (sic)
byproducts of scholarship. The philosophy and scientific spirit of the great thinkers of
the Enlightenment age actually promoted the intellectual engagement of the intrinsic
unity of knowledge, not the separation and ultra-specialization that is so prevalent today
(Wilson, 1998, p. 8).
In strong fashion, Wilson states that the greatest enterprise of the mind has always
been, and will always be, the attempted linkage of all the sciences and the humanities
together (Wilson, 1998, p. 9). Although this sentiment appears to be very modern and
mechanistic, perhaps primarily due to his choice of wording (linkage), one could argue
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that a postmodern perspective exists here as well; one much like that presented by
William Doll. What Wilson is really trying to say with this statement is that unless the
humanities, the social sciences, and the natural sciences work with a strong sense of
coherence and interdisciplinary urgency, the knowledge base and level of understanding
of the world and human condition will continue to be nebulous, murky, and unresolved.
In short, it is Wilson’s contention that we need to collectively come to a better
understanding of the workings of the human mind, the notion of consciousness, and the
true meaning of knowledge before we can begin to constructively address the social and
ethical illnesses of our current society (Wilson, 1998).
A balanced perspective cannot be acquired by studying disciplines in pieces but
through pursuit of the Consilience among them. To the extent that the gaps
between the great branches of learning can be narrowed, diversity and depth of
knowledge will increase (p. 13).
In these latter statements Wilson uses coherence while concurrently shedding
light on our current level of understanding of the world, while simultaneously expressing
his scientific-empirical roots for truth and knowledge and us. However, Wilson is
cautious and somewhat realistically reserved in stating the challenges, barriers, and
delimitations of Consilience. He readily admits that the whole notion of Consilience is
indeed a neo-intellectual entity that is currently embraced by only a few philosophers and
scientists. Like other new theories and philosophical ideas, it possesses a certain
vagueness and quality of the unknown. So new if fact, that the author categorizes his
intellectual presentation as “…essentially a metaphysical worldview” (Wilson, 1998, p.
9).
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Although many might consider the 4 domains that Wilson presents
(environmental policy, ethics, social science, and biology) as being closely connected so
that rational inquiry in one would trigger a chain reaction of reasoning in the other, the
modern academic mind separates each domain so that they stand-alone with their own
practitioners, languages, modes of analysis, and standards of validation (Wilson, 1998, p.
9). In her exposition on the history of interdisciplinarity, Lattuca (2001) points out that
although problem based interdisciplinary research and curricular projects have been in
existence for some time in the academy, “general systems theory and structuralist
thinking provided the theoretical foundation” for much of the efforts, and so
“structuralism and semiotics defied disciplinary boundaries in their search for underlying
systems or forms that would unify theory in disparate areas” (p. 9-10). The result of a
structuralist based interdisciplinarity, or consilience then is confusion; a confusion, or
chaos that may be due in part to the evolution and history of the American academic
institution and its’ subsequent economic dependence on majors and academic
specializations (Abbott, 2001).
Wilson’s way to avoid confusion, which Francis Bacon purportedly termed as
“the most fatal of errors”, is to unify the elements of the domains with a consilient
approach to learning and inquiry. This, Wilson claims, is where most real world
problems exist and one in which fundamental analysis is most needed. The problem
though, is that the modern academic fragmentation of information and concepts from the
various specialized disciplines have left few concepts and maps available to guide us into
interconnected, or interdisciplinary ways of seeing and thinking. Scientists have become
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too specialized, too focused on their own narrow worldview, and too reliant on the
“objectivity” of the scientific method to genuinely see the consilient nature of their work.
A new type of science is needed to overcome this modernist, anti-Newtonian and antiCartesian scientism that predominates our current culture. Doll seems to echo this
sentiment by arguing that a post-modern curriculum should contain a “new version” of
science; one that’s more complex, indeterminate and more interactive than the classical
version. This new science should, and will dominate the status quo and subsequently
generate a new paradigm characterized by self-organization, dissipative structures,
ecological balance, punctuated evolution and complexity (Doll, 1993, p. 12).
How does this all relate to education in the large scope of things; including, but
not limited to, pedagogy, curriculum and higher education? Wilson addresses the plight
of the current educational, intellectual and professional environment in his chapter on The
Great Branches of Learning. His views on the state of education in our country are clear
and succinct (Wilson, 1998).
In education the search for Consilience is the way to renew the crumbling
structure of the liberal arts. During the past thirty years the ideal of the unity of
learning, which the Renaissance and Enlightenment bequeathed us, has been
largely abandoned. With rare exceptions American universities and colleges have
dissolved their curriculum into a slurry of minor disciplines and specialized
courses (p. 12).
Part of the causation for this movement can be seen in recent trends of college and
university curriculum. As reported but not referenced by Wilson, the percentage of
mandatory courses in general education has decreased by more than fifty percent in US
colleges and universities, while the number of actual courses (major specialization) has
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doubled; and only one-third of the higher education institutions in the US (in 1997)
required students to take at least one course in the natural sciences (1998, p. 13).
Opening The System Of Knowledge & Knowing For The Self
One evolutionary effect of the previously articulated neoliberal shift in
contemporary educational institutions has been the gradual and pronounced production of
educational technocrats (itself a modernist concept) that values specialized expertise and
technique over a broader, wiser and more holistic approach to knowledge and life (Doll,
1993, p. 24). In contrast to our “uniquely powerful and powerfully unique” disciplinary
system (Abbott, 2001, p. 128), European university systems developed intermediate
institutions to help structure the larger interactional fields of the university because they
realized that most complex interactional fields tend to break up into clusters of entities
that develop internal identities. This recognition thus provides a better small frameworklarge framework platform for students, who are then able to see and connect the two
frameworks with a more consilient perspective and understanding.
In multiple and separate cases, even Albert Einstein expressed concern with the
growing trend towards overburdening our young students with specialized knowledge
(1936/1982; 1952/1982). To Einstein, highly specialized and technical education, if not
countered with diversity and depth, would preclude a more well-rounded and harmonious
enlightenment (Einstein, 1936/1982),
I want to oppose the idea that the school has to teach directly that special
knowledge and those accomplishments which one has to use later directly in life.
The demands of life are much too manifold to let such a specialized training in
school appear possible. The development of general ability for independent
thinking and judgment should always be placed foremost, not the acquisition of
special knowledge (p. 64)…It is essential that the student acquire an
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understanding of and a lively feeling for values. He must acquire a vivid sense of
the beautiful and of the morally good. Otherwise he—with his specialized
knowledge—more closely resembles a well-trained dog than a harmoniously
developed person (p. 66).
As Wilson, Doll and Einstein individually argue in their own manners, only when
natural science, the social sciences and the humanities are all approached together with
Consilience as the backbone to their scholarship and teaching, will a meaningful
educational reform occur. As a measure of this advanced interdisciplinary frame of
thinking, Wilson challenges the nature, content, and effectiveness of higher education by
posing an edict for all college graduates. According to Wilson, a truly effective and
consilient curriculum should allow every college student, public intellectual and political
leader to be capable of answering a complex, yet simple and critical question (1998)
What is the relation between science and the humanities, and how is it important
for human welfare? (p. 13).
From a personal perspective, my own educational experiences preparing to become a
technocratically trained professional (Chapter 1), and my subsequent eleven years in
higher education can certainly attest to, and locally verify the insightful comments made
by Aronowitz, Doll, Abbott and Wilson. It is my humble impression that this complex,
multi-factorial and far-reaching question could serve as the foundation for curriculum
development for many levels of education. Perhaps it could also provide an “addendum”
to the theoretical framework of many postmodern curriculum theorists, thus providing a
new angle, or a new approach to the discourse of educational substance and reform
movements.
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In many ways, the curriculum theory field may be seen as a microcosm of
Wilson’s notion of Consilience. Upon familiarizing themselves with the deeper
underpinnings of Consilience, some theorists might agree that it just might be an effective
and dynamic metaphor for curriculum reconceptualization. Except for one glaring, and
modernism based fault that can be witnessed in Wilson’s desire for a unity of knowledge,
biology and the natural sciences serve as the central, binding discipline around which the
humanities and social sciences interconnect. In using biology as “the” central node for
the model (which, interestingly enough contrasts with Newtonian/Cartesian modernists,
such as Bertrand Russell, who prefer to anoint a more mechanical philosophy—physics—
as the center of all knowledge) Wilson violates one of the central tenets of postmodern
theory. Ironically, or perhaps paradoxically, postmodern theorist William Doll agrees
with Wilson concerning the use of biology as the center stone for a diverse and connected
curriculum, citing biology’s inherent hierarchical structure, complex organization, open
system, and its connectedness to other natural sciences as the reasons for such a claim
(1993, p. 58-68).
Doll certainly makes a strong scientific claim (he himself being admittedly
“unversed” in the humanities as well as he would like) for the use of biology as the
centerpiece of our curriculum (which of course, opens his stance up to considerable
debate and disconcertment); but it is the metaphor of biology for curriculum that actually
holds more interest and potential for education. In its most simplistic representation, Doll
believes that curriculum and educational systems should be biologically oriented because
humans are living, open systems (1993, p. 58). Doll continues to present his idea of
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curriculum as an open, biological system by arguing that such open systems are
transformative. In direct contrast, Doll, presents the current, modernist and Tylerian
curriculum as a closed, passive transmission system that excludes the student, the teacher,
and the complexity of human thought from the center discourse(s) (p. 58). To further
support this biological metaphor, Doll even ventures to say that physics (long considered
the center of science) has excluded the concept of interaction and has thus had
devastating effects on curriculum and student growth (p. 63). Perhaps if Doll was more
cognizant of the updated notion that open systems theory, chaos and cybernetics, and
their many similarities and connected constructs, can (and are being) actually be applied
to social systems as well as living systems, his articulation of a more biological
curriculum might take on a different slant today.
Another common and central theme put forth by myriad postmodern theorists
interested in opening up spaces for inquiry and development, is Herbert Spencer’s ageold question pertaining to “what knowledge is of most worth?” (cited in Marshall, Sears,
& Schubert, 2000, p.1). A connected, consilient model for a curriculum’s content could
be imagined with input from the personal experiences, cultural diversity, ethnic heritage,
“t”ruth and active democracy, gender and race issues, and so forth; all interconnected,
coherent and interdependent, and “jumped together” in a way that promotes individual
growth, creativity, intellectual honesty, and critical thought. Around these central themes
are several dynamic and interconnected variables that must be included in a complete and
realistic educational system. In this sense, one might propose for a consilient curriculum
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to be developed and implemented in place of the current modern day educational
curriculum structure.
One need not look much further than the table of contents in the cautiously
comprehensive text edited by William Pinar and colleagues, to witness the desire that
curriculum reconceptualists have for a more postmodern, complex, heterogeneous, and
consilient curriculum. Understanding Curriculum (UC) is a text that chronicles and
outlines a very multidisciplinary, yet central approach to curricular reconceptualization in
an attempt to better “understand curriculum” (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery, & Taubman,
1995). The various works in UC demonstrate the multi-factorial nature and myriad
domains of consideration that are involved with a postmodern curriculum theory; ones
that historically, have been marginalized, neglected, or not yet thoroughly evaluated.
This text, like many other works in the field, includes considerable discourse and debate
on issues ranging from politics, race, gender, phenomenology, arts, religion and
internationalism. In considering the depth and breadth of this landmark text in
curriculum, it might not be inappropriate to guardedly draw some parallels with Wilson’s
central arguments for the coherence of the many faces of social science, the humanities,
and the natural sciences. The critical difference between these two conceptions however,
is that Pinar, et al.’s vision has the student and the teacher firmly situated at the vortex of
all educational endeavors, in the center of the system shining like beacons in a foggy
landscape; while Wilson’s ideology is completely void of the personal self and its utility
in the learning process. The five domains of a metaphorical postmodern consilient
curriculum based on the tenets and arguments presented in UC, would be psychological,
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personal, emotional, intellectual and cultural; all of which would interconnect and affect
the true understanding, growth and development of the participles in the center—the
students and the teachers. Again, this metaphorical representation is cacophonously
similar to the open, biologically oriented model put forth by Doll (and admittedly
borrowed from Piaget) in his call for a living, human centered, and self-organizing
educational system (1993, p. 64). If we applied Wilson’s explanation of consilience to
curriculum then, the relative success of such an idea is dependant upon the relative state
of knowing in each of the 5 core participles that Pinar and all have expressed in the
reconceptualization of curriculum.
One could also easily extrapolate other sub components of the five participles
synoptically highlighted above, and continue the web of connectedness across many
levels, layers and fields, as Deleuze & Guattari express in the articulation of their
“rhizome” concept (1980/1987, p. 7). In fact, if this were done for both student and
teacher imagine what that would look like schematically! Considering the sheer
magnitude of potential variables, or what Serres calls the “multiplicities of multiples”,
that come into play with this modular expansion the potential is mind boggling, and
perhaps even intimidating for some. Doll echoes these sentiments with his curricular
implications for teachers and critical points for curriculum makers (Doll, 1993, p. 67).
To teachers, Doll suggests that they need to assess what performance and operations have
been learned at one level and (added for emphasis) those that are in the embryonic stages
of development. To do this however, the teachers must be able to understand these
varying levels of knowledge and cognitive maturity themselves. In short, the teacher
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must be consilient in their knowing by having an understanding of the student’s position,
experiences, understanding, physiological and psychological states and maturity, AND
know the various content, its’ various levels and underpinnings that are to be taught to the
student. Mind boggling indeed, but required. For curriculum developers, there are 4
points that Doll feels are essential to creating a consilient curriculum (my term for
emphasis) (Doll, p. 67):
1. Biology with its hierarchies, complexity, and network relations is
heuristically a richer metaphor for curriculum.
2. Only available to those able to move to open framework.
3. Transformation requires perturbations.
4. Teacher awareness of multiple levels of operation is required.
Using biology as the center is very tempting since after all, it is the “study of life”; but
alas, it is also very Wilsonian modern too, and so we must be cautious of the
metanarratives it imbibes. From a positive perspective thought, the ability to move to
“open frameworks” imbibes a sense of open systems theory, perturbations are echoed in
Serres’ need for “turbulence” and discomfort, and “multiple levels of operation” oozes a
consilient and chaotic undertone that would make Deleuze, Guattari, Serres and other
open systems thinkers proud.
In these highly analogous and compatible models (Doll’s and Wilson’s adapted
that I have been calling postmodern consilience), the postmodern and effective
curriculum connects the personal experiences of the teacher and student in a way that
makes them a “multifarious one”. The psychological state and emotional well being of
both teacher and students must be considered, and subsequently interwoven into the
educational experiences and fabric to allow each participle to grow and mature in
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personal and truly democratic ways. Of particular importance in this view is the cultural
diversity, background and perspective that each teacher and student brings to the
classroom. Excluding the many cultural components of education and society, and their
inherent interconnectedness will effectively undermine the perceptive notion we have of
our “truly democratic and polyvocal society”. The state, curiosity, capacity and well
being of the student’s intellects are generally considered to be the central pillar of the
educational mission today. However, the consilient, reconceptualized curriculum
includes the teacher and at least 4 other interdependent domains, without which, the task
of culturing and developing the intellect becomes very difficult, if not impossible.
Noam Chomsky, author and professor of linguistics and philosophy at MIT, may
be seen as a modern day consilient scholar whose works have influenced the diverse, yet
connected fields of philosophy, political science, sociology, biology, and the cognitive
sciences. In his recent text, Chomsky on MisEducation, he and Editor Donaldo Macedo
argue for a true democratic revolution in the halls and classrooms of our schools. Among
other compelling arguments, they make the very poignant point that schools are by and
large designed to support the dominant interests of our society-those with wealth and
power. The function of our schools currently is to socialize, or indoctrinate, our students
into becoming part of this self-serving system. Along the way, the truth is not taught or
encouraged because this will cause a dramatic shift in the distribution of power in our
social and political system. In reality, Chomsky argues, teachers in our current system
teach myth, not truth, so as to safeguard the ideological yet often hypocritical doctrinal
system of the United States (2000, p. 6).
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As Chomsky and Macedo set up the foundation for their discourse on
MisEducation, several consilient themes come to the surface and expose themselves as
core philosophical tenets that the authors seem to rely upon. While discussing the need to
teach political clarity (and thus help lead to the truth and a breaking out of the ideological
and non democratic system of US education), the authors allude to the need for teachers
and students to be capable of linking different historical events if they wish to gain a clear
understanding of reality (Chomsky, 2000).
The inability to see through the obvious contradiction is part and parcel of the
ideological manipulation that often produces a disarticulation of bodies of
knowledge by dislodging observes and sustains them. This disarticulation of
knowledge anesthetizes consciousness, without which one can never develop
political clarity (p. 8).
With this in mind, Chomsky presents several historical examples whereby the
typical American intellectual cannot truly decipher between political reality and media
and bureaucratic blurring of the (i.e., bombing of Kosovo to “ease human suffering”,
while failing to take the same action in countries that have similar unrest and injustice but
provide us with strategic alliances, and or benefits). Developing or acquiring a “self
defense” for this forced ideology is only possible if we develop “a critical comprehension
between the meaning of words and a more coherent understanding of the meaning of the
world”. This, Chomsky feels is a prerequisite for achieving what he calls “clarity of
reality” (2000, p. 10).
Perhaps the strongest fibers of Consilience in this modern work can be found with
Chomsky’s comments on the need for scientific objectivism and the problems
confronting the social sciences (Chomsky, 2000, p. 20). Objectivity is something that
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should not be dismissed in education; rather it is something that should work hard to
embrace in the pursuit of truth. He goes on to elaborate on the inherent challenges
associated with social science—that the constraints imposed on researcher by the outside
world are much weaker. The complex problems confronting social sciences are harder to
interpret, yet the understanding seems to be much shallower. In contrast to the nature of
the social sciences, Chomsky supports the claims of Wilson that the natural sciences are
more governed by the laws of nature, and thus experimental errors in their work can thus
be easily exposed. Macedo also takes a postmodern, pro Wilson stance when he warns of
the dangers of fragmented science and an over reliance on abstract, non consilient
empiricism by introducing a bit of intellectual prose from Paulo Freire with his own
concern of “blind intellectuals” (Introduction to Chomsky, 2000).
This social construction of not seeing characterizes those intellectuals whom
Paulo Freire described as educators who claim a scientific posture and who
“might try to hide in what [they] regard as the neutrality of scientific pursuits,
indifferent to how [their] finding are used, even uninterested in considering for
whom or for what interests [they] are working” (p. 20).
In presenting these arguments, Chomsky challenges teachers to become
intellectual seekers of the truth, to become consilient in their own knowledge base and
understanding of the true complexities and objective interconnectedness of knowledge so
that they can, in turn promote a different, more complex truth. This, he argues, is the
only way to challenge the status quo ideology, to attack the lack of true democracy in our
schools, and to restore democratic freedom to our future generation. In visualizing a
consilient Chomskiesque curriculum that would center on the teachers and the students in
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a reconceptualized fashion, a slightly different conceptualization comes to mind that
contrasts sharply with that of Wilson: consilience = truth = democracy.
POST(ing) Up: Postmodernizing The Consilient Paradigm Of Thinking & Learning
In contrast to the “modern metanarrative in disguise” that Wilson’s consilience
advocates, I am calling for an educational narrative that fills in the spaces…one that
coalesces into a “fragile synthesis” (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 119)…one that
allows dissipation, autopoiesis…self-regulation to live in the middle…to flounder…and
to ignite multiple and critical ontological transformations of the various independent
subjects. As a poststructural argument, what I am calling for “denies all appeals to
foundational, transcendental, or universal truths or metanarratives” (Pinar, et al, 1995, p.
452) in that it freely promotes the wide open development of individual truths, realities,
and subjectivities that liberally assemble themselves from underneath the deconstruction
of knowledge, identity, politics, and language that constrain and define our cultural
epoch. Thus situated, all knowledge domains in the postmodern condition, and not just
those associated with modern scientific endeavors can and should be appreciated as
discontinuous and paradoxical, or to exploit Lyotard’s outlook, as “postmodernly
conditioned”.
In contrast to Lyotard’s somewhat nihilist and relativistic perspective, a more
practical and discursive approach is being called for here; one that resonates strongly
with Deleuze & Guattari’s contention that some element of order does indeed exist in life,
that a little order in things and states of affairs does indeed exist in our natural and social
worlds (Deleuze & Guattari, 1990/1995, p. 31). But for Lyotard, any attempt toward
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achieving consensus via a new grand metanarrative under the guise of rescuing humanity
from the existing system is out of question, because such a project would invariably
result in another oppressive system that inevitably perpetuates the same modern system
he critiques. In reflecting this particular aspect of postmodern criticism, Lyotard roundly
condemns modern systems theory by claiming that it’s merely another border developing,
metanarrative based solely on the substitution of another hegemonic language game that
prevents and constricts multiplicity, multivocalism, and local rules, contexts, and
relations. In this view, it could be rightfully argued that Lyotard is thinking more of
closed systems, and not the open and undetermined systems that Laszlo, Bertalanffy, and
Capra describe in their work, a type of myopia that if taken literally, can be translated as
a rather nihilistic and far too relativistic perspective that doesn’t offer any chance for
hope, change, or reconstruction. In critiquing “systems” from a general perspective, it
appears that Lyotard may not have been fully cognizant, or at least appreciative of the
paradoxical differences between actual closed systems ideologies based on
exclusion/inclusion, truth/untruth, and authoritative semiotic chains, and the more
poststructurally oriented potential that open systems theory offered for epistemology and
ontology; a foundational tenet that has been more commonly embraced by postmodern
theorists like Deleuze, Guattari, Serres & Katherine Hayles, amongst others.
In contrast to an open systems based approach that can be appreciated in the
philosophical compositions of Deleuze, Guattari, and Serres (of which, I will articulate in
the upcoming sections), the closed systems that Lyotard is wary of attempt to rigidly
control entropy (disorder) by enforcing linearity, absoluteness and objective
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predictability, while concurrently operating under a homogenous banner of exclusion and
authority. Essentially and historically based upon socially constructed linguistic models,
closed epistemological and ontological systems are to poststructuralists, not abstract or
open enough; a perspective roundly supported by Deleuze & Guattari (1980/1987).
They do not reach the abstract machine that connects a language to the semantic
and pragmatic contents of statements, to collective assemblages of enunciation, to
a whole micropolitics of the social field…A semiotic chain is like a tuber
agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also perceptive, mimetic,
gestural, and cognitive; there is no language in itself, nor are there any linguistic
universals, only a throng of dialects, patois, slangs, and specialized
languages…there is no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant
language within a political multiplicity (p. 7).
Perhaps thinking more practically than Lyotard, Serres whole-heartedly admits
that parasitic and metauthoritative knowledge can indeed be seen as “death”, indicating
that any time a new voice challenges or replaces another (which happens every time we
speak incidentally) the other voice is eradicated in a violent death (1990/1995b, p. 74).
Respectful of the power of disciplined logocentrism, Serres intentionally uses simple
language in his latter texts in order to perpetually change his conversational method.
Although this strategy confuses and bemuses Bruno Latour, his interviewer and
discursive partner, Serres’ methodology represents an earnest attempt to minimize
“taking space”, and to circumvent the willful and intentional creation of other
supplanting metanarratives that will inevitably contribute to another type of death.
Obvious in Serres’ comments regarding this poststructural caution and apprehension, and
likewise not readily apparent in Lyotard’s Postmodern Condition, is the recognition and
realistic submission that to some extent or another, we cannot avoid “killing” unless we
remain absolutely silent (which ironically, is also a type of killing in its own right)
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Unlike closed systems though, open systems embrace chaos, multiple associations, fractal
networks, the existence and recognition of unknowns, reoccurring and disappearing
patterns, growth & dissipation, reemergence, plastic organization, unbounded life and
possibility; and from a postmodern/poststructural perspective, constantly and perpetually
work to deconstruct the various social, cultural and political semiotic chains that
construct our “reality” and knowing.
It is in the apparently paradoxical and cautious thoughts expressed by Lyotard,
that I see both support and critique for my particular poststructural perspective, in that I
do not want to create a metanarrative that claims legitimacy, but yet I do want to allow
for a dynamic and open intellectual diversification of inquiry and myriad way(s) of
knowing that reflect the systemic, fluid, rhizomatic and interconnected nature of our
existence; and that subsequently prove capable of treating academic dyskinesia and
dyslogia. An education characterized and anchored by the central tenets of open systems
theory, and one interlaced with a postmodern sensibility capable of revealing structural
tendencies and elements of power and authority is one compatible with the views on
knowledge and being that shape the writings of Deleuze, Guattari, and Serres. Serres
various thoughts can be succinctly connected and characterized by a philosophy of
multiplicities, and the process of knowing to Serres can be distinguished by fluidity and
turbulence in that it is and ought be unpredictable, related, autopoietic, dissipative, selforganizing, chaotic, and most of all, open, unbounded, uncontrolled, and undetermined
by any essential observer. Similarly for Deleuze & Guattari, “reality” and authentic
knowing are constituted by “lines of articulation, segmentarity, strata and
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territories…lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification”, that
can perhaps best be described by the conceptual acceptance of “rhizomes” (1980/1987, p.
3).
Using Serres’ “fragile, liquid synthesis” and “amodern philosophy of
prepositions”, and the Deleuzian-Gauttarian notion of “rhizomes” as conceptual
foundations for my discourse, I see in their work a recurring and intrinsic resemblance to
what may be conceived of as a postmodern open systems theory (POST). For me, POST
represents a tenuous and open paradigm of inventive and multiple thought based more on
postmodern comparativism, than on sequential linking; one based on the swift and fluid
travels of Hermes, rather than one based on the modern, closed system consisting of solid
constructions of deductive, reductionist, and modern rationalization (Serres & Latour,
1990/1995, p. 73). A POST education has the potential to treat and rehabilitate
dyskinesia by attacking the controlling boundaries and semiotic chains that disciplinarity
induces on the thinking and knowing subject, thus allowing open and voluntary
movement in, and amongst the various knowledge domains that inform our being. Like
Serres’ soccer goalie metaphor, a POST education will promote, allow, and demand for
even, a hyperkinesia for all in that it will command a complete and responsive freedom of
movement (1991/1997).
Relaxed, as if free, the body mimes the future participle, fully ready to unwind;
towards the highest point, at ground level, or halfway up, in both directions, left
and right; toward the center of the solar plexus, a starry plateau launches its
virtual branches in all directions at once, like a bouquet of axons (p. 9).
Once freed from the disciplinary and hegemonic control that now defines our neoliberal
based University, a POST education promises to eradicate dyslogia by offering the power
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to reveal modern, corporatized educational policies for what they really are—agents of
human capital theory that possess little, if any meaningful epistemological and
ontological potential for individual subjective growth and development. Thus
accomplished, the rehabilitated subject is now free to move and think on “flat
multiplicities of n dimensions”, and to reason on open, undictated, and postmodern terms
that are fundamentally “asignifying and asubjective” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p.
9). In order to articulate their “schizoid” approach to deconstructing modern reality,
Deleuze and Guattari use “maps”, or a “diagrams” to represent the cartographic and
folded sets of various interacting lines that constitute art, society and individuals
(Deleuze, 1990/1995, p. 33).
In strong contrast to Lyotard’s’ overly cynical logocentric phobia, Serres has
constructed a metaphor using a certain character from Greek mythology—Hermes—to
define his idea of the “freedom of movement” (Serres & Latour, 1982/1995, p. 64).
Hermes, an “Agent of Rapprochements”, is Serres’ way to express the idea of a free
mediator who wanders through folded time and establishes connections; an agent capable
of inoculating the subject from dyskinesia; of describing spaces between things that are
already marked out, or what he calls spaces of interference between methods, history,
modes of inquiry and established knowledge (p. 64). Hermes is a metaphorical agent
designed to order disorder by holding on to a “connected intellection”; one capable of
containing, not restraining chaos (p. xiv). In short, Hermes is the intermediary angel
capable of passing through folded time in order to making millions of connections
between these maps, to transverse the noise, to move towards meaning, to map out the
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potential cartographies; and in an “amodern” sense, to explore and promote the space
between and amongst that characterizes Serres’ “philosophy of prepositions” (Serres &
Latour, 1990/1995, p. 127). For Serres, inventing knowledge is the essential and
fundamental purpose of all education; a critical and practical ground still very much
unexplored my many educational theorists and pundits. For Serres, the only way to truly
invent knowledge (which is different than information—that which is passed on,
reproduced, “re”searched, reified over time) is to find and use an intermediary such as
Hermes, capable of effecting juxtapositions, of transporting modes and means of
invention, and of exporting and importing various knowledge from all domains, from all
the various levels of organization and networking that make up an open system, and from
across folded, non linear and reversible time (1982/1995, p. 66). The job of philosophy
then, is “not only to invent, but to also invent the conditions necessary for the future
invention of knowledge” (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 86).
In spirit then, I want to take advantage of Lyotard’s ambivalence, his paradoxical
arguments, and his postmodern condition to argue for a more comprehensive, critical, and
meaningful exploration of knowledge and understanding. Not a finite explanation that
creates a legitimate, centered, and fixed metanarrative (either intentionally or
unintentionally), but rather a rhizomatic exploration that “connects any point to any other
point…”has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows
and which it overspills” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 21). In contrast to the
ordered, decelerating, and finite effect that science (both natural and social) has had on
the open and chaotic nature of knowledge and our perceived reality, I see a POST
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education as one having an accelerating, quasi-ordered, fractal effect on knowledge. Or,
as Deleuze and Guattari put it, a POST educational paradigm can be seen as one that
preserves “the infinite speeds of chaos in the concepts that it creates and traverses”
(1991/1994, p. 118). In Lyotard’s owns words, “as long as the game is not a game of
perfect information, the advantage will be with the player who has knowledge and can
obtain information”, or more simply the one who can traverse back, forth and between
multiple spaces and can thus invent their own knowledge will have best views of what
objectivity there is in nature (1979/1984, p. 51).
I would like to now transition my current discourse regarding the “need” to
change, to some ideas concerning “how” to change by providing three germane
comments from leading theorists that effectively relate the conceptual threads that exist
between 1) the poststructural philosophy of Serres, Deleuze and Guattari, 2) curriculum
reconceptualized in a postmodern manner, and 3) pertinent characteristics of open
systems, information, and chaos theories. By introducing chaos and systems theory into
the current discourse regarding a more postmodern education for the academy, it is my
intent to demonstrate their inherent and vital connections to both my larger discourse, and
to the subsequent alternative forthcoming in Chapter 5. Effectively then, I wish to argue
that a POST education extended and informed by chaos and systems theories ideas, has
the potential capacity to remedy the various ill effects that Dysacademia induces in its
subjects.
We are drilling holes in the wall of mystery that we call nature and reality on
many locations, and we carry out delicate analyses on each of the sites. But is
only now that we are beginning to realize the need for connecting the probes with
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one another and gaining some coherent insight into what is there (Laszlo, 1996, p.
3).
The space between—that of conjunctions, the interdisciplinary ground—is still
very much unexplored. One must travel quickly when the thing to be thought
about is complex” (Serres, 1990/1995b, p. 70).
Conventional education in physics, biology, psychology or the social sciences
treats them as separate domains, the general trend being that increasingly smaller
subdomains become separate sciences, and this process is repeated to the point
where each specialty becomes a trifingly small field, unconnected with the rest
(Bertalanffy, 1969, p. 51).
Chaos & Complexity Theories: Complicating the Spaces
In Chaos Bound, Katherine Hayles presents her central thesis that “language’s
power to constitute reality and reality’s power to constrain and direct language” as a
testament to the poststructural and chaotic nature of all language, knowledge, and reality
(1990, p. 3). In an attempt to generate a discourse around the challenges she sees central
to literature and science, that being to develop methodologies that can illuminate
convergences between disciplines while still acknowledging the very real differences that
exist, Hayles sets the stage for her postmodern review and application of the triangulation
of chaos, poststructuralism and fiction. According to Hayles, it was following Henri
Poincare’s 1890 mathematical proof of Newtonian mechanics’ inability to explain how
small perturbations in the moon’s orbit would effect on the sun and earth, that critics in
other fields started to recognize and deconstruct the respective textual boundaries that
confined their epistemological foundations (p. 2).
Emerging from this new found, anti-empiricist mode of thinking was “chaos
theory”, a paradigm of thought that embraced and sought out both the similarities and
dissimilarities between various disciplinary fields, while also recognizing the effects and
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limits that culture and tradition had upon the respective fields, their scopes of knowledge,
and their method of inquiry. As chaos theory gained momentum across many of the
disciplinary fields, it gradually became apparent to those who embraced such a radical,
postmodern idea that we were living in “a universe of discourse that is at once
fragmented and unified” (Hayles, 1990, p. 4). In short, chaos theorists began to challenge
the dominant modes of linear thinking by realizing that the more random and chaotic a
message was, the more information that it contained. To those unfamiliar with the scope
and foundations of chaos theory, it was seen as a negative and nihilistic construct, one
void of all meaning and content; but to pro-chaos scholars, chaos theory actually
embodied the opposite of such cynicism. For chaos theorists, this new epistemological
paradigm represented a more positive reflection on the nature and limits of humankind to
completely grasp the fractal and complex nature of most phenomena in our natural
worlds. In addition, the modern linear mode of thought that dominated our academic and
scholarly culture up until the WWII era implied that order and structure inherently
embodied a greater level of complexity and sophistication. But in chaos theory, order
and quietness are believed to actually contain less information to interpret, less noise and
distortion to decipher and comprehend, and thus non-chaotic entities were ultimately
simpler. From this perspective came the notion, as contrary as it may appear, that as
things (phenomena, concepts, etc.) emerge, and/or become more chaotic, they actually
take on a more complex, organized, and dynamic nature that puts into question the limits
of our understanding, perception and methodology concerning such phenomena (Hayles,
p. 6). Inextricably tied to the central concepts of chaos and complexity, is the belief that
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small fluctuations, or perturbations in the initial state or proximal extremity of a
phenomena can cause large, unpredicted changes in the latter, more distal extremities of
the phenomena. The classic example of this dynamical aspect of chaos theory can be
seen in the potential effects that a butterfly flapping his wings in Florida might have upon
the storm fronts and weather systems in Africa; or that very small changes in the earth’s
gravitational pull will dramatically effect the movement and behavior of the balls moving
on a pool table.
Pedagogically, an example of the two sides of this perspective can be easily seen
in the connection between learning and grades. From a linear modernist perspective
(a.k.a., behavioral psychology), a student that earns a grade of “D” on a project, or exam
is deemed to have failed to acquire at least 70% of the relevant material on the evaluation
form given. From this data, a modernist could surmise, quite simply, that this student
“has not learned” enough about the subject that was evaluated, and so he/she requires
remediation, is not a good student, or didn’t prepare well enough. In short, a linear
thinking modernist believes that there is a firm, predictable and ordered relationship
between student knowledge, performance, and the grade given. However, a chaos
theorist might look at this situation a little differently by realizing that in all probability,
there are many other, non-accounted for factors involved in this student’s performance
and the subsequent evaluation. Among them, a chaos pedagogue might be sensitive to,
amongst other things that can and do affect student learning, the students mental and
physical state of health on the day of the exam, the possibility that there does exist other,
equally viable answers for many if not most of the questions on the exam, that the exam
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itself may not be “measuring what it is supposed to be measuring”, that the teacher may
have graded unfairly, or even incorrectly, etc., etc. The central point of this example is
that a chaos theorist is fully aware of and sensitive to the multiple possibilities that exist
in teaching and learning, and to the limitations of all forms of measurement, among other
things that can/do affect our social an natural worlds. Within the large domain of
education known as pedagogy, there are numerous examples of the dichotomous split
between the two dominant paradigms of thinking about knowledge, teaching and
learning; and it is towards some of these ideas that I will turn to as I elaborate further on
some of the intricate properties of chaotic systems.
Hayles goes on to define, or perhaps categorize is a more appropriate term, the
two general emphasis areas that have consumed chaos theorists over the years (1990, p.
9). In one school of chaos thought, scholars work from within the perception that chaos
is order’s precursor and partner, and that as such, there occurs a spontaneous emergence
of self-organization from chaos even when entropy (state of disorder) production may be
deemed as high. This school of thought was made more credible by Ilya Prigogine’s
work on the application of chaos theory beyond to all living systems, and can perhaps be
best remembered as the “Order out of Chaos”, or chaos produces order paradigm.
Central to the order out of chaos paradigm sits the attempt to reconcile the “being with
becoming” phenomenon, in which pre-existing, existing and future states of chaotic
systems are seen to be continually changing, or becoming in dynamic and largely
unpredictable manners—or what Prigogine called “dissipative structures” (Prigogine &
Stengers, 1984).
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Pedagogically, the order out of chaos principle can easily be applied to both the
student and the curriculum by considering both the student and the curriculum as
dissipative structures working in a chaotic state. Specifically, both the student and the
curriculum can be viewed in this light and treated as open, chaotic, and dissipative
systems, rather than the antithesis of such—closed, ordered, and self-limiting. Sadly,
today’s American education machine can easily be characterized as the latter—closed,
hyper ordered, and limiting—rather than one in which the self (the student) is allowed to
find their own order amongst a chaotic sea of knowledge and realities, and one in which
the curriculum is open, multifarious, polyvocal and thus, self-generating over time. In
Prigogine’s terms, the student and the curriculum can, and should, be viewed as chaotic
systems that focus more on the becoming aspect of learning, living and experiencing an
authentic subjectivity, and less on the being which implies stagnation, closed order, and
eventually death. As I see it, the pedagogical “being with becoming” reconciliation
should center on the perpetual, self-organizing and open ability for subjects to construct
an individual epistemology and ontology; as an opportunity to embrace a chaotic
curriculum that allows something to emerge from the void of chaos, something individual
that personifies an original and hyper real epistemological and ontological subjectivity
capable of real and meaningful deconstruction and reconstruction of experiences,
phenomena, discourses, and knowledge.
The second important principle of chaos holds that a hidden order actually exists
within chaotic systems, or more simply that chaotic systems inherently possess order
already. Particular to this ordered system, and not found in Prigogine’s idea, are deeply
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encoded structures called “strange attractors” (Hayles, 1990, p. 10). It is believed that
these strange attractors, which are responsible for the inherent order found in chaotic
systems, actually contract to a confined region and trace complex patterns within a
particular structure’s limits; much like the vascular and neural systems of the human
body do as they expand and retract in response to physical and mental stress—
undetermined, but with realistic boundaries of constraint that are defined by the system’s
structure, topology, or in the case of the human system, anatomy and physiology. In the
case of the human anatomy and physiology, the neural and vascular networks that we are
born with are, quite simply, not the same fractal patterns of physical mass with which we
will die with—thankfully. As we exercise our minds and bodies, our internal circuitry
and plumbing change accordingly, in both positive and negative ways. Vascularly, the
more we exercise our muscles the more capillary growth (called “capillarization”) we
acquire in the working muscles in order to deliver the necessary nutrients and to dispose
of the metabolic wastes that are part of exercise physiology. Chaotic in that there are no
predetermined patterns in which the new micro capillaries lay down, but determined by
the structure and topology of the muscles, fascia, bone, and skin etc. that limits the
growth patterns somewhat.
Interestingly, the same is true of the neural networks that we create in our brains
as we learn, experience, and process new sensory information. It is thought that as we
learn (used here in a larger, more global and encompassing sense that includes all forms
of intra and extra sensory perception), our brain creates new neural pathways and
connections between and amongst the existing neural network. This multi-level
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scaffolding like construction of existing nerves to create new pathways and networks in
the mind based upon experience and learning, have been intricately defined by many
terminological signifiers, but in essence is at least part of the theoretical constructs known
either as “neural networks”, “neurogenesis”, and now “neuroplasticity” (Schwartz &
Begley, 2002). What makes these “mind-brain-neuron” theories of consciousness
especially compelling, if not even somewhat credible, is the networking, synapse firing
experiences that one gets when playing the word association game—what do you think
of/see/visualize, etc., when I say “dog”? As time passes, what other memories, thoughts,
and/or visualizations come to mind that are connected with the original signifier “dog”?
If enough time passes, the processor of this game could end up thinking of the most
obscure, unrelated event, experience, or thought that all started with the word “dog” (dog
biscuits—biscuits and gravy—gravy and potatoes—French fries, etc., etc., etc.).
Open…fractal…chaotic…strange attractors, all.
Curriculum and students can also be viewed in this way if chaos theory is
embraced with regards to knowledge formation and critical, reflexive ontological
subjectivity. Pedagogically, the student can be viewed in this light as a chaotic system
that has a hidden order, that being neural networks that drive and substantiate their
consciousness, their epistemology and their ontology towards a subjectivity that is
unique, plastic, self organizing, and limited only by the physical structures that confine
them (the skull). These neural networks are undetermined, yet they are somewhat
confined. When nourished and stressed in a linear, modernistic fashion, they might be
perceived to grow in linear, binary forms that are qualified by simple dichotomies of right
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vs. wrong, black and white, and truth vs. fiction. In contrast, when the neural networks
are nourished in a more postmodern and chaotic fashion, they can be seen to grow in star
like, laminar, folded and fractal patterns that have multiple synapses and cross bridges
indicating greater depth, breadth, and heterogeneity and thus, the quantity of information
received, processed and stored will be greater and richer. Over the course of a lifetime,
the neural networks (and thus the mind) of the chaotic student will be much more
complex, ordered, and saturated than will the networks of the linear student.
Hayles summarizes four major characteristics that all chaotic systems are thought
to share in some respect, or another (1990, p. 11). First, and perhaps the most general
and recognizable quality that chaotic systems possess is nonlinearity, a function opposite
to linear and predictable cause and effect systems because it is often distinguished by
startling incongruities between causes and effects. Most often, nonlinear systems can be
witnessed to have very large and pronounced effects from very small, seemingly
inconsequential causes (think, Butterfly effect, or the movie “Pay It Forward”).
Culturally, the concept of nonlinearity has shown to have a powerful influence in the
postmodern challenge of the hegemony of Newtonian mechanics, and the classical
linguistic coding that has dominated modern epistemology in many disciplines, not just
science. For Deleuze and Guattari, a rhizome captures the concept of nonlinearity
perfectly (1980/1987).
Unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and
its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature. Unlike a structure,
which is defined by a set of points and positions, with binary relations between
the points and biunivocal relationships between the positions, the rhizome is made
only of lines: lines of segmentarity and stratification (p. 21).
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A chaotic system’s complex forms contribute the second shared characteristic, a
feature that challenges the old, classical notions of scale assumed to be valid and
unassailable in the modern paradigms of thought (Hayles, 1990, p. 12). Specifically, the
notion of complex forms challenges a very strong modern assumption that all
measurement forms are standard, objective and “multi-applicable”. For example,
although a standard ruler and its measurement values will do for measuring the length of
a piece of paper, it will not suffice for measuring more complex forms, like the length of
a coastline, the linear length of the human nervous system, or a rhizome. Thus, the
modern assumption that measurement values and modes of inquiry reveal some sort of a
priori truth that is objective and strictly quantitative is directly challenged. Fractal
geometry is the perhaps the most recognizable off shoot of chaos theory, in that it
specifically addresses the notion of complex forms, fractal dimensions, and qualitative
differences in chaotic systems.
Remembering that chaotic systems can have large-scale effects from small causes,
a chaos theorist is fully aware that microscopic fluctuations in a system can send the
system off in an impressive and undetermined array of different directions. Because of
this quality, chaotic systems also share an acknowledgement of the sensitivity to initial
conditions, the third common characteristic (Hayles, 1990, p. 14). Specifically, a chaotic
system quickly becomes unpredictable unless the starting conditions of the system’s
structure, topography, or apparatus can be specified with infinite precision. In this sense
then, chaotic systems can be seen to be both deterministic and unpredictable in that the
observer may not ever be able to adequately ascertain the initial starting condition of the
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system under study, but is however able to observe that some sense of order and
organization will eventually emerge from a chaotic system.
The fourth familiar feature of chaotic systems that Hayles presents, which
ironically is also a major element of open systems, is called a feedback mechanism (1990,
p. 14). As the theory goes, all living and social systems that are thought to be chaotic and
open create loops in which output generated by the system feeds back into the system as
input, thus having a perpetual and dynamic effect(s) upon the transformation and
evolution of the system at hand. The resulting dynamics that occur of these continually
working feedback loops are central to the process of system self-organization, and
explain why complexity can eventually emerge in systems that have undergone small
perturbations initially.
Open Systems Theory
The specialists concentrate on detail and disregard the wider structure which gives
it context. The systems scientists, on the other hand, concentrate on structure on
all levels of magnitude and complexity, and fit detail into its general framework.
They discern relationships and situations, not atomistic facts and events (Laszlo,
1996, p. 9).
The arrival, and subsequent popularity of general systems theory came about from
the growing disentrancement with reductionist Cartesian science and logic that so
dominated our modern era. Frustrated with growing criticism, failed results, and
repetitive procedural redundancies, and suddenly acutely aware of the limits of atomistic
and mechanistic paradigms of thought, 20th century scientists (primarily biologists) and
scholars (Gestalt psychologists) from many fields began to seek out a different lens from
which to study their social and natural worlds (Capra, 1996, p. 17). This early
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postmodern paradigmatic flight of thought also spawned, or symbiotically emerged with
the gradual development of other modern theories that began to shake the Cartesian and
Newtonian foundations of rationality and objectivity. Although steeped in empirical
methods and working from within modernist paradigms of scientific inquiry, Einstein’s
relativity theory, quantum mechanics, game theory, thermodynamics, and later, Norbert
Wiener’s communication theory all emerged from an evolving awareness of the
incommensurability of certain, more complex phenomenon with the perceived actualities
of nature (Bertalanffy, 1969; Capra, 1996). As scientific knowledge progressed beyond
the basic processes of organization, structure, classification, and functioning of simple
systems that adhered to more straightforward laws and rules, and that could be
understood with existent technologies, progressive scientists began to gradually see the
inherent limits of modern science and the construction of a rational epistemology. In this
sense, a postmodern sensibility seemed to begin to take hold in certain domains of
science long before being given credit for such a movement. These activities
subsequently contributed to the development of more comprehensive and modern
paradigms of thought, most notably systems theory. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, long
considered the modern father of systems science, quite simply defines a system as a
living or social entity that consists of nonlinear characteristics with organized complexity
(1969, p. 19), describes system science as a “general science of wholeness” (p. 37), and
differentiates an open system from a close system by pointing out that open systems (of
which, all living organisms are) “maintain themselves in a continuous inflow and
outflow…in a state of chemical and thermodynamic equilibrium” (p. 39).
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Ervin Laszlo, who seems to have taken the systems theory beacon from
Bertalanffy, expounds further upon Bertalanffy’s definition by making it clear that each
system has “a specific structure made up of certain maintained relationships among its
parts, and it manifests irreducible characteristics of its own” (1996, p. 9). Simply put, the
systems approach belies the mechanistic approach in that one cannot reduce a living
system to its component parts, study them in a solitary fashion, and then hope to
understand the complex and coherent function of the system itself either before, during or
after “putting them back together”. Laszlo goes on to clarify the openness and mobility
of the systems practitioner by pointing out that the systems method “does not restrict the
scientist to one set of relationship as his object of investigation”, but rather that systems
thinkers continually travel between relationships, levels, and depths in order to get a
better, more global appreciation of the object under study (p. 10). This point is an
important one as it regards perspective, context and arguments centering on the local vs.
the global, and as such, it will be an issue that we return to later. Today, systems theory
is actively applied to myriad fields as diverse as economics, business management,
information management, communication, ecology, weather, and yes, education.
In contemporary times, the systems theory torch bearers seems to be physicist,
turned philosopher Fritjof Capra, and neuroscientists Francisco Varela and Humberto
Maturano (Maturano & Varela, 1997). Author of 6 books and one movie on, or related to
the science, understanding and application of systems theory, Capra’s life work now
focuses on the application of open systems theory to ecology and our sustainable
future(s). As such, it is in Capra’s recent works that I find the most comprehensive,

246
updated, and lucid explanations and material rationales for open systems theory; and
although Capra is fundamentally referring to deep ecology with most of his energy, it
also seems to me to provide an apropos fit for theoretically framing the pedagogical
discourse centered herein (1996).
Ultimately these problems must be seen as just different facets of one single
crisis, which is largely a crisis of perception. It derives from the fact that most of
us, and especially our large social institutions, subscribe to the concepts of an
outdated worldview, a perception of reality inadequate for dealing with our
overpopulated, globally interconnected world…The recognition that a profound
change of perception and thinking is needed if we are to survive has not yet
reached most of our corporate leaders, either, or the administrators and professors
of our large universities. (p. 4).
Criteria of Systems Thinking
Since Capra more directly applies his discourse of living systems to all living and
social systems (organisms, parts of organisms, and communities of organisms), and
effectively expounds upon the many complexities involved with all such living systems,
his account of the criteria and tenets of OST can be readily applied to the living system
that is curriculum, as well as to the more obvious living system, the student. Because
living systems can be viewed as a multilayered, multi-dimensional “web of life”, they
must be viewed and appreciated as series of networks exiting within other networks,
much like the fractal, but ordered neural pathways that are believed to make up the
brain’s neurophenomenological physiology. Another strong, somewhat postmodern tenet
of systems thinking is that, because of the complex “network within a network
infrastructure” of systems, we only have approximate knowledge of a system, not “real
truth” (Capra, 1996, p. 41). As such, the following criteria are deemed existent in all
systems modes of thought: 1) a shift from the parts to the whole, 2) the ability to shift
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one’s attention back and forth between a system’s various levels, 3) a relational reversal
between the parts and the whole, 4) that ultimately, there are no parts at all, only patterns
existing in an inseparable web of relationships, and 5) epistemology has to be included
explicitly in the description of natural phenomena (Capra, 1996, p. 36-7).
If one were to take a little liberty with Capra’s system criteria, apply a little
critical postmodern flavor, and thus apply them to the pedagogical elements known as the
curriculum and the student, the reworked criteria would look very interesting and
compelling for critical pedagogues. Criteria one, that pertaining to the part to whole
shift, would mean that the curriculum would be looked at as a “whole entity”, not as
individual subjects mired in technocratic and highly specialized forms of inquiry.
Problems and knowledge, to borrow Wilson’s term, would be addressed and studied from
a more consilient manner with a systems approach to curriculum; more than
interdisciplinary, it would be transdisciplinary. For example, instead of addressing the
deforestation of the rain forests simply from an environmental perspective, the social,
political, economic, cultural and medicinal issues as they relate to the various critical
tangents associated with chopping down acres of trees in order to grow more potatoes,
graze more cattle, produce more French fries and hamburgers, increase cardiovascular
disease amongst the Western consumers, increase pharmaceutical research and design for
cholesterol reducing and blood thinning drugs, etc., etc., could be addressed from a
systems approach that stresses the organizational relations of the parts.
The second and third criteria, the ability to shift attention back and forth within
and amongst the various layers and fractal wings of the network, and appreciating that the
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relationship between the parts and the whole has been reversed, can be looked at together
in the case of the curriculum and the student. Appreciating these two criterion would
force educators to realize that a system’s properties at all levels are emergent. Thus,
educators might be inclined to see how ineffective the majority of tests and other
evaluations of static knowledge are in measuring the overall intellectual, social, and
emotional state of a student (a living system). Additionally, this criterion would compel
educators to more fully see how little the various parts (outcomes, tests, objectives, etc.)
of a curriculum actually and realistically connect to the whole—that is to the students
themselves, and to the socially constructed world that they exist in presently, and in the
future. As the contemporary curriculum continues to become even more centered on
capitalistic-industrial principles that will drive the market and world globalization
(domination?) ideologies, students are becoming increasingly removed from the system
they are thrown into (the curriculum). In short, the modern education paradigm fails to
shift back and forth between the system’s various levels that affect the central living
system (the student); that being the outside world, the curriculum, the student, and the
family. A systems approach to curriculum would amend this linear, irreversible flaw in
the modern education machine and effectively address the local contextuality of each and
every part of the system, in all directions, at all levels, and with an appreciation for the
existence of only partial truth.
In an ongoing attempt to further challenge the paradigmatic constraints that have
been bequeathed us from the Enlightenment era, criteria four and five can be condensed
into the more postmodern pedagogical model being articulated here—that being that
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there are no separate parts nor essential objects, only interrelated, fractal patterns of
relations; and also that epistemology must be included in the description of the natural
world. Specifically, attention to these criteria would work to dispel the false, linear
pursuit of absolute truths, essences, and absolute knowledge, and instead, embrace the
concepts of chaos, limited order, fractals, and networks; while also allowing for the
socially constructed reality of knowledge and truth to surface as legitimate concepts
capable of rivaling our Eurocentric, anthropocentric logocentrism. This would introduce
a strong notion of partial subjectivity and contextuality to the knowledge introduced and
covered in a curriculum, while also placing students more in the center of the curriculum
as opposed to their present position on the outside as “non-experts” of knowledge. Thus,
students would be introduced to the very “real” notion that nature, for example, is not
what we observe, but rather, what we socially construct which of course is a by product
of our methods of questioning and our current language and technology. Naturally, this
requires a shift from an objective, Newtonian science framework to a more postmodern
“epistemic science” that challenges the construction, reification and interpretation of all
knowledge.
Characteristics of Open Systems
Building upon his explicit but overlapping criteria for systems thinking, Capra
then presents several critical and interesting characteristics of open systems, that when
deconstructed with a postmodern lens, can aptly be applied to students and curricula.
Primarily through the amalgamation of the works of such renowned scholars as Ilya
Prigogine, Alexander Bogdanov, and Humberto Maturana, Capra takes great pains to
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review and clarify these concepts as they were developed singularly, then following his
criteria for thinking about systems, deftly connects them together in order to provide a
well articulated, partially lucid, and partially nebulous view of the complexity and depth
of living systems. Underpinning all of these characteristics is the notion that all living
systems are nonlinear networks with intricate feedback mechanisms, designed to allow
for sustenance and growth (Capra, 1996, p. 82). It is from this simple point that one may
potentially see education existing as a large, open system; full of complex, fractal, and
multilayered, multidimensional layers, or networks; and with multiple feedback
mechanisms built in for checks, balances, and re-organization.
Thus the community can correct its mistakes, regulate itself, and organize itself.
Indeed, self-organization has emerged as perhaps the central concept in the
systems view of life, and like the concepts of feedback and self-regulation, it is
linked closely to networks (p. 83).
In light of this “nonlinear network” representation of all life systems, selforganization eventually emerged as the central concept in systems thinking as a result of
the early cybernetics work done by neuroscientists and mathematicians in collaborative
efforts (Capra, 1996, p. 83). In contrast, today’s educational system can in reality be
seen as one big closed system, with linear progression (grades based simply on
chronological age, standardized tests, “normal” knowledge, objective overemphasis, skill
tracking, graduation tests, etc.), and the only sort of feedback provided is that of simple
pen-paper, objective knowledge tests that portend to measure learning, skill and objective
knowledge of the world. When speaking of our modern school, I think that it goes
without saying that students “are not allowed to self-organize” anything in their
respective curriculums, nor are they much allowed to self-organize themselves into
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autopoietic subjects. If however, students were treated as open systems, and the selforganization principle were allowed to operate unimpeded, ordered patterns would begin
to spontaneously emerge out of the initial random state that young students represent
upon arrival in the school. In short, self-organizing students would eventually turn chaos
into order, and gain order from noise on their own respective level, in their own
respective terms; contextually relevant, locally pertinent, and globally applicable.
Capra’s presentation of physicist and cyberneticist Heinz von Foerster’s work is an
apropos application to students as self-organizing systems, the “real” process of learning
and ontological subjectification (1996).
He coined the phrase “order from noise” to indicate that a self-organizing system
does not just “import” order from its environment, but takes in energy-rich matter,
integrates it into its own structure, and thereby increases its internal order (p. 84).
Important to the notion of self-organization are three sub-characteristics that also
reflect the position that I am proposing to look at students as open systems (Capra, 1996,
p. 85). First, is that a self-organizing system creates new structures and new modes of
behavior during the self-organizing process; the key word here is “self”, not expert,
teacher, or authority figure. I am not calling for a recommitment to the ideals of
behaviorist psychology that predicates itself upon the notion that learning is a predictable,
controllable and measurable change in behavior—that would be representative of a
closed system. Is not an open, self-organizing, and self-making student and curriculum
representative of a dynamic and Socratic education? Shouldn’t the “self” be allowed to
create a new self, to transform one’s subjectivity, to change one’s behavior, ideals,
outlook and cognitive processes as a result of learning in a more “natural” and
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unstructured manner? Shouldn’t students have at least some say in the formulation of
their “epistemic culture”? Perhaps an open systems curriculum, designed to address and
facilitate open systems organisms (students) could provide such growth and
transformation in the epistemological, ontological and even axiological realms for all
those immersed in such an endeavor.
The second common characteristic to self-organizing systems is that they all deal
with open systems operating far from equilibrium; known in thermodynamic circles as
entropy, or disorder. Energy (seen as knowledge and experience in the open pedagogical
model) is constantly being shuttled within and through living systems (the student), and it
is this energy that is required for self-organization to occur when the system is far from
equilibrium. This state of relative disorder represents an entropic condition that all open
systems go into, and out of on a continual and reformative basis, each time emerging
“distorted”, transformed, and reformed. Michel Serres differentiates critical, “real”
learning from information reception by describing the learning process as being adrift in
the turbulent waters, without a foot grounded, uncomfortable, painful, and unsure
(1991/1997, p. 5). Shouldn’t students always be operating far from equilibrium? Is
Serres’ metaphor for learning not an effective representation of disequilibria? Nonlinear
connectedness is the third characteristic common to all self-organizing models, a concept
covered earlier in this piece as one of the central criteria for systems thinking, and so it
need not be reiterated again. Thus, it can be said that self-organizing systems, like
students and curricula (both living organisms), are characterized by “the spontaneous
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emergence of new structures and new forms of behavior in open systems far from
equilibrium, characterized by internal feedback loops” (Capra, 1996p. 85).
Similar to, but perhaps a bit more complex than the self-organizing principle
discussed is Maturana’s “autopoiesis” concept that stipulates “self-making” as a
distinctive organizational property of all living systems (Maturana & Varela, 1997, p.
43). More specifically, Maturana in his quest to better understand human cognition
proposed that the organization of living systems is the set of relations among its
components that characterize the system. Capra builds on this theory by defining
autopoiesis as “a network of production processes”, whereby the function of each
component is to participate in the production of the transformation of other components
in the network (1996, p. 98). Largely accepted as at least part of the explanation for our
cognitive processes and the intricate network of neurons that we develop and re-develop
as we learn and experience, the autopoiesis theory can also serve as an incredibly
interesting metaphor or model for a postmodern, and chaotic curriculum, and student. As
it already explains cognition, its relevance to the student is somewhat obvious already,
but in curricular terms it begs for a more consilient and Serresian approach to pedagogy
and learning whereby transdisciplinary approaches to learning and problem solving work
autopoietically to build, support, refute and reformulate each part of the overall
curriculum.
The last concept imported into the discussion of open systems is that of
dissipative structures first put forth by Nobel chemist Ilya Prigogine in the 1960s (1984).
In open systems, Prigogine demonstrated that as the system moves farther away from
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equilibrium, it reaches a critical point of instability, which to Prigogine represented a
spectacular example of spontaneous self-organization. In other words, Prigogine’s
concept of dissipative structures showed that in open systems, dissipation actually
becomes a source of order. According to Prigogine, dissipative structures not only
maintain themselves in a stable state far from equilibrium, but may even evolve into new
forms, new systems, and in the case of the student as a dissipative structure, into a new
subjectivity (1984). Quite simply, when the flow of matter and energy (experience and
knowledge) through them increases, the student may go through new instabilities and
transform themselves into new structures of increased complexity. Perhaps most
importantly, Prigogine’s theory showed that while dissipative structures receive energy
externally for the most part, the instabilities and jumps to new forms of organization that
occur during the instable moments of ordering and reordering are the result of
fluctuations amplified by the built in network feedback loops. In the case of students,
these feedback loops may be seen as processes like reflective thought, metacognition,
exposure to multiple perspectives and realities, and in the engagement of critical dialogue
and discourse that can all occur in an open curriculum. In an open curriculum, tempered
and softly modulated disorder and disequilibria will actually permit the open systems
student to achieve more order for him or herself through autopoietic manifestations of the
conscious and subconscious self. Again, Serres notion of the “turbulence” that is
required to authentically learn, or to invent anything represents a harmonic concept with
Prigogine’s more physically scientific principle; and so, it provides a very powerful
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metaphor for a postmodern pedagogical paradigm that treats both the student and the
curriculum as dynamic, self-organizing, and reformulating open structures.
The Postmodern University Student & Postmodern Knowledge
In relating back to the lived curriculum that I attempted to articulate in Chapter
One, the central premise put forth by Wilson in Consilience made me take a long, hard
look at my own educational experiences, my current intellectual state of mind, and
eventually at the epistemological dimension of the various university students that I have
interacted with from the other side of the instructional podium. In critically reflecting
upon these complex and multiple planes of consciousness, I gradually came to the
observation that something was askew with college and university education today. In
short, I began to notice that far too many university students resembled docile bodies
functioning mostly under the pretext that the purpose of attaining a university degree was
primarily, or resolutely even, for economic and professional success. In noticing that
very few of my students possessed any of the more historical and romantic notions of
what higher education can do for the intellect, the spirit, and the individual ontological
development (subjectivity), I have come to believe that far too many students are content
with being the central mechanistic devices that drive the economically laden “human
capital theory” and its production of capable, but docile consumer objects of production
(Apple, 1995, p. 39).
Or, to borrow Paolo Freire’s now infamous term, they have largely become the
objects of the “banking phenomenon” of pedagogy whereby knowledge and facts are
merely deposited into their [sub] consciousness, idly sitting there, collecting dust and
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eventually, growing mold. Lyotard specifically applied his notion of “performativity” to
education, whereby the “other” facet of knowledge (that being its transmission) is now
just a “subset of the social system”, and where higher education can be perceived as
based on the best possible input/output equation (1979/1984, p. 46-48). With such an
economical and technical focus and motivation towards learning, it has also became
apparent to me that these same students were thus largely incapable of their own
epistemological creations, of meaningful knowledge synthesis, or of de- and r-e
construction of complex phenomena or critical issues. And in all honesty, I saw in them
what I was now able to see in myself following my undergraduate and master’s
experiences 10 years earlier—highly and technically trained, but not what one might call
critically educated.
Specifically, Lyotard believes that with regards to education, the “desired goal
becomes the optimal contribution of higher education to the best performativity of the
social system”, with two kinds of indispensable skills created in the process (1979/1984,
p. 48). First, students acquire the specialized skills necessary to “tackle world
competition” as it is locally relevant to the global market; and secondly, higher learning
will have to supply the social system with the skills needed to maintain its’ own internal
cohesion. It is largely within Lyotard’s contentions that “in the context of delegitimation,
universities and the institutions of higher learning are called upon to create skills, and no
longer ideals”, and “the transmission of knowledge is no longer designed to train an elite
capable of guiding the nation towards its emancipation, but to supply the system with
players capable of acceptably fulfilling their roles at the pragmatic posts required by its
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institutions” (p. 48), that I have centered my own personal critique of higher education
and the production of performative subjectivity.
In Chaos of Disciplines (2001), sociologist Andrew Abbott analyzed the specific
history, development and current condition of the social sciences, and then applies this
discourse to the relative state of other academic disciplines. Essentially, it is Abbott’s
contention that any discipline can actually be represented by self-similar fractal patterns
and chaos; and that there is actually much less to disagree about amongst and between the
different disciplines. Presented from the ground up (the individual disciplines), Abbott
calls for a curriculum with less boundaries, and one that illuminates the fractal
connections between different types of knowing. In this far-reaching and unique text,
Abbott clearly points out that academic disciplines do a much better job of staying
connected than do the professions (Abbott, 2001, p. 142-143), but steers clear of
intonating that academia does in fact, do an admirable and effective job of teaching an
eclectic, interstitial, or interdisciplinary approach to its students. In fact, he actually
identifies several of the now established traditions of the American academe as being
responsible for much of our current state of intellectual disrepair. Chiefly, he lays blame
on the specialized PhD—academic major reproductive cycle, and the standard reliance
and emphasis on academic majors and all of their financial and administrative
underpinnings as being the primary disciplinary structures responsible for preventing a
true, interstitial, or consilient curriculum (2001, p. 127).
In A Post-Modern Perspective on Curriculum, William Doll’s criticism of
knowledge production and education echoes that of Wilson as he presents a multi-
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pronged argument for a megaparadigm change in the development, philosophy and
implementation of curriculum (1993).
A curriculum that is creative and transformative must combine the scientific with
the aesthetic; eclecticism is one feature that makes post-modernism such an
exciting movement (p. 6).
Within the introductory sections of this noteworthy text, Doll presents his case that the
current segregation of knowledge within our culture is a direct byproduct of modernism,
and that a better future can only be reached through a defragmented and unified approach
to knowledge inclusive of science, philosophy and art (p. 7). Although a unifying
approach to knowledge may appear to simply be, dare I say it, a metanarrative in drag to
staunch post-modernists, Doll argues that it is the modernist adaptations of Newton’s
empiricism and Descartes’ rationalism that are responsible for this fragmented paradigm
of knowledge that defines educational curricula today (p. 2). As such, Doll posits that a
“post-modern perspective” is required to reverse, or at least to neutralize, this modernist
deification of science and knowledge that governs much of contemporary culture today.
One of the educational challenges in the postmodern mode is to design a
curriculum that both accommodates and stretches: a curriculum that (combining
terms and concepts from both Kuhn and Piaget) has the essential tension between
disequilibrium and equilibrium so that a new, more comprehensive and
transformative re-equilibrations emerges (p. 10).
In coalescing E. O. Wilson’s notion of consilience, and the post-modern
curriculum arguments put forth by William Doll, with the poststructural philosophy on
knowledge and invention that defines much of Michel Serres’ work into a primary
constitutive concept, I am effectively arguing for a postmodern consilient curriculum-one
that relates, makes compatible, and interconnects the various, multivocal and chaotic
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facets of our human existence into complex and unique ontological and epistemological
subjectivities. But because of the significant limitations in consilience as Wilson
describes the term, and so in order to circumvent confusion between consilience and my
more postmodern version, I prefer to use POST as the central conceptual paradigm for
rehabilitating Dysacademia. In short, I am interested in investigating and articulating a
reconceptualization of curriculum that is grounded in issues of knowing and knowledge;
one that’s less focused on the doing and more attentive to being. In effect, I want to more
critically analyze higher education curriculum from a perspective that investigates what
kinds of knowledge and skill are needed to thrive in, and contribute to a
postmodern/posthuman society. My specific intention here is to contribute to the
reconceptualization movement by articulating a curricular paradigm that is actually not a
paradigm, but rather a fragile and open conceptual framework that allows the principle
actors in the educational process—the students and the teachers—the mobility, location
and impetus to pursue the true meaning of education, that being the ability and desire to
wander into open, unknown spaces. In short, a postmodern consilient curriculum would
be a curriculum that reflects the theoretical underpinnings of William Doll, in that it
would “jump together” (1993).
Life, indeed our working reality itself, is made up of interconnected experiences.
Obvious as this statement is, developmentally simple in its approach, it has not
played an essential role in curriculum development (p. 68-9).
In using a postmodern approach to articulate a relations based POST education
analogous to Serres’ “fragile synthesis”, it should be lucid that I am not advocating for
the development of, or reliance upon, one comprehensive metanarrative that directs and
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controls our knowing and understanding, as Lyotard roundly and resolutely critiques
modernism of doing. Rather, I am merely looking at a POST education as the concept of
“association”, that being the process whereby human subjects use ideas, relations,
perceptions, associations, and contiguity to represent one way of ordering the chaos
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1991/1994, p. 201). Again, the rhizome model put forth by Deleuze
and Guattari expresses my sentiments well (1980/1987).
In contrast to centered systems with hierarchical modes of communication and
preestablished paths, the rhizome is an acentered, nonhierarchical, nonsignifying
system without a General and without an organizing memory or central
automaton, defined solely by a circulation of states (p. 21).
In short, concepts and knowledge construction are innate, local and contextual subjective
mechanisms that we use to create some semblance of order for our subjective selves, to
grasp our own contextual and personal chaotic subjectivity, not some a priori,
authoritative semiotic chain. As such, open and rhizomatic modes of inquiry and
knowing ought provide the central platform from which we construct and compare our
own, self-invented knowledge. In order to address the many social, cultural and political
ills that mark our particular epoch, POST education needs to be concurrently
implemented alongside the professional preparation that now dominates Dysacademia.
Thus located, the purpose of the current discourse is to explore the conscious and
social constructions of knowledge in a more comprehensive, critical, and gaping manner
that accounts for many postmodern and poststructural claims; not to authoritatively
explain it (“it” being true knowledge), nor to differentiate between truth/fiction, to play
into the modern objective/subjective binary, or to establish a new hierarchical, sedentary
and closed language game that presumes hierarchical legitimacy. I don’t want to

261
decelerate the exciting and open chaos of knowledge into modern, linear and simple
categories. Rather, I argue for an active and open acceleration and enhanced awareness
of intellectual and ontological fractal geometry. In Serresian parlance, I am seeking a
paradigm of prepositions that allow mobility and fluidity (between, for, with, to, and),
and not one of verbs that imply, insinuate, or demonstrate permanence, rigidity, or
linearity (connect, fix, construct, create). Nor am I positing that there exists one true
positivist source of knowledge that provides the ultimate blue print to the universe and its
many metaphysical, surreal and multiplistic components. Rather, I argue, as Serres does,
that educated citizens and educators in particular, should through active participation in a
POST based educational experience, strive to gain a certain level of understanding and
discovery of how other sources of knowledge effect, influence and interplay with other
more familiar sources of knowledge; how the student and the curriculum are deeply
connected in one large open, postmodern system. Or in the parlance of Pinar, et al., the
current discourse is “intended as much to provoke questions as it is to answer questions”
(1995, p. 56).
In order for this to occur, one kind of inquiry would not be able to dominate
others as the “way” to knowledge, and thus, the structure of research and curricula would
be resituated in order to maximize the multiplicity of small narratives. For Michel Serres,
classic epistemology in the “modern” sense is thus unattractive, unoriginal, and lazy
because it merely reproduces and repackages old ideas and information with “ultra
technical vocabulary that breeds fear and exclusion” (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 24);
and thus, an “authentic epistemology is the art of inventing, the springboard for passing
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from the old to the new” (p. 14). To Michel Foucault, this represents the essential
purpose and critical foundation of philosophy, that being “precisely the challenging of all
phenomena of domination at whatever level or under whatever form they present
themselves—political, economic, sexual, institutional and so on” (Bernauer &
Rasmussen, 1988, p. 20). It is here that Lyotard’s theoretical position seems to comply
with the post structural approach I am proposing (POST), but with one caveat--Lyotard
seems to contradict his post disciplinary views in other sections of The Postmodern
Condition. Specifically, Lyotard seems to reject any interdisciplinary organization of
knowledge, as it implies to him a “common measure”; or, the development of new
language games, which of course reifies narratives and eventually, metanarratives
(Lyotard, 1979/1984, p. 50-53). In “defining” a poststructural structure as “an ordered
multiplicity of ordered multiplicities” (1982/1995a, p. 106), Serres poetic thoughts can be
seen then to effectively soften Lyotard’s extreme, and perhaps somewhat nihilistic
poststructural concern with a more modest appreciation for the power and
epistemological infinity of “multiplicities” and fragile syntheses of thought (1982/1995a).
The work of transformation is that of the multiple (p. 101).
It is not an everyday occurrence when there is a potential meeting between refined
branches of knowledge, overt phenomena, and everyday language. We need to
conceive the multiple as such…we need it in the social sciences and the
humanities (p. 103).
In my view, higher education ought provide the same critical and philosophical
foundation for all of its subjects; the ability to challenge, to deconstruct, to operationalize,
and to appreciate multiple problematic perspectives should be endowed in all college and
university graduates, regardless of their chosen field of study, or subsequent professional
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line of work. But perhaps more importantly, a POST curriculum and pedagogy would
reflect the ethics of Michel Serres, in that it would be lived in the spaces, in between
known and unknown, between this and that, between self and other; allowed to wander in
the open, unknown spaces without an explicit pressure to reach any specific,
predetermined and solid place.
Becoming POST consilient in our knowledge, understanding and experiences also
has the potential for many different levels of application and meaning, depending upon
the discipline and setting of specific individuals. For example, as a university educator
and program director, I must consider and effectively incorporate a diverse multitude of
knowledge, perspectives, and experiences relative to pedagogy, curriculum, and
educational administration that have profound and dynamic interconnections to my
everyday practice as teacher, mentor, parent and citizen. Granted this can be a time
consuming, romanticized and daunting transformative process, but one that I think all
educators and students wishing to be truly educated ought be willing and anxious to
embrace.
As a practicing health care provider, empowered with the care of physically active
populations and with the teaching and mentoring of future health care providers, I must
also consider how different technical and scientific knowledge developments potentially
effect and interplay with current knowledge within my specific disciplinary field. POST
understanding in this sense includes a masterful understanding of the relevant
applications and limitations of empirical and theoretical scientific knowledge produced in
the related disciplines, understanding the applicable limits of knowledge generated via
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the scientific method in sterile laboratory environments, and most importantly, knowing
when to use certain techniques and knowledge and how to implement them according to
contextual and pragmatic factors relative to individual patients. Thus, in order to provide
sound, quality health care services to those under my care, and to provide a dynamic,
evolving and “interdisciplinary” education to my students, I must stay abreast of the latest
developments in orthopedics, physical rehabilitation, sports psychology, nutrition,
exercise physiology, and wellness. More importantly, I must become more aware and
respectful of how each of these fields affects, effects, relates, connects, diverges,
influences and manipulates each other if I am to become a more POST based athletic
trainer, and educator.
As I become more cognizant of, and immersed with, the various sources of
knowledge associated with curriculum, teaching, & learning, and how they are each
themselves interconnected to the larger web that is society—culture, politics, art, pop
culture, history, science, phenomenology, hermeneutics, etc., the more consilient I will
become in my pedagogy. For example, the current intellectual journey that is my
doctoral program, continues to transform me into a much more diverse and consilient
educator, intellectual and citizen. And, because I have worked hard within my discipline
to bring various forms of related knowing in my field together both practically and
didactically, I feel that I am also in the process of becoming a more POST health care
provider in that I am more fully aware of the non-linear, fractal and open nature of the
human body, wellness and pathology.
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Towards a Poststructural Episteme of Consilience
Joe Kincheloe’s (1993; 1995) work reflects a notion similar to consilience in
describing his perception of the contextualization movement. It may even seem ironic
perhaps, that Edward Wilson could actually be viewed as a soldier of the
contextualization movement with his modern day introduction of consilience. As I
understand it, the contextualization scholars are proponents of an ideology that promotes
the integration of concepts, and ideas of knowledge against a larger framework.
Kincheloe has advocated for an inclusion and coherence of such issues as personal and
social history, cultural diversity, and philosophical agendas into school curriculums and
in an effort to reverse the modernist trend towards the decontextualization and
fragmentation of skills and knowledge in our schools. This fragmentation, Kincheloe
feels, separates our schools form the world in which we actually live and work (1995, p.
347). Inclusion, coherence, separation, and fragmentation--words and concepts that ring
very similar to those of Wilson, Doll and other scholars investigating the postmodern
nature of knowledge and understanding.
In Schools Where Ronnie and Brandon Would Have Excelled, Kincheloe writes
about modern teachers and the isolation that they have from one another, from their
students, and from the outside world of business and politics (Kincheloe, 1995). His
frustration with the fragmentation of teachers’ experiences, resources, and educational
outlooks parallels the discontent expressed by Wilson in Consilience. In the latter text,
Wilson describes how postmodern academic scientists have become fragmented from
their colleagues, and have in effect, become stranded on their own philistine research
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islands. Stranded, they have become cut off from the consilient purpose of science—to
unify the knowledge and make sense of the world.
Kincheloe expresses similar concern over the failure of our current educational paradigm
to recognize the academic, sociopolitical and cognitive capacities that our model students
and citizens must possess if they are going to make a real world difference (Kincheloe,
1995, p. 349). In support of his argument, he introduces the following challenge from
(From Grubb, 1991, as cited in Kincheloe).
Such a recognition can serve to construct a revolutionary consciousness, a way of
seeing that will not allow the world to remain the same (p. 349).
Finding and developing teachers with special insights who are interested in, capable of,
and motivated to integrate a consilient, reconceptualized curriculum is what is needed if
we are to begin to truly reform our educational system, and thus the Dysacademia that
now infects it.
Kincheloe goes on to argue that a sense of “dualism” (not to be confused with the
now much maligned theory of Dualism presented by Descartes) is also required in
today’s teaching workforce; whereby teachers not only know “what”, but also know
“how”. In Kincheloe’s consilient curriculum, teachers must be able to “…separate theory
from practice, thinking from doing, and learning principles from devising applications if
they are to be capable of transferring knowledge and skills to the working world” (1995,
p. 356). In William Doll’s terms, teachers in such a critical, integrative curriculum must
be able to “jump together” knowledge in a connected, coherent way; and to reconnect
her/himself to all facets of the educational experience, a point similarly echoed by
Kincheloe.
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Integration, no matter what form it takes, should strengthen the teaching of all
subjects. When adeptly executed, integration should make history, literature, and
the social sciences come alive for previously unmotivated students (p. 359).
Kincheloe provides a very effective example of this “model” by highlighting the
need for vocational students in agriculture and farming to also be well versed and
experienced in the environmental sciences (1995, p. 355). Consilient in the sense that
students may gain valuable insight into the connections between farming and pollution;
skilled and conversant in the politics of environmental damage; aware of how big
business keeps the government from interfering with their insensitive ecological
practices. In turn, this requires that future farmers acquire a deep and genuine
understanding of how big business works, from Wall Street economics, to the
development and perpetuation of corporate culture, to the dynamics of the political
lobbying machine in our nation’s capital. In integrated POST curricula such as this, the
key dynamic at work according to Kincheloe is that both the teacher and student are
“learning how to learn” (Kincheloe, p. 361).
Perhaps the strength of Kincheloe’s postmodern consilient philosophy is probably
best supported through his Critical constructivist concept of education (1995, p. 355). He
aptly defines Critical Constructivism as a form of world making, whereby constructivist
teachers teach for understanding and application. Included in this critical postmodern
curriculum of integration are the central role of student experiences, and their original
and personal constructions of the subject matter(s). Here, Kincheloe goes on to criticize
the schools of the post-enlightenment era for emphasizing the learning of that which had
already been defined as knowledge, rather than emphasizing the actual production of
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knowledge (p. 356). A curriculum of true integration attempts to focus its attention on
the cognitive processes of the learner. Recall for a moment Wilson’s argument for
consilience, and our subsequent over reliance on the biological sciences to reveal how the
mind works in order to answer many of the questions and issues of the modern world
(Wilson, 1998). This would mean that consilient intellectuals and postmodern
constructivists would thus have to acquire a coherent knowledge in psychology,
sociology, biology, anthropology, as well as the humanities and the arts.
“A Bell Ringing in the Empty Sky”, by David Jardine (1992) also presents several
arguments and ideas that reflect a notion of a consilient curriculum. In this very personal
and self-reflective essay, Jardine uses the metaphor of a ringing bell that represents the
center of all things. As a representation of the coherence and interconnectedness of all
things, Jardine also argues that all things are ordered around the ringing bell, that they are
linked together in one way or another (p. 265). Wilson would certainly agree with this
precept, but would add that all things are connected through the natural sciences.
Jardine’s empty sky, indicating that a lack of interconnectedness is present and thus not
allowing the bell’s ringing to be heard, represents the discontent found in the works of
Serres, Kincheloe, and others with the current state of affairs amongst the Post
Enlightenment thinkers, scholars, scientists, and teachers.
Jardine’s effective metaphor depicting our species existing in an empty sky
symbolizes the relative lack of understanding of the interdependency and complexity of
the world amongst many of those in power in the current educational and social systems.
Wilson presents a parallel argument in his quest for Consilience amongst the scientists
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and policy makers of the world, and presents many specific examples to support his
argument including one for education. Jardine argues that our over reliance on
fragmented knowledge and our dependence upon knowledge produced by isolated
empiricism has caused our lives to become episodic, and not semantic (1992, p. 266). If
we continue trotting along in such an isolated and fragmented manner, Dysacademia left
untreated may prevent us from ever hearing the bell ringing in the empty sky.
To fuel his arguments for the ringing bell to be heard by all, Jardine presents a
quote from Hahn that also parallels the convictions of Wilson; “The universe is a
dynamic fabric of interdependent events in which none is the fundamental entity” (as
cited in Jardine, 1992, p. 272). Jardine is not advocating however, that we become totally
self absorbed in seeing ourselves as the center of the universe, or that we employ a
“violent colonization” of all things. Merely, he is making the point that we all need to
recognize the indebtedness to the existence of all things in one’s self. In effect, we need
to come to the understanding that all things are not here for us as individuals, but that we
are part of all things—in a way connected and dependant, but not self existent. With
more brevity, we need to become more postmodernly consilient by embracing a POST
way of seeing, thinking and inventing.
Diversified, eclectic, personal, non-restrictive, interconnected and coherent—
terms that have been used, discussed, advocated, and implemented by curriculum theory
scholars and intellectuals. Perhaps POST can now be added to this list, and thus
incorporated into the current discourse of reconceptualization in the curricular field.
Perhaps POST can coherently represent all of these words, and initiate a new or modified
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line of reasoning in the debate on educational reform. As I have attempted to
demonstrate in the preceding sections, myriad postmodern reconceptualization scholars
such as William Pinar (psychoanalysis theory), Joe Kincheloe (Marxist theory), & David
Jardine (phenomenology), each seem to have individually captured the spirit of the POST
conception I have articulated in their writings and expressions on curriculum theory in
unique and expressive ways. Together, the narratives put forth by reconceptualized
curriculum theorists present specific challenges to all teachers, administrators and
students in sincere attempt to focus on “the learning of learning” (What is learning? How
does one learn? When is learning done?, etc.), on the individual self, on developing a true
awareness of the inherent and coherent nature of knowledge, on the self-actualization
process, and on the discovery and refinement of new truths and new, contextual and
locally subjective knowledge. Wilson openly admonishes the scientific community
concerning the pitfalls of anti-consilient rhetoric and knowledge development, while
alternatively advocating for an environment whereby one hand genuinely understands
what the other hand is doing. Curricular theorists seem to be arguing for the same type of
educational reform—one that intertwines the many diverse faces of the individuals
involved, one that addresses the many complex domains of society, human culture and
the modern world; and one that regresses from the current empirical model that weighs
objectives and performance on a predictable scale of educational competency. A
consilient curriculum might just be the one, but maybe with a more postmodern twist.
Summarily, my critique is specifically aimed at higher education in the United
States, and as such, it is my specific position that university education today no longer
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serves as the critical springboard to diverse and meaningful intellectual transformation
and exploration as it once did when liberal arts and comprehensive pedagogy were more
en vogue. It can perhaps be surmised that our current educational condition can be
traced, but certainly not limited, to at least three co-evolutionary, multifactorial,
interrelated and mitigating factors that have metastasized over the last 40-50 years in our
society. Amongst the principal genealogical and archeological perpetrators contributing
to our quasi-necrotic educational condition are, 1) an over reliance on the processes and
mechanisms of objective science (reductionism) and the subsequent development of
“quasi-objective” behaviorist psychology (cognitive psychology & learning theories) &
Tylerian curricular principles, 2) the neoliberal, performative, and industrio-capitalistic
emphases placed on the larger Western educational mission of universities and colleges,
particularly in the United States; which today can be distinguished by the myriad
specialized academic majors that financially support their respective operation, existence
and educational “mission” and the obvious corporative transformation occurring on many
campuses across the nation, and 3) the pronounced Foucaldian-Lyotardian-Deleuzian
relationship between power, knowledge and control as evidenced by the interrelated
concepts of political technology of the body and language games; especially as they
pertain to the professional and academic disciplines and their pedagogical utilities. Due
to the overwhelming volume of scholarship addressing the pedagogical implications
associated with the post Sputnik social and cultural influences on the development and
reliance upon the scientific management and social efficiency paradigms for education,
most notably presented and contested in Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery and Taubman’s
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synoptic, yet comprehensive Understanding Curriculum (1995, p. 95), the current focus
will extend primarily to the discourses surrounding the latter two interconnected and
intricate factors.
Because higher education now seems to rely largely upon a quasi-scientific,
compartmentalized disciplinary and foundational model (behavioristic psychology,
curriculum guidelines, accreditations standards & objectives) to essentialize knowledge,
truth and reality, it is my observation that the contemporary customer of the educational
factory that is “higher education” is being denied her/his epistemological and axiological
rights, human potential, and ultimately, a free, critical and personal existence. As such, it
can quite easily be argued that many of today’s college graduates merely symbolize a
departmentalized, specialized and highly technocratic “product” that has been sold a bill
of goods, an object that has been subsequently duped into believing that they have paid
for, and received in full the tools and knowledge necessary to create a substantive and
critical ontological and epistemological foundation—a foundation that has traditionally
been intended to provide the means necessary to transform each participant into active
and productive citizens in a democratic, postmodern society.
On the flip side, there also exists an inordinately high number of students entering
the college and university ranks with deep-seated industrial and capitalistic notions of
what a college degree signifies, what its utility is, and what the end goal should be of
graduating from college—a good paying job. Yes, most colleges still have core
requirements steeped in the traditional liberal arts curriculum; yes, many colleges are
experimenting with various pedagogical manifestations of interdisciplinary curricula in
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an attempt to hold on to the liberal arts and humanities; and, yes critical, transformative
institutions of higher education do still exist in this country and they are doing their part
to turn out critical and reflexive citizens for our democratic society. But the fundamental
problem to be addressed here lies in the bare fact that these positive and exemplary
instances seem to be in the ever increasing minority, and the majority is now made up of
general education institutions, on line universities, and money making “degree stampers”
who increasingly appear to resemble businesses more so than they do inventors of
subjectivity, transformation and intellectual complexity.
If this is indeed the case, that the socio-cultural role of the academy has
unashamedly shifted towards neoliberal principles of market value, commodification and
technocratic expertise and away from intellectual diversification and maturity, then the
majority of young citizens entering our complex, post human/ modern /disciplinary
/colonial /911 /structural world as professional policy makers, politicians, business
leaders, educators, and eventually parents, are lacking a certain critical mass required to
confront our immediate and long-term posthuman conditions that are staring the
collective “us” right in the face. Something needs to change before this negentropic, but
closed system (negentropy in a closed system is dangerous due to the structural
constraints that define and objectify the system, in contrast to an open system) self
implodes upon itself and obliterates our civilization, our humanity, and our ecosphere.
In my albeit limited personal and professional experiences, I have noticed that far
too many of the college and university graduates today that I have encountered (at least at
the general public university setting now so popular largely because of constraining
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economic factors) are relatively ill-prepared to carry out the meaningful analysis and
problem solving skills needed for confronting the critical social, scientific, and political
issues that define and characterize our (post) human condition in inventive and creative
manners. With respect to Lyotard’s’ observations on the dualistic purpose of higher
education, I am concerned that today’s academy may not be producing enough of the
second type citizen that he mentions--the type of educated elite that is capable of
maintaining the “internal cohesion” of our society. Rather, it has been my collective
experiences as an educator, program director, student advisor, and student recruiter that
has lead me to the impression that too many general university students today enroll for
specific job training skills and knowledge, and the associated lure of economic and social
security that higher education promises.
In fact, a recent study conducted by The Chronicle of Higher Education supports
Wiener’ “social status”, and Giroux’s neoliberalist influence claims by demonstrating
that 92% of the public it surveyed sees higher education’s most important role today as
“preparing undergraduates for a career” (Selingo, 2003, p. A10). Additionally, the
Chronicle’s fairly inclusive study shows that 90% of all respondents consider higher
education to be principally responsible for “providing education for adults to qualify for
better jobs”. Ironically, respondents also urged universities to focus less on research and
economic development, and to focus more on general education, teacher education,
leadership and responsibility. How universities should reconcile the public’s perceived
need to decrease initiatives designed to spur local and regional economic growth, educate
students more for the economic work place, and to focus more on civic, social and
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personal responsibilities and general intellectual growth at the same time, is a very
interesting and complex social impression that begs further research and analysis.
As a result of our current and long standing Dysacademic condition, far too many
students today are not intellectually capable of inventing the knowledge necessary to deal
with the issues that we, as a historical society/culture, have left for them to confront; they
either don’t have, or aren’t allowed the opportunity to live, work and exist from within, or
without a Thoureauvian consciousness. Global capitalization and the associated
diminishing natural resources and increasing pollution/contamination of our ecosphere;
post cold war and pre postmodern war plutonium propagation; the human genome
project, cloning and stem cell research; the ecological, social, economic and health
complications associated with worldwide rain forest deforestation; and the scientific and
technological invasion upon all forms of culture, including the impending development of
artificial intelligence and autopoietic robots, are just of the few extremely complex and
pressing issues facing our current and future generations.
Another relevant example (in addition to the post 9-11 example provided in
Chapter 3) involves the many complex and interconnected issues pertaining to global
economic expansion, ecological sustainability, and our [post] human futures. Many, if
not most of the students and young adults that I have been involved with assume that
recycling their beer bottles and newspapers is “all that is needed” by our society to
counter the hyper consumptive appetites of the Western economic machine that is
gradually devouring our natural resources. As such, those who actually do recycle their
waste containers are inclined to think that they are doing “their part” to solve this
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complex and multifaceted problem (which, ironically is actually seen as simple and over
exaggerated in their eyes). Inextricably bound as cogs in the apparatus of consumption
and its associated free market policies, much of today’s citizenry (including those with
higher education degrees) are unqualified to critically deconstruct their respective roles,
impact and eventual effects in/on our current neoliberal society dominated by
consumption, production, and the mythical American right to material acquisition.
Bigger. Better. More. As long as I can afford it…it’s my American right!
To further illustrate the need for, and relevance of a more POST based model for
curriculum and education, consider the following example: most of the issues facing our
society and civic leaders today contain important scientific and technological
components. Everything from healthcare, to environment and ecology, endemic poverty,
and of course, education represent complex, multifarious, and systemically related
problems that require more than quick fix, linear solutions based on modern empirical
thinking. In his latest book, The Future of Life, Wilson laments the prospects for
mankind, earth, and our sustainable future by pointing out that we would theoretically
require 4 more planet Earths to survive if every country were to reach the current level of
consumerism found in America (2002, p. 46). When compared to the potential
implications and complications associated with genetic cloning, stem-cell research,
pharmaceutical memory pills, and information technology, these former issues seem
somewhat less significant, however they are ALL inherently and problematically
connected. Yet, many of our elected and hired professionals who are charged with acting
upon these problems are ill equipped to integrate the necessary knowledge from the
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natural sciences with that of the social sciences and humanities. How can we expect such
(dys)educated people to develop reasonable and effective strategies for resolving ethnic
conflict, arms escalation, global warming, overpopulation, abortion, or rain forest and
natural resource depletion? As Wilson suggests in Consilience, “…only fluency across
the boundaries will provide a clear view of the world as it really is, not as seen through
the lens of ideologies and religious dogmas or commanded by myopic response to
immediate need” (1998, p. 13).
Discussing, participating in, or attempting to develop resolutions to these
contemporary problems, as well as various others, requires both breadth and depth of
knowledge; it requires a transdisciplinary and transideological approach that embraces
multiples, heterogeneity, complexity and invention. It requires a critical POST approach
that promotes and encourages the development of the 3rd person, of multiple 3rd spaces,
and relies upon a 3rd curriculum. In this light then, many contemporary college graduates
may be ill prepared to demarcate and clarify the various knowledge claims that
philosophy, science and art (on a more global level, inclusive of the humanities, music,
etc.) construct of our world, and thus are not inclined to think openly, critically and
reflexively about issues requiring a certain “chaoplexic” approach (Arnott, 1999, p. 49).
By “chaoplexic”, Arnott is integrating the properties and principles of chaos and
complexity theories into a postmodern appreciation for the notion that as things appear to
get more chaotic, they actually show deeper signs of complexity and organization.
If, as noted and self-professed amodern philosopher Michel Serres says, “the goal
of instruction is invention” (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 133), and if the “goal of
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teaching is to have teaching to cease” (p. 22), then pedagogy today may be exposed as
being more “necrotic” (dead, as in lacking nutrition and energy) than alive; or at least
“quasi-necrotic”. Simply put, in these current times of classroom discipline, rabid
standardization, measurable outcomes and teacher accountability that so typify our 21st
century educational paradigm at all levels, the typical American student has very little
opportunity or initiative to invent his/her own knowledge, and thus, very little ability to
teach the self. As the “founder” of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, points out, this is not a
new or novel argument (1954).
Our elementary and secondary schools are more interested in formal classroom
discipline than in the intellectual discipline of learning something thoroughly, and
a great deal of the serious preparation for a scientific or a literary course is
relegated to some sort of graduate school or other (p. 132).
For Wiener, education in the 1950s was already being viewed as a closed and myopic
system, one wherein young minds were no longer implored to think, to invent, or to
experience knowledge for themselves; young actors were “taught” how to act rather than
being allowed to express their art forms from within, and young writers were schooled in
“how” to write from expert sources, rather than being allowed to invent their own form of
communicative art. In short time, highly specialized and advanced degrees, especially
the PhD, were the standard bearers of knowledge and communication needed to impart
learning and skill onto the masses. To Wiener, “forms” of knowledge and occupational
skill now superseded critical and intellectual mass as part of a fast moving trend towards
an “ever-increasing thinness of educational content”; while the artistic desire to invent
was rapidly being structured around particular methods and forms, and thus, subsequently
extinguished in all but the most extraordinary of students (1954, p. 133). In harmony
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with Serres’ and Wiener’s critical calls for invention to serve as the primary focus of
education, Katherine Hayles suggests that the creative writer is perhaps the best example
of a free-floating and chaotic inventor, capable of connecting various epistemic cultures.
Working from the “third territory” then, somewhere between order and disorder, is what
allows the creative writer to communicate beyond one particular field of study, and thus
better capture and articulate the “aura of cultural meanings that surround chaos” (1990, p.
19).
And so, if individual subjects are not provided a clean canvas, a blank parchment,
or an open space with which to invent one’s own objective worldview, or one’s own selfconstructed and reflexive language game, it can be surmised that he/she will more than
likely not be able to transform in unknown, open manners, he/she won’t be able to
cultivate a unique and plastic ontology, nor a critical and multivocal epistemology.
Forced to exist with current and historical language games, to acquire a worldview from
within an already vulcanized, fragmented and specialized disciplinary field, inevitably
and dangerously denies the subject the opportunity to genuinely channel their respective
experiences and worldly interpretations into a meaningful and organic subjectivity. Of
what aesthetic quality and intellectual depth would Henry David Thoreau’s literary work
have if he did not have the natural respite that Walden Pond provided? What would have
become of Albert Einstein’s scientific endeavors if not for his genuine appreciation for
poetry, music and the arts and his firm conviction in the value of a well rounded and
balanced education?
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Walden Pond provided Thoreau with the opportunity to explore nature in its
natural splendor, the opportunity to invent his own biological worldview, and thus a
contrast of sorts that allowed him to compare his socially constructed and natural
ontological and epistemological perspectives; an experience that perhaps allowed him to
more critically reflect on the rapidly evolving industrial society and urban life from a
different, somewhat self-invented perspective. This contrast of views and experiences
provided both Thoreau & Einstein with unique epistemic privileges that infiltrated their
literary and narrative works on many levels--a type of dispensation that can be seen as
being more consilient than linear, more comprehensive and multiple than singular, more
liberated and less restrictive, more inventive and less transparent. In referring to
interpretation and aesthetic value as they relate to education, perhaps it would not be a
large stretch to surmise that both Thoreau and Einstein would agree with Norbert
Wiener’s eloquent sentiment on the subject of nature and knowledge when he said that,
“no school has a monopoly on beauty” (1954, p. 134).
From this perspective then, I wish to advance my “curriculum reconceptualized”
by integrating what I see as complementary concepts from various scientific frames of
thought to the larger framework of pedagogy, curriculum and the student in a postmodern
manner. Specifically, it is my position that much, if not all of the central constructs that
characterize open systems theory (OST), cybernetics and information theory, and chaos
and complexity theories can with a little theoretical creativity, be applied to a postmodern
curriculum, and in so doing, create an educational paradigm that maximizes mobility,
growth, wandering and eventually negentropy (or, complex order). In doing such, I have
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intended to introduce and arrange the contributing parameters for my theoretical
conception of the 3rd Person, and the 3rd Curriculum—the focus of Chapter 5. It is hoped
that the critical development and appreciation of a 3rd Person & Curriculum for the
postmodern University, as I am attempting to articulate will be one that extrapolates
specific conceptual elements from various theories related to open systems, chaos,
information, multiplicities, and rhizomes; and subsequently connects and relates these
complimentary concepts as constituent structures of an alternative postmodern curricular
discourse that provides openings, possibilities, and recursions. And in an attempt to
adhere to the poststructural notion that “theory is not prescriptive”, it’s merely
“idiosyncratic”, the discourse I have constructed is offered “up front” with the full
awareness that it’s effectiveness (real or potential) can only be embodied by a discourse
structured by invention, hope, prospects and multiplicity (Pinar, et al, 1995, p. 56).
In short, all students, regardless of their chosen and intended academic/preprofessional field of study, should be invited into the murky, nebulous, and rhizomatic
world of postmodern open systems thinking; all students should become 3rd persons at
some point in time, and likewise, all members of the professorate should continually and
consistently be/come 3rd teachers. Postmodern students suffering from the modern
viruses that induce dysgnosia, dyslogia, and dyserethesia as sequalae of their disciplined
and controlled dyskinesia, and thus seeking rehabilitation or medication ought to learn to
relish in the disorder and turbulence of open spaces (milieu). Members of the
professorate can only counteract the “death of the professor” by becoming and remaining
the 3rd instructor by entering into, moving amongst, and remaining in multiple 3rd spaces.
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Students and teachers alike must be allowed to seek gradual and fragile order not through
modern disciplinarity and control, but rather through chaos and dissipation.
Dysacademics ought be shown, and allowed to enter the passageway to what Serres’
refers to impassionedly as the “third place” (1991/1997, p.8). In order to treat, and
prevent Dysacademic dyskinesia from inflicting the self, teachers must teach and allow
students “to dance”; for the teacher has failed if the student hasn’t learned how to dance
among the domains of knowing and being (1982/1995a, p. 45). In expressing his strong
dislike for “re” search, Serres articulates his fervent belief that, “to discover seems the
only act of intelligence…ideas that circulate are usually astonishingly old, thus, he who
seeks newness remains alone” (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 145). Surely then, one
cannot discover for her/himself if they allow themselves to be docile participants in the
current disciplined, controlled, and neoliberal-industrial curriculum that so typifies
Western higher education today (1992/Guattari, 1995).
Thus the issue returns with insistence: how do we change mentalities, how do we
reinvent social practices that would give back to humanity—if it ever had it—a
sense of responsibility, not only for its own survival, but equally for the future of
all life on the planet, for animal and vegetable species, likewise for incorporeal
species such as music, the arts, cinema, the relation with time, love and
compassion for others, the feeling of fusion at the heart of cosmos? (p. 120)
Rather, it is my contention that schooling, at any level must be based on Serres’
contention that invention is education’s central purpose, not reproduction and
meaningless debate; and furthermore, that it must therefore be connected to the larger
socio-cultural mission of education, regardless of what the chosen discipline is/will be.
Peter Berger, renowned sociology scholar, coined this sociological consciousness and
wrote that the critical development of such rigorous intellectual skills would allow the
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knower to deconstruct, or “see through” the various social structures that form opinions
and myth, privilege power and authority, bias certain forms of knowing and knowledge,
and situate our social roles and identities (1965). In order to do this—to invent the
critical knowledge needed to reach sociological consciousness—students must be
allowed to traverse into, between and amongst what Serres calls the “third place” (Serres,
1991/1997, p. 43). That is, all parties in the pedagogy relation, both student and teacher,
must be allowed to endure the pain, the discomfort, the uncertainty, and most importantly
a certain, undetermined “boundarylessness of self” that accompanies a critical ontological
evolution into the third place). For this to happen, teachers, intellectuals, and
administrators must reach out and interact with students as subjects viably interconnected
with the purposes of education and democracy, rather than merely treating students as
objects knotted within an overly determined, objective and fixed educational process.
Teachers must of course adhere to academic and professional standards that subsume
both the discipline’s knowledge base with the teachers’ professional experiences; I am
not calling for pedagogical anarchy, or professional nihilism in any manner.
Standardization of knowledge, of method, of delivery and of thought is unethical,
unprofessional, and counter productive to the larger mission of the University, writ large.
And above all, university educators of all disciplines must be allowed and encouraged to
teach students how “to be” citizens with varied professional lives and purposes, not just
merely how “to do” their chosen profession. Young professionals must be critically and
ontologically connected to the larger problems of society, and to what is required to live
“in” a democracy, not just live “off” of a democracy by coming face to face with their
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own, disciplined intellectual and cultural myopia. In describing the social forces that
now bind the various “intellectual” and “cultural” fields into one homogenous and
legitimate competition, Pierre Bourdieu classifies the insular and juvenile condition of
what he calls “independent intellectuals” (1969).
Everything leads one to suppose that the constitution of a relatively autonomous
intellectual field is the condition for the appearance of the independent
intellectual, who does not recognize nor wish to recognize any obligations other
than the intrinsic demands of his creative project (p. 91).
Thus said, it has been the intent of the current chapter to present the various
characteristics, criteria, and phenomena associated with open systems and chaos, and to
communicate them as a small parts of a compelling and practical model for a postmodern
open systems education; and likewise, for students to be understood, viewed, and handled
as living, undetermined and open systems with equal complexity, depth, and breadth. All
of course regarded and understood as a paradigm of hope operating underneath a veil of
postmodern sensibility; a curriculum that empowers and enables students to see through
the transparent guise of a preconceived modern utopia, full of happiness and peace for
all; one that affectively harmonizes with Marla Morris’ dystopic concerns for a
curriculum she sees as “more adequate to the task of becoming an educated person”
(2001, p. 199). Situated as such, it is my intention to present a model of pedagogy
(inclusive of the curriculum and the student) that can reasonably and theoretically be seen
as a self-organizing, entropic, fractal, chaotic, dissipative, and autopoietic subjectivity for
students entering into the curriculum by appreciating the power and vitality of the Michel
Serres articulation of the 3rd, or middle place. From here, I wish to add a more
postmodern intellect to these concepts by elaborating more upon the pedagogical and
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cultural thoughts of Michel Serres, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, and others in an
attempt to articulate an alternative, sub-discourse pedagogical paradigm that I will call
the 3rd Curriculum. As students progress through a curriculum reconceptualized as such,
they don’t proceed in a linear and scientific fashion of objectivity and controlled order;
rather, they transform from entropy (disorder) towards negentropic (order) and complex
forms, but in a more fractal, rhizomatic and postmodern manner that is not predicted,
controlled, or manipulated by objective ideals, essential knowledge, or modern absolutes.
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CHAPTER 5
INVENTING THE 3RD PERSON & THE 3RD SPACE(S): CHAOSMOSIS,
PHILOSOPHY & MOVING TOWARDS THE SHADOWS OF A SERRESIAN
CURRICULUM

I see that clear knowledge contains a blindness almost as far-reaching as the dark
knowledge contained in ignorance is deep. Sometimes one can only understand if
one liquidates one’s knowledge in the loyal narrative of circumstance. The
solutions do not always reside in the place where one looks for them. One must
always pay, that is, accept that one must pay off this change of place with some
kind of blindness, in order to see better.
Michel Serres (1991/1997, p. 66)
Do the patterns of thought and language transmitted by the school, e.g., those
which treatises of rhetoric used to call figures of speech and figures of thought,
actually fulfill, at any rate among members of the educated classes, the function
of the unconscious patterns which govern the thinking and the productions of
people belonging to traditional societies, or do they operate only at the most
superficial level of consciousness?
Pierre Bourdieu (1967, p. 339)
Problematizing The Order Of The University
In examining contemporary curricular discourses across the various domains of
education, it is now fairly apparent to me that there exists very few open and turbulent
passages which might allow for personal and subjective inventions, very few
epistemological synapses or bridges which might allow for the connection of the various
branches of knowledge and learning that exists in our complex world. In short, there
appears to be very little opportunity to patch up the comminuted curriculum (comminuted
as in what a shotgun wound would do to a bone) through invention, subjective
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scaffolding, and original iteration (Abbott, 2001; Bertalanffy, 1969; Doll, 1993;
Martusewicz, 2001; Serres, 1982, 1997, & 1995; Trifonas, 2000: and Wilson, 1998).
Indeed, there now seems to be a subtle but translucent return in the Academy to what
Foucault has painstakingly described in The Order of Things, that being the Lamarckian
and Linnaean foundations of rational, objective and controlled order in the various and
separated disciplines that defined Classical thinking up to the 18th century (Foucault,
1966/1970). An order, that translucent as it may be, is also sadly connected to the
hegemonic power and authority associated with economically based, disciplinary
competition. In effect, it can be argued then that education writ large has effectively
become a “closed system”, one now reflecting the various and sundry values associated
with neoliberal, capitalistic, and social efficiency agendas and initiatives that further
remove the institution of education from its larger historical, personal and social
mission(s). In his call for a new ethico-aesthetic paradigm of thought for psychoanalysis,
Felix Guattari connects the institutional and social fragmentation that I have previously
described and subsequently applied to the Academy, to a like process seen in the
subjective, living self; a concept I wish to explore further in the remaining section of this
text (1992/1995).
The devaluation of the meaning of life provokes the fragmentation of the selfimage: its representations become confused and contradictory (p. 12).
Derrida On Institutional Dysphilosophy
Much heralded and influential French philosopher Jacques Derrida is well known
for his early and significant work in the area of deconstruction, particularly as it pertains
to language, text, and communication. Along the way, Derrida has applied his profound
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and original thinking in myriad writings and presentations on such varied cultural and
social issues as forgiveness, violence, love, being, technology, art, the internet, ethics,
and of course, philosophy (1978; 2000; 2002; & 2003). Although not typically viewed as
an “ethical” philosopher in the classical sense, Derrida’s deconstructive philosophy is
deeply concerned with the ethical responsibility we hold in recognizing the difference(s)
of the other. Viewed as such, Derrida’s various works commonly articulate a philosophy
that is deeply axiomatic in both nature and intent, in that the various systems of norms,
values and regulating principles that define and contain our culture can all be
deconstructed and re-invented with critical reflection and modesty (1997/2002, p. 5). In
1991, Derrida demonstrated his ethical perspective in a lecture given at the first
International Conference for Humanistic Discourses entitled “Du droit a la philosphie
d’un point de vue cosmopolitique”, and hosted by UNESCO (United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) (first published in 1997; Trifonas,
2002, p. ix). Translated as “The Right to Philosophy from the Cosmopolitical Point of
View”, Derrida effectively “reveals how deconstruction can help an institution to
reconfigure itself for the better by causing those who are part of it, are it, to question the
grounding of the concepts they hold most dear as the keys to the perfectibility of human
being” (Trifonas, 2002, p. x). At this point, it should be fairly evident that a certain
deconstructive philosophy (“disguised” as theory) has been the central mechanism used
herein to establish the need for a “reconfiguration” of the academy by presenting
Dysacademia, and its many sub maladies to the reader.
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Naturally then, it is philosophy that begs itself to also be part of the
“reconfiguration” needed in order to reconstruct, refigure, and re-invent the Academy for
those with vested interests and critical concerns. Indeed, Derrida opens his exposition
not by defining or justifying philosophy, but rather, by asking the critical and more urgent
question, “where ought it take place?” (1997/2002, p. 2). Because of the institutional
relations among universities and the institutions of culture, and the inherent
interdisciplinary relation between philosophy and the other disciplines, the answer is
actually quite simple for Derrida, as it is also for me. Philosophy ought take place in
institutions of research and education (1997/2002).
These institutions are already philosophemes…such institutions imply the sharing
of a culture and a philosophical language…they are committed to make possible,
first and foremost by means of education, the access to this language and
culture…commit themselves, in principle, philosophically, to recognize and put
into operation in an effective way something like philosophy and a certain
philosophy of rights and law, the rights of man, universal history, etc. The
signature of these charters is a philosophical act that makes a commitment to
philosophy in a way that is philosophical (p. 3).
Derrida briefly deconstructs the Dysacademic status of philosophy in the modern
University by lamenting its “disciplinary” and “aperformative” existence in modern
institutions (1997/2002, p. 9). Fragmented and separated from other modes of inquiry by
departmental hierarchies, essentialized as chiefly Eurocentric and canonical in character,
and dubbed “aperformative” because of its non-impact on neoliberal policies and
initiatives (“philosophy is everywhere suffering”, p. 15), philosophical thinking in
today’s academic institutions can be seen then to represent a “value neutral” endeavor (p.
4). From Derrida’s perspective then, value neutral equates to value negative; thus
presenting a significant dilemma for those constituents who recognize, as he does, that
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the entire University “is” essentially philosophical, and thus there is no reason to define,
or constrain philosophy to one, essentialized and fragmented academic department.
Herein lies Derrida’s fundamental, polyfactorial concern over the access to, and the
existence of philosophy in contemporary institutions that are after all, philosophical; and
thus its critical relevance to the current discourse concerning Dysacademia. Philosophy
for Derrida has become Dysacademicized by the modern University, or better yet, it may
now be thought of as dysphilosophy. In effect, modern philosophy in most often
manifested by Eurocentric & Western works that operate to essentialize our
epistemological, ontological and axiological perspectives and views; and so, has been
effectively dubbed as “the” philosophy of value in our current learning system. Second,
modern philosophy has for the most part, dissipated from the contemporary academy
curricula because of its limited powers to improve the performative quality of the
University, or the local, regional and national economies. After all, what can one do with
a philosophy degree in the 21st Century techno-science world? Lastly, Derrida is deeply
concerned that when modern institutional philosophy “is” included/required in the
curriculum, it is partitioned and fragmented into separate academic departments, and not
interspersed “across the curriculum”. The disciplinary fragmentation of philosophy
effectively eliminates and marginalizes most of its potential for informing the other
disciplines, and so its inherent value and utility is minimized even further (1997/2002).
Thinking is always also compelled by institutional norms and forms, and
displaces them. And sometimes it’s within an institution, within the limits of an
institution, that a philosophical or a thinking event may occur, then displacing the
structure of the institution (p. 39).
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The Right To Philosophy: Derridean Deconstruction & Dilating The Space(s)
Having addressed the “where” for philosophy, our institutions, Derrida thus
moves on to articulate the “why” and “what” of his thesis in the latter sections of his
original lecture. Of critical importance for understanding Derrida’s point(s) here is the
realization that 1) not just “any” brand or type of philosophy deserves to hold the space,
or produce the metalanguage for our many educational and cultural institutions, and 2)
that the structure of the institution in which philosophy is housed must be displaced, or
deconstructed if we hope to ever “do” anything with our thinking. In keeping with his
poststructural legacy, Derrida briefly outlines and critiques the Eurocentric discourse
surrounding the historical legacy of philosophy and its Greco-Roman roots, in order to
“go beyond the tiresome, worn-out, and wearisome opposition between Eurocentrism and
anti-Eurocentrism” (p. 9). Clearly positioned then, Derrida communicates a different sort
of philosophy that is “no longer determined by a program, an originary language or
tongue whose memory it would suffice to recover so as to discover its origin” (p. 10). So
as to avoid history, hegemony, and authority, Derrida articulates a “cosmopolitical”
philosophy characterized by reflection, displacement and deconstruction of existing
hegemonies, and one that provides the subject access to the philosophical events, signs,
languages, and metanarratives that define, legitimate, and constrain our existence and our
knowing. In short, a cosmopolitical philosophy is inherently poststructural in that it can
be practiced in myriad ways, take multiple paths, and produce polyvocal languages with
the intention of liberating the self from the dogmatism and authority that dominant
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current and historical languages produce/induce; in the current usage, it can be used then
to “displace the University” (1997/2002).
It is a matter of putting into operation each time in an original way and in a
nonfinite multiplicity of idioms, producing philosophical events that are neither
particularistic and untranslatable nor transparently abstract and univocal in the
element of an abstract universality (p. 12).
Contrasting such a cosmopolitical philosophy of openness, subjectivity and multiplicity,
is a philosophical discourse based on a sole language (discipline, control, and
performativity) that imposes itself upon the subject without any possible discussion—
Dysacademia. For Derrida, the right to a cosmopolitical philosophy is not “just” about
philosophy itself, nor the obvious applications to our complex techno-science world, but
also about a certain “politics of thought”, and a “democracy to come” that possesses the
faculty to lead to a “rediscovery of an irreducible autonomy in science, law, religion, and
democracy “ (p. 13-15). A worldwide philosophy is needed for all walks of life, all
professionals, all who call themselves educated; a worldwide political philosophy that
helps us understand what’s happening through a deconstructive analysis capable of
revealing the open systems nature of things and events; a worldwide philosophy that aids
us in deconstructing the various social, cultural, scientific, and political myths that govern
and distort our subjectivities and world views. After all, as Derrida says, “every kind of
thinking, of thought, is philosophical” (1997/2002, p. 22), and “sometimes it’s within an
institution…that a philosophical or a thinking event may occur” (p. 39). A
cosmopolitical philosophy, as Derrida suggests, is what’s needed to deconstruct the
system of Dysacademia and to displace the structure of the University (which I have
attempted to do in Chapters 1-3), to open up the epistemological and ontological spaces
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for subjective growth and understanding (as I have attempted to articulate in Chapter 4
with POST thinking), and for the transformation and development of 3rd person(s) and 3rd
space(s). In this latest area, Derrida’s views on invention are clear, and also compatible
with one of his colleagues Michel Serres—there are no essential, singular or natural
events; deconstruction & displacement opens and dilates passages for philosophical and
poetic re-invention; turbulence is required for invention; and the disciplined reproduce
the discipline(s) with cultural reproduction and closed, modern thinking (1997/2002, p.
52-55).
The Educational Theory Of Michel Serres: The 3rd Person & The 3rd Space(s)
In using a multitude of profound metaphors to express his “amodern” views of the
larger, more philosophical undertaking for pedagogy in Troubadour of Knowledge,
Michel Serres poetically articulates his visions of the purposes, processes and pains of
true learning, while concurrently highlighting the pedagogical constraints that
disciplinary boundaries impress upon one’s epistemological and ontological
development. To do this, Serres metaphorically situates the learner in the midst of a
turbulent river crossing (Serres, 1991/1997).
In crossing the river, in delivering itself completely naked to belonging to the
opposite shore, it has just learned a third thing. The other side, new customs, a
new language, certainly. But above all, it has just discovered learning in the
blank middle that has no direction from which to find all directions. At the apex
of the cranium, in a vortex, twists the cowlick’s tuft, a place/milieu were all
directions come together. Universal means what is unique yet versed in all
directions. From then on, the solitary soul, wandering without belonging, can
receive and integrate everything: all directions are equal (p. 7).
Knowledge then, to Serres, is elliptical, it becomes decentered just like the world
eventually does to each separate individual, and thus, the third place can only be borne if
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one enters the turbulence, the disorder, and the chaos that ironically and inevitably
produces the order that the learner seeks (1991/1997, p. 9). This third place requires the
experience of experience, of exposure, of transformation, and even death; death in this
case signifying the purging of old knowledge, old ideas, and misplaced opinions, and
being replaced by new, invented ideas. It is here, in the 3rd place that Serres sees the
educated soul residing, dilated only by experience and by learning. And, as many
poststructural theorists oft remind us, there are indeed many, multiple 3rd spaces ad
infinitum, from which to enter, exit and reside in; hence, the recognition of 3rd place(s)
and space(s) (Deleuze, 1990/1995; Deleuze and Guattari, 1980/1987; Serres,
1982/1995a). Characteristic of all such descriptions, the 3rd place(s) requires motility,
hypermobility, plasticity, and even buoyancy; it is where both modes of knowledge
(verification and inventiveness) can be addressed, and where each individual can form a
syrrhese, or a mobile confluence of fluxes on his/her own topographical terms (Serres,
1990/1995, p. 126). It is the 3rd space(s) then that welcomes, comforts, and produces
even, the 3rd person. Via a cosmopolitical philosophy capable of deconstructing and
displacing the system, the 3rd person removes him/herself from the argumentative and
perpetual binaries of conventional dialogue (from taking one side, or the other), and
rather, invents her/his own version of events, dialogue, and concepts. Rather than taking
part in one side of an existing argument, the 3rd person creates new tangent(s), new
interpretation(s), and new possibility(s); multiple multiplicities, in fact. Wisdom, or the
intelligent use of knowledge requires us then to invent a 3rd curriculum, and so to,
embrace and utilize a 3rd pedagogy. A curriculum or pedagogy built upon the 3rd person,
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the 3rd space(s), and the 3rd conversation(s) is one that may prove to be more generally
characterized by the instructed third (le Tiers-Instruit), or more simply, as a Troubadour
of Knowledge (Serres, 1991/1997, p. 184).
To Serres, knowledge is typically constructed around 2 dichotomized and
comminuted poles (right/wrong, truth/fiction, good/bad, winner/loser, light/dark, etc.);
and sadly, the 1st or 2nd instructed (the dysacademic) tend not to linger at the center of the
two poles, in the turbulent, fluxed, hyperreality of the knowns and unknowns that reside
in the middle (Serres, 1991/1997, p. 161). Our educated dislike of the third place (which
incidentally, can often be confused as an a priori element of “human nature”) is largely
founded upon our learned avoidance of the pain, the disorder, the anxiety, and the
discomfort that is associated with insubstantial concepts, things that reside in the middle
and in between, things that wander and live in the third place; things that can’t be tracked,
predicted, measured or standardized. In research parlance, things deemed subjective are
not given the same weight or consideration as “official knowledge” (largely because of
their perceived neoliberal nonsignificance), and thus can be seen to represent what
Guattari has called the “conservative reterritorializations of subjectivity” (1992/1995, p.
3).
Modern, Dysacademic and dysphilosophic based learning has qualified its
subjects to favor linear and objective certainty, and simplicity; and thus to seek order for
the duration of all learning experiences (negentropy). Again, Guattari’s concern over the
fate of subjectivity in our culture is significant, and although not included explicitly in
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this passage, its relevance and applicability to the discourse of education is rather
apparent (1992/1995).
As things stand, sociology, economic science, political science and legal studies
appear poorly equipped to account for the mixture of archaic attachments to
cultural traditions that nonetheless aspire to the technological and scientific
modernity characterizing the contemporary subjective cocktail (p. 4).
Paradoxically, looking at things through a poststructural lens that resituates and
contextualizes the observer, much of the living natural world can be seen to tenuously
reside in the third place; and so we must enter the 3rd place(s) if we ever hope to see,
touch, hear, or taste it (the natural and social world) with our full sensory apparatus.
Pedagogically and socially, absolute knowledge, technical expertise, and ultimately
power and concrete order reside at/in these poles, away from the disordered center that
provides much of the security and ease associated with modern (disciplined) thinking and
being.
Thus, these ordered poles are far more comfortable, predictable and reliable for
the subject who resides at the margins. In contrast, wandering into the center of the 3rd
place(s) is like drifting into the middle of a turbulent river, wading without any sure
footing, without the safety and assuredness of firm terra cotta, distant from the safety of
the banks (Serres, 1991/1997, p. 5). Loitering in the center is like entering into the
nebulous and sticky cauldron of dissipative structures, where there are no absolutes, no
determined directions in which to turn for safety, for assuredness, for light, or for
immediate and concrete order. Swimming in the dissipative center allows the self to
freely roam the waterways between the archipelagos, temporarily and transiently
struggling to float, suspended in undetermined uncertainty (disorder) until the support of
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land can be discovered, somewhere, somehow, ideally different for all (subjective
entropy). Here, in the middle spaces between the poles of light (knowledge) and dark
(non knowledge), there is no protection from the dark, from the heat of entropy, from the
unknown and the chaotic, or from the murky and strident waters that cloud our vision,
our hearing, and our senses. Here, in the 3rd place(s), one sees that knowledge is not
represented exclusively by light, and concurrently that dark doesn’t represent the absence
of knowledge; dichotomies are broken, binaries split into multiples, and realities
shattered into chaotic localities and contextualities. In effect then, it is within and
amongst the 3rd spaces that the disciplines, and the disciplined are made to be irregular,
abnormal, and “dys” ‘ed; thus, they are re/de situated as dysciplines, and eventually, the
dysciplined. In, within, and amongst the 3rd space(s), it is accepted and expected that the
3rd person be represented by an autopoietic subjectivity that is “in fact plural and
polyphonic” (Guattari, 1992/1995, p. 1).
Getting Into The 3rd Space/Person: Problematizing Subjectivity
In problematizing and resituating the notion of subjectivity that our modern epoch
now essentially realizes and accepts as “objectivity”, Felix Guattari believes its
obligatory for us to include the various semiotic productions that mass media,
informatics, telematics and robotics have constructed when thinking of our collective,
and individual psychological subjectivities (1992/1995, p. 4). Specifically, Guattari
maintains that the various technological machines of information and communication our
society has produced “operate at the heart of human subjectivity, not only within its
memory and intelligence, but within its sensibility, affects and unconscious fantasms”.
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Recognizing these technological connections to our subjective selves then, requires us to
redefine the heterogeneic nature of the production of subjectivity on 3 interconnected,
and discursive levels (1992/1995).
Thus one finds in it: 1. Signifying semiological components which appear in the
family, education, the environment, religion, art, sport…2. Elements constructed
by the media industry, the cinema, etc., 3. A-signifying semiological dimensions
that trigger informational sign machines, and that function in parallel or
independently of the fact that they produce and convey significations and
denotations, and thus escape from strictly linguistic axiomatics (p. 4).
As it pertains to the current discourse surround Dysacademia’s affect(s) upon the
subjective formation of 3rd space(s) and 3rd persons, Guattari’s redefinition works on all 3
levels to resituate the constituencies of the Academy’s organic subjects (both the
professorate and the student body).
First, knowledge, truth, value, meaning, democracy, and all other discursive
elements, concepts, and notions that are historically and actively constructed, disciplined,
controlled, and reinforced under the “guise” of education, must be realized for what they
really are—signifying semiological components. Secondly, other semiological
constructions from the media and popular culture outlets must also be recognized and
realized for what they are, and for their interconnected meaning to each subjective “lived
curricula”—important and very real rudiments of one’s formulated and reflexive
subjectivity. Lastly, the poststructural dimensions found in the a-signifying semiological
systems that define much of our educational machine have been fully elaborated upon in
the many works of Jacques Derrida, including The Right to Philosophy.
For Guattari though, a subsequently recognized “provisional subjectivity” based
on this poststructural insight would be thus defined as “the ensemble of conditions which
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render possible the emergence of individual and/or collective instances as self-referential
existential territories, adjacent, or in a delimiting relation, to an alterity that is itself
subjective” (1992/1995, p. 9). Situated as such, in all its multiple and heterogeneic
robustness, Guattari envisions and calls for an “immense complexification of
subjectivity”, replete with “harmonies, polyphonies, counterpoints, rhythms, and
existential orchestrations, until now unheard and unknown” (p. 18), or to be more
succinct, a “schizo unconscious” characterized by flux, autopoiesis, and ethico-poetic
subjectivity (p. 12). It is specifically here that Guattari’s Derridean associations and
affinities, and thus their relevance to the current discourse surrounding disciplinarity and
control emerge, as his suggested “method” for complexifying subjectivity is founded
upon 1) imperceptible bifurcations capable of overthrowing the framework of dominant
redundancies (i.e., the classical order), and 2) the shifting of subjectivation, courtesy of
the a-signifying existential functions typical of poststructural deconstruction (p. 20).
Thus appreciated, the first (and only?) step towards creating, maintaining, and reinventing 3rd space(s) and 3rd persons in the pedagogical realm involves the active and
open deconstruction of the classical order found in the inorganic University (which I have
attempted to do in the Chapters 1-3), and the perpetual shifting and movement of the
multiple individual subjectivities that comprise the organic components of the University
(which I have attempted to introduce and continue in Chapters 4-5).
In combining the profound and deeply entrenched existence of Dysacademia with
the seemingly difficult poststructural challenge to de- and re-construct individual
subjectivities and the institutions which give life to them, those interested in just such an
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undertaking may be inclined to wonder “how”, or “where” to begin just such an
undertaking. In fact, the cynical postmodern theorist, or even the well-meaning
modernist, may wonder aloud if the potential for such a transformation really exists with
the current state of affairs being as bleak as I have portrayed (are they?). If there is
potential to engage in such a reconstructive, yet open discourse (and I believe there is),
what form will/does it take? Additionally, just how does one begin to develop and
partake in the necessary actions needed to underscore the discourse, in order to actualize
the discourse’s reconstructive intentions for inducing change? In keeping with the
theoretical threads presented herein then, it should be readily apparent that the “how”
must be through, or with some strain of philosophical thinking. And, as it has been
previously presented, Derrida has offered us a suggestion that addresses both questions; it
1) ought take place in our philosophemes, or our philosophical institutions, and that 2) it
ought take the form of a cosmopolitical philosophy, rather than the tired Eurocentric/antiEurocentric discourses that perpetuates our malaise (1997/2002).
All is not that simple and clean for poststructural and postmodern theorists
however, as a serious dislike of “centers” and fixed positions (which ironically &
typically serves as the foci of the deconstructive discourses) can also work to
paradoxically construct potential barriers for the reconstructive effort(s). Simply put,
once the deconstruction of a discourse or system is undertaken, PM & PS theorists are
notionally reluctant to replace it with “another” center in lieu of the deconstructed one;
even when an alternative “is” desired, and arguably needed. Thus exists an “occupational
hazard” of sorts for the PM & PS theorist. But, if there is ever to be “some thing” that
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can tenuously and temporarily dwell in the “center” of the discourse; something with the
potential to reconstruct “other”, something “new” and undetermined; without
permanently and hegemonically taking the open space, resolutely, authoritatively, and
statically; perhaps poststructural and/or cosmopolitical philosophy represents that “some
thing”. For Deleuze and Guattari that “some thing” can be appreciated with rhizomes,
multiple lines of flight, and schizoanalysis; for Derrida, in the right to a “cosmopolitical
philosophy”, for Serres in turbulent passageways that ontologically and epistemologically
illuminate multiple 3rd spaces; and for Felix Guattari, that “some thing” exists in the form
of “Chaosmosis” (1992/1995); all of which can be seen as poststructural extensions of the
POST discourse submitted in the previous chapter, and succeeding sections of this text.
Towards A Chaosmotic Subjectification Of Space & Self
In theoretically attempting to reconcile chaos and complexity into a workable and
meaningful discourse capable of supporting and explicating the formation of multiple and
diverse autopoietic subjectivities, Guattari has metamorphasized chaos and osmosis into
“Chaosmosis” in an attempt to describe the homogenesis of ontological referents
(1992/1995).
A world is only constituted on the condition of being inhabited by an umbilical
point—deconstructive, detotalisating and deterritorialising—from which a
subjective positionality embodies itself. The effects of such a nucleus of
chaosmosis is to make the ensemble of differential terms the object of a
generalized connectivity, an indifferent mutability, a systematic dequalification…
This oscillation at infinite speed between a state of chaotic “grasping” and the
deployment of complexions anchored within worldly coordinates takes place
before space and time, before the processes of spatialisation and temporalisation
(p. 80).
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More specifically, chaosmosis means that any attempt to construct an ontological
heterogenesis requires a continual and reflexive reconstruction of the operational
narratives that govern and shape our social realities; or, a “relative chaotisation in the
confrontation with heterogeneous states of complexity” (p. 112). In an eerily similar
sentiment, Hosek & Freeman (2001) articulate this self-formation process as “osmetic
ontogenesis”, a neurodynamical process whereby conceptualizations of the postmodern
self converge and resonate with the various mechanisms we possess for sensation,
perception, representation, and meaning (p. 510). Or to put it in another, a chaosmotic
reconstruction of that knowledge is required in order to function beyond the signifying
properties of information and communication is possible because the communication and
information that we process in the formation of our individual epistemologies and
ontologies is structured by language. To draw an analogy, Guattari likens this
schizoanalytic construction of the self to the free and open construction of jazz music.
Jazz music can be comprehended as chaosmosis because of its’ spontaneous ability to
self generate without a set script (autopoietic), its’ reliance on multiple and disparate
parts to form a whole (heterogeneous), and because of its inherently and individually
determined aesthetic quality (p. 93). If the chaosmotically self-constructed self is viewed
as a jazz song then, “being crystallizes through an infinity of enunciative assemblages
associating actualized, discursive components with non-discursive, virtual components”,
and “it is out of this chaos that complex compositions…constitute themselves (p. 58-9).
Interestingly, the game of soccer (football) provides another apropos and
philosophically connected metaphor for the open, undetermined and aesthetic qualities
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and potential for chaosmosis. To those who know the game, soccer is a game of limited
structure, open spaces, and reactionary movements, the nuances of which take years of
exposure to master for most participants. Aside from the physical-technical mastery
required, those who play and coach it at a high level possess a profound understanding of
closed and open spaces; offensively they know how to open space(s), defensively they
know how to limit and close space(s), and the flow of the game is comprised of a
continual and undetermined series of opening and closing of undetermined space(s). In
the intriguing documentary film entitled simply “Derrida” (2002), Jacques Derrida briefly
expresses his love and past experiences with soccer, while the application of his work to
soccer is readily apparent to those who know both provinces well. Similarly, Michel
Serres creatively uses myriad soccer and rugby (and dance) exemplars as metaphors for
the “anti-structural” and chaotic nature of true learning and education, and the various
relations based syntheses that are capable of being formed. For example, he incorporates
the open, undetermined, responsive and agile movements/reactions/actions required by
the goalie in order to respond to the play at hand, and the dissipative flow of the game
(1991/1997, p.9).
In translation then, the self and the knowledge that informs and shapes
subjectivity, is constructed through the chaotic contribution and quasi-random
assemblage of various, disparate, and undetermined notes; much in the same way that a
jazz song materializes from the open spaces that silence occupies, or in the way that all
soccer players on a field are related to each other based solely on the position of the ball,
and their adjacency to others. Impromptu jazz jams and sophisticated soccer games alike,
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materialize out of chaotic and dissipative relations; they are not prescripted, rigidly
conducted, or a priori determined by any omniscient being or force. In short, both the
jazz song and the soccer game are invented each and every time they are played.
Sometimes, the constructed song (part of the self) is aesthetically pleasing from the initial
moments, other times it requires reworking, reconstruction, and new information in order
for it to “stick”. Sometimes, the constructed song needs a new melody, a new beat, or the
addition of a new instrument or player; or perhaps, just new audiences in order for it to
become part of the subjective self. Over time, some songs are kept, some are deleted, but
most of them are reworked, reconstituted and resynthesized with parts of other songs,
other notes and other rhythms to continually construct and crystallize new ones. The
same goes for any particular soccer game. In this sense, the entropy associated with
chaos gradually and perpetually becomes negentropic by bleeding, blending and
reformulating (osmosis) with other existing and incoming nodules of thought and
experience. For Guattari, the inventive powers of art, like those expanded upon with jazz
music, offer the potential for “mutant coordinates to extremes: it engender
unprecedented, unforeseen and unthinkable qualities of being”, that if encouraged,
allowed, and promoted, offer a new ethico-aesthetic paradigm for the construction of
subjectivities (1992/1995, p. 106). Yes…art.
For Guattari (1992/1995), as for Maxine Greene (2000), the inventive and
creative powers of the arts possess the capacity to resist and counter established
boundaries, to highlight and re-evaluate the creative dimensions that traverse all domains
of thought and praxis, and to invent heterogeneous views, perspectives and ethical
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positions. Largely removed and marginalized from today’s contemporary curriculum,
and perhaps even in the large scope of our culture, an aesthetics based paradigm
positioned from within the arts’ creative powers has ethico-political implications because,
“to speak of creation is to speak of the responsibility of the creative instance with regard
to the thing created, inflection of the state of things, bifurcation beyond pre-established
schemas” (Guattari, 1992/1995, p. 107). For Maxine Greene, democracy needs the arts
because the cultivation of imagination is important to the making of a democratic
community that respects, embraces and encourages multiple perspectives, ethics, and
subjectivities (2000).
One of the primary ways of activating the imaginative capacity is through
encounters with the performing arts, the visual arts and the art of literature…Such
encounters make possible an education of feeling; an education in critical
awareness, in noticing what there is to be noticed…The arts hold no guarantee as
to true knowledge or understanding, nor should they replace other subject matters.
They should become central to the curricula and include exhibitions and deliver
performance, thus adding to the modalities by means of which students make
sense of their worlds. With aesthetic experiences a possibility in school,
education will be less likely merely to transmit dominant traditions (p. 277).
More specifically, because the ethical purpose(s) of creative invention ought
focus on the subjective invention of the self in ways capable of freeing the self from
established political and social boundaries of being, and for the creation of truly free,
critical and subjective communities (democracies), art represents a double process
learning machine that possesses autopoietic-creative and ethical-ontological dimensions.
For Hosek & Freeman (2001), osmetic ontogenesis demonstrates how bioepistemologically unique subject shifts over time in intra-action with the world, or more
simply, how the body/brain (self) is constructed in, and through the world (p. 538). In this
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light then, chaosmosis and osmetic ontogenesis can both be seen as Foucaultian and
Serresian mechanisms capable of allowing subjects to subjectively invent and transcend
the self through reflection, deconstruction and reiteration (Guattari, 1992/1995).
The chaotic nothing spins and unwinds complexity, puts it in relation with itself
and with what is other to it, with what alters it. This actualization of difference
carries out an aggregative selection onto which limits, constants and states of
things can graft themselves. Already we are no longer at the speeds of infinite
dissolution…In symbiosis with infinite complexions, finite compositions insert
themselves within extrinsic coordinates, enunciative assemblages fit together in
relations of alterity. Linearity, the matrix of all ordination, is already slowing
down, an existential stickiness (p. 114-115).
Towards Different & Other Educational Space(s)
As for a specific stratagem for developing a 3rd curriculum capable of opening 3rd
space(s) and allowing the open, subjective, chaosmotic, and philosophical formation of
the 3rd person, I again turn to the poststructural thinking of various contemporary scholars
for guidance and insight. Rebecca Martusewicz (2001) recognizes the Serresian need for
a more uplifting and explorative notion of pedagogy, one that sharply diverges from the
fairly cynical view of the “educated condition” currently predominating our standardized,
objectified and accountable time period.
To think about education…is to be interested in the transformation of ‘the way
things are’ into more just and healthy relations, structures, and ways of thinking
and being (p. 8).
Michel Serres, whom Martusewicz leans upon heavily in articulating her post-structural
pedagogy and ethical position, creatively intertwines various concepts from science and
history, literary imagery and metaphors, and poetic narratives to judiciously communicate
his position concerning the modern fragmentation and partitioning of knowledge in
modern times (1982/1995).
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The passage is rare and narrow…From the sciences of man to the exact sciences,
or inversely, the path does not cross a homogeneous and empty space. Usually
the passage is closed, either by land masses or by ice floes, or perhaps by the fact
that one becomes lost. And if the passage is open, it follows a path that is
difficult to gauge. (p. xi)
For Serres, as well as for other French postmodern thinkers like Deleuze, Guattari
and Foucault, the natural sciences, literature, mathematics, philosophy,
mythology, and the human sciences have largely been separate “islands” of
thought that when effectively linked, inform us of the political and cultural
landscape that is human life. Serres trusts that education ought to allow the
individual to “see on a large scale, to be in possession of a multiple and
sometimes connected intellection” (p. xiii).
But what consistently seems to qualify the diverse works of Michel Serres, Gilles
Deleuze and Felix Guattari are critical, poststructural attempts to find epistemological
passages, rhizomes, lines of flight and chaotic nodules, or what Katherine Hayles calls
“archipelagos of chaos”, between the complicated branches of knowledge while
simultaneously identifying and overcoming the obstructions and assumptions that prevent
traveling in such passages. In echoing the sentiments put forth by Martha Nussbaum’s
call for the cultivation of humanity (1998), Serres extends this discourse further into the
axiological realm by arguing that morality, or in his terms a “science of humanity” is only
achievable through a complementary marriage between the natural and social sciences
and the humanities (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995).
The future will force experts to come quickly to the humanities and to humanity,
there to seek a science that is humane (p. 179).
In athletic training, as in other allied health care fields, this amounts to the development
of a set of skill sets and a level of consciousness that allows practitioners to go beyond
the mechanical and modernistic delivery of health care services. In short, all caregivers
must never forget that helping people is the primary objective of all care decisions and
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plans of action, and as such, that healthcare is a very complex and interconnected venture
for even the most seasoned caregiver. In addition to the myriad and ever changing
bioscientific skills and knowledge proficiencies required to work in a certain healthcare
scope of practice, all health care givers must also understand the open and chaotic nature
of all science (including medical science), the contextual and local nature of each patient
presentation, the socio-cultural perspectives, anxieties, fears and biases that caregiver and
patient bring to the relationship, and the various economic and emotional baggage that
each patient possesses.
Plastic, mobile, perpetual and chaotic—Serres refers to these channels of
exploration and invention metaphorically as the “Northwest Passage”; an opening that
must be traversed with great pain, but also one that gives birth to unpredictable,
unexpected and spiritual transformations of the self (Serres, 1991/1997, p. 47). To
Serres, it is during the turbulent travels through the symbolic Northwest Passage that the
journeyman/woman will come to see, feel and interpret the myriad vortexes that exist
between the various branches of knowledge. Traversing the Northwest Passage then,
will subsequently provide the much-needed opportunities for inventing knowledge at the
various crossovers that one experiences. Similarly, Deleuze and Guattari inscribe “lines
of flight”, “schizoid flow drawings”, and multiple “folds” as their preferred manner to
describe a more open and gradually negentropic process of inquiry, while introducing
“essentially inexact yet completely rigorous notions” into the discourse of knowledge and
objectivity in their A Thousand Plateaus text (1980/1997).
Here once more, it’s to do with the way someone’s own work can lead to
unexpected convergences, and new implications, new directions, in other people’s
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work. And no special status should be assigned to any particular field, whether
philosophy, science, art or literature (p. 30).
And, as Serres states, “even if specialties are divided, the inventive remains undivided”
(1991/1997, p. 55). To Serres, a chaotic and convergent curriculum constitutes the third
conversation, one that allows time and locality to make networks fluctuate, to be
unstable, and to bifurcate; one that forms a mobile confluence of fluid and turbulent
fluxes (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 114). The challenges to do this, to recognize the
inherent and natural connectedness and interstices of different knowledges, should not be
an intimidating and negative experience but rather, one that enlivens and challenges the
conscious spirit within all of us (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995).
Indeed, one of the exciting problems of our era consists of rediscovering the
chaotic nature of knowledge (p. 127).
Clearly, elements of recursiveness, unpredictability, dissipation, self-organization,
and interconnectedness resonate loudly throughout the various writings of Derrida,
Serres, Deleuze and Guattari, and thus so too should the inherent connectedness and
association of their philosophy of prepositions, chaos, multiplicity, and inventiveness
reverberate with many of the central tenets associated with open systems theory, chaos
and cybernetics. From here then, an attempt can be made to combine the central notions
of chaos, open systems, & cybernetics with the poststructural thinking of Serres, etc. into
a pedagogical sub-discourse that might prove capable of rivaling, and/or resisting the
dominant one now in place. Whereas the dominant modes of mechanistic and
scientifically based processes that drive the American educational paradigm seem intent
on reducing all complexity and chaos to a rational, stable, predictable and linear
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structured order, it is the manner in which order seems to perpetually and almost
magically come about from the “immanent threat” that chaos intonates that makes this
sub discourse seem so radical and theoretically unlikely. In its simplest terms, an open &
chaotic 3rd curriculum regards and situates students as individual and open systems, as
organic entities that are actually capable of creating order (negentropy) out of what
appears to be complete disorder (chaos/entropy). In essence, students will progress
through a 3rd curriculum as learner directed self-dissipating systems. A 3rd Curriculum is
a transient, tenuous, plastic and mobile order that traverses many fractal landscapes of
knowledge, is presented and experienced in full (three) dimension, and is capable of
creating many vortexes (syntheses); some aesthetic, some phenomenological, some
experiential, some objective, some real, some mythical; all fragile, and all personally
subjective. Although pedagogical issues for Deleuze and Guattari may not appear as
readily noticeable as they are in Serres’ works, they are very clear in denouncing the
typical didacticism so prominent today as the imposition of hegemonic doctrines on
innocent and made-docile bodies in later works (1991/1994, p. 3).
In contradistinction to the typical, modern curriculum characterized by a
controlling, power laden, and self-limiting pedagogy, Deleuze and Guattari offer a model
of apprenticeship pedagogy that provides a “taste” of knowledge and skill without
hindering the creative possibilities, a process that if approached with an open and
reiterative mindset, would allow for dissipation, for autopoiesis, and for self-organization
of the student (1991/1994, p. 3). In What is Philosophy? Gilles Deleuze and Felix
Guattari introduce their notion of three Chaoids, a trinity of thought encompassing and
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intertwining art, science and philosophy into a demarcated, but non-hierarchized
understanding of thought (1991/1994, p. 197). It is this dynamic and infinite play
between chaos and order, local and global that makes Deleuze and Guattari appreciate the
open, fractal and contextual nature of knowledge, of the power of invention, and of the
potential schizoanalytic topography of “reality”. All threes of these factors, argue
Deleuze and Guattari, complement one another, are connected with a type of ontological
and epistemological chaos, and are dissipative in that they continually reformulate into
something new as they come into contact with other heterogeneous elements; and as
such, together represent “thought as heterogenesis” (1991/1994, p. 199).
Additionally, Deleuze & Guattari’s chaoplexic concept reinforces their
philosophical belief in an anti-essentialist process based approach to the development of
concepts, rather than the typically modern, classical scientific approach to essentializing
what things “are”. Rather, Deleuze is more interested in “the circumstances in which
things happen: in what situations, where and when does a particular thing happen, how
does it happen, and so on” (1990/1995, p. 25). The focus for Deleuze and Guattari is thus
placed on the vortexes, the fragile synthesis—how are/were they developed, and most
importantly, what do they mean for the subjective mind. Deleuze was also fond of the
concept of chaos, or as he liked to refer to it “the virtual”, and how it was a common
element of science, art and philosophy (1991/1994); while Guattari metamorphasized the
term into what he called “chaosophy” in his final book Chaosmosis (1992/1995). Careful
not to confuse the philosophical notion of chaos as a transcendent phenomenon (as
transcending the real), Deleuze and Guattari perceive chaos as a positive kind of pool of
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resources that is capable of producing new ideas, new ways of thinking—a source of
creativity and inventiveness. In their last book together (What is Philosophy?), the long
time co-authors give several “operational definitions” of chaos worth including in the
current dialogue because of the innate relation to the views of Serres, and to those put
forth by systems and chaos theorists, alike (1991/1994).
Chaos is defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which
every form taking shape in it vanishes. It is a void that is not a nothingness but a
virtual, containing all possible particles and drawing out all possible forms, which
spring up only to disappear immediately, without consistency or reference,
without consequence (p. 118).
Chaos is characterized less by the absence of determinations than by the infinite
speed with which they take shape and vanish. This is not a movement from one
determination to another but, on the contrary, the impossibility of a connection
between them, since one does not appear without the other having already
disappeared, and one appears as disappearance when the other disappears as
outline. Chaos is not an inert or stationary state, nor is it a chance mixture. Chaos
makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite (p. 42).
Poststructuralism, & Cultural Studies: Opening(s) For Undetermined Space(s)?
In Understanding Curriculum, an entire chapter is devoted to curriculum as
poststructuralist, deconstructed and postmodern text whereby the authors attempt to
provide an explorative, yet non-essential background of these complex and interrelated
theories (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery & Taubman, 1995).
At its most general level, Poststructuralism, deconstruction, and postmodernism
share a rejection of structuralism, humanism, and modernism, a repudiation of the
ways various academic disciplines have “traditionally” presented their versions of
reality (p. 452).
As it regards Poststructuralism (PS) in general, it is important to realize that PS denies all
claims to metanarratives, foundational, essential, universal, or homogenous truths; but
rather, pays more critical attention to the symbolism, status and power that fundamentally
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reside in language, desire, and representation (Pinar, et al, 1995, p. 452). Furthermore,
PS theorists see nearly everything that is not fundamentally “natural” (like water, air and
matter) as text and/or discourse that is fundamentally bounded by language games,
socially constructed paradigms (of thought and practice), and elements of assumed
“normativity”; while concurrently attacking structuralisms’ linguistic idealism,
ahistoricism and relative misunderstanding of language’s inherent power to substitute for
the lack of a true, objective reality (p. 461). In short, PS theorists beginning with Michel
Foucault and Jacques Derrida, most notably, have effectively asked if the underlying
structures of “things” constitute any sort of fixed, ahistorical, and a priori objective
reality or meaning; while simultaneously charging that the structuralist approach to
deconstruction fails to take into account the historical, social and political constructions
that drive and constitute contemporary language systems. In this light then, PS theorists
argue that concepts, systems, and structures become socially constructed signifiers of
“things”, while simultaneously deriving their largely unexplored meaning(s) and
symbolism from “man made” signifiers.
As such, all texts and discourses that can easily be seen as representing objective
“reality” by modernist thinkers, can thus be deconstructed by the PS theorists into their
constitutive, mythical and reiterative parts as part, and parcel of a cosmopolitical
philosophy. Deconstructive practices and readings in a PS frame of mind then can be
subsequently traced to their historical, social, cultural and political elements to reveal
reiterations, commonalities, and discrepancies that challenge linear and modernist
authority. Because he firmly believes that “ultratechnical vocabulary” breeds fear and
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exclusion, poststructural author Michel Serres detests the “ultra technical vocabulary”
that is produced by groups, cliques, and so called “experts” (1990/1995, p. 24); and it is
for this reason that Serres (wanting to avoid authentic structuralism) was forced to find a
“new language” for his inventive thought—each time he produced a new piece of work
(p. 72). For Serres, both the causes and the fixes of modernity’s rigid epistemological
and ontological barriers that constrain thought, creativity, and invention, while also
strangulating identity and subjectivity can be traced to the academy, writ large (as cited in
Serres & Latour, 1990/1995).
The obstacles come from divisions, both ancient and very recent, improved by
academia. The passage is natural, and the obstacle is artificial (p. 74).
Michel Foucault is oft credited with “coining” the PS term known as “discourse”,
a term meant to signify a discursive practice which itself forms the objects of which it
speaks (Pinar, et al, 1995, p. 462). Perhaps Michel Serres’ version is more capable of
illuminating the nature of what Foucault meant by the notion of discourse (1990/1995).
An idea opposed by another idea is always the same idea, albeit affected by the (-)
sign. The more you oppose one another, the more you remain in the same
framework of thought. New ideas come from the desert, from hermits, from
solitary beings (p. 81).
Quite simply, Serres, Foucault and other PM/PS prognosticators contend in myriad, yet
analogous ways that in order to engage in a discursive encounter with someone, or with
some text, one has to know the boundaries, the histories and the ramifications of thought
that structure the concept. From the particular signifiers used to articulate the signified, to
the various parameters that have been historically formulated in order to define and
essentialize the concept’s objectivity, a deconstructive thinker must look from within, and
from without in order to deconstruct the structure, language, rules, and signs that
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construct the image, identity, truth, or conception under investigation. In other words, it
is impossible to authentically and neutrally see, or speak from “outside” a discursive
concept; even though one may be attempting to deconstruct and rearticulate the concept
with an honest scholarly intent, or what is more readily known as a “neutral” approach to
inquiry.
For example, it is impossible for any of us to have a “non-discourse” dialogue
about the white and black races because the antecedent concepts of “black” and “white”
have already been socially constructed and embedded in our mind’s experience; qualified
by language, signifiers, and experiences now inherent in our internal system of
understanding and articulation. We can’t possibly remove ourselves from the discourse
that exists, and so we cannot authentically work from any sort of neutral subjectivity.
Thus said, authority, objectivity and rationality can be effectively destabilized and
deconstructed into multiple subjectivities, localities, and contextualities that are capable
of illuminating what Derrida calls the “reiterability” and “diffe´rance” of the various signs,
marks, signs, texts, and modes of thought that characterized our postmodern epoch
(Derrida, 2000, p. 7). Intelligence is an excellent example of how discourse operates in
our consciousness and vernacular—the “concept” of intelligence has been created by a
discourse that has been fed by various scientific and authoritative narratives, not by truly
objective and essential knowledge, and thus it is the discourse itself that creates and
recreates the “reality” of what it means to be (or not to be) intelligent. For a
poststructural thinker then, knowledge does not represent reality—discourse constructs
reality, and power is thus represented by the ability to define, unify or totalize phenomena
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into a discourse (Pinar, et al, 1995, p. 462). The same can be said of any discourse,
including the current one surrounding the affective utility and identity of higher education
in the United States--Dysacademia.
In the introduction to the “anthology like” Cultural Studies text, an attempt is
made by its authors to articulate the tenuous project of the cultural studies field by
describing it as, among other things, “anti-disciplinary” (Nelson, Treichler & Grossberg,
1992, p. 2). Specifically, the authors make no haste in pointing out that by critiquing the
various domains, methods and intellectual legacies of the traditional disciplines, the field
of cultural studies is itself “reluctant” to become a “real” discipline. When one stops to
consider just how difficult it is to define culture itself, it becomes easier to see just how
difficult it might be to define cultural studies; and therein lays the essential challenge
facing cultural studies scholars. It is precisely this critical, transdisciplinary, and
postmodern identity that gives cultural studies its mobility, creativity, and reiterative
power of invention that allows its workers to “draw from whatever fields necessary to
produced the knowledge required for a particular project” (p. 2). Careful to avoid a
destructive turn towards “intellectual nihilism”, cultural studies scholars are clear in
announcing that their field(s) of study is/are not merely “anything”. Rather, it is critical
for the neophyte and inquisitive outsider to realize that multiple, open avenues for inquiry
are available to the cultural studies scholar; and that that various modes of inquiry in
cultural studies usually involve the attempt to draw relations between cultural concepts
and phenomena with power, critical theory and historical forces (Nelson, Treichler &
Grossberg, 1992, p. 3). As noted cultural theorist Stuart Hall writes, “Cultural studies is
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not one thing, it has never been one thing” (as cited in Nelson, Treichler & Grossberg,
1992, p. 3), rather, it is a diverse enterprise that encompasses different paradigms of
thought and knowledge in specific localities, it addresses any and all questions of cultural
significance. In the process, the critical study of culture poses new questions and traces
multiple roots of thought, all the while aligning itself with different institutions and
locations.
That being said, perhaps the best “definition” to work from may be that cultural
studies is “an interdisciplinary, transdisciplinary, and sometimes counter-disciplinary
field that operates in the tension between its tendencies to embrace both a broad,
anthropological and a more narrowly humanistic conception of culture” (Nelson,
Treichler & Grossberg, 1992, p. 4). Thus, cultural studies does not equate “high culture”
exclusively with culture, is not just another intellectually snobby name for “popular
culture”, and is committed to studying the entire range of a culture’s arts, beliefs,
institutions, and communicative practices (including popular culture) in an earnest
attempt to actively deconstruct what John Fiske labels as “the social order that constrains
and oppresses the people”, while offering action based, politically engaging subdiscourses and counter narratives that “offers them resources to fight against those
constraints” (cited in Nelson, Treichler & Grossberg, 1992, p. 5). In this sense then,
cultural studies is not just another popular, yet passive and “value-less” academic phase,
but rather, a politically engaged interference mechanism that possesses the potential to
produces sub, or counter discourses to contextual hegemonies and political technologies
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of oppression and subjectification. On this important point, Nelson, Treichler &
Grossberg are worth quoting at length (1992).
Cultural studies thus believes that its practice does matter, that its own intellectual
work is supposed to—can—make a difference. But its interventions are not
guaranteed, they are not meant to stand forever. The difference it seeks to make
is necessarily relevant only for particular circumstances; when cultural studies
work continues to be useful over time, it is often because it has been rearticulated
to new conditions. Cultural studies is never merely a theoretical practice, even
when that practice incorporates notions of politics, power, and context into its
analysis (p. 6).
In reconciling the field(s) of cultural studies with a postmodern sensibility of
reiteration, openness, contextuality and locality then, cultural studies must be mindful of
its capacity and responsibility to articulate insights about “the constitutive and political
nature of representation itself, about its complexities, about the effects of language, about
textuality as a site of life and death” (Nelson, Treichler & Grossberg, 1992, p. 7). In
effect then, cultural studies scholars must be equally aggressive in deconstructing cultural
phenomena and concepts, as they are reconstructive in creating new avenues, strategies,
and voices for counter action, correction and ultimately social change. Cultural studies
theorists can not simply “lay down like lambs” after they have deconstructed the political,
economic, cultural, racial an social manifestations and subaltern dynamics at work in the
global AIDS epidemic, or likewise for the myriad of complex social and humanistic
issues associated with deforestation, technology, science and a innumerable other
dilemmas facing our cultural epoch.
Emphasizing real world problems, possible solutions and the inherent
contingencies involved in deconstructive theorizing is central to contemporary cultural
studies, and to the “theory of articulation” that cultural studies workers intend to
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formulate (Nelson, Treichler & Grossberg, 1992, p. 8). The ultimate goal then of cultural
studies work is to carry out “conjectural analysis”, or analysis that is “embedded,
descriptive, and historically and contextually specific…to address the changing alliances
within contemporary political movements and to sort out contingent intersections of
social movements from long term ‘organic’ change” (p. 8). To carry out conjectural
analyses, cultural studies theorists use any and all relevant cultural texts, or artifacts such
as film, books, art, etc. to draw connections, show relations, describe discourses, and
highlight society’s myriad power structures that define, control and maintain the various
Foucaultian “political technologies of the body”, or “biopower”, and their resultant and
perpetual stranglehold on individual identity, subjectivity, and other elements of
postmodern discourse.
As I alluded to earlier, cultural studies is not just another name for popular
culture, in fact the scope and breadth of cultural studies work is considered to be much
broader and inclusive, more reflexive and reiterative, and most importantly, much more
political (Nelson, Treichler & Grossberg, 1992, p. 11). Cultural studies is, however,
more deeply concerned with what is considered “popular” in other more critical ways,
such as 1) interrogating the mutual determination of popular belief with other discursive
formations (as can be seen between popular belief and science), and 2) the everyday
terrain of people, and with all the ways that cultural practices speak to, of, and for their
lives (language, hierarchies, power, categorization, homogenization, marginilization, etc.)
(p. 11). As an example of what “is” and what “is not” considered to be cultural studies as
it may be applied to curriculum discourses, consider the current challenges to the
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traditional literary canon and its relation to pedagogy and curriculum. Merely
“redrawing” or “eliminating” the traditional line between high culture and low culture, or
between “official knowledge” and “unofficial knowledge”, in and of itself does not
constitute cultural studies according to Nelson, Treichler & Grossberg (1992, p. 12). If,
and only if, the analysis or argument interrogates the “cultural practices” within both the
academy and private worlds that create, sustain, or suppress contestations over inclusion
and exclusion can the work be considered “true” to the cultural studies field.
In other words, merely making an intelligent and coherent argument that the
Western canon of knowledge should be “opened up” and diversified to include works
from other repressed and marginalized voices does not fit the bill for true cultural studies
work; the analysis must also articulate how text book companies exert their considerable
power over the curriculum, and how current policy makers with vested political and
economic interests work to uphold this hegemonic infrastructure. Of course, cultural
studies as a field is not that simple—those who are cultural theorists don’t get to
whimsically decide “who is” and “who is not” a cultural studies scholar, or “what is” and
“what is not” cultural studies work. Rather, cultural studies requires of its workers to
identify the operation of specific practices and what they accomplish as potential texts,
while at the same time they must constantly interrogate their own connections to
contemporary relations of power in order to prevent itself from becoming irretrievably
woven into its own discursive web (p. 13). Nelson, Treichler & Grossberg summarize
the various and complex responsibilities, challenges, and legacies facing the cultural
studies field (1992).
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Continually engaging with the political, economic, erotic, social, and ideological,
cultural studies entails the study of all the relations between all the elements in a
whole way of life. This is at once an impossible project and the necessary context
of any objects or traditions rescued…from the enormous condescension of
posterity (p. 14).
For Derrida, the two-part process and responsibility afforded to cultural studies
and poststructural theorists constitutes the intentional and effaceable value of
“deconstruction”, that being the primary challenge to deconstruct a particular phenomena,
discourse or text, followed closely by the more challenging task of subsequently offering
up some type of performative possibility for change (2000, p. 21). Deconstruction for
Derrida then, “does not consist in moving from one concept to another, but in reversing
and displacing a conceptual order as well as the nonconceptual order in which it is
articulated”, and further it is thus intended to offer “the chance and the force, the power
of communication” (p. 21). Thus appreciated, it is the responsibility and challenge for
me, in this current discourse, to offer some type of performative possibility for change
and transformation in Dysacademia.
Chaosmotically Bowling For 3rd Space(s) & 3rd Person(s)
For most, watching disparate films like Bowling for Columbine (2003) forces the
viewer to use a certain cosmopolitical philosophy in order to enter the 3rd place, to
embrace the 3rd person, and to have the 3rd conversation. As a text that resides in, and
arises out of, the 3rd place, Michael Moore’s critical and thought provoking film directly
challenges and disorders our notions of a media generated reality, and thus our
conceptual ideas concerning how justice, crime, politics, education and social
responsibility operate in our nation are fundamentally and critically challenged. In
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deconstructing the discourse surrounding the tragic events of Columbine High School,
America’s gun culture, and today’s youth, Moore proceeds to ask difficult questions in
Columbine. In doing so, Moore presents a noteworthy amount of relevant cultural
comparison and deconstructive analysis of the competing themes and arguments
concerning the central issues of the film. In viewing the film in its entirety, the viewer
gradually becomes aware that Moore is not necessarily intending to find answers to the
problems he addresses; but rather, he seeks to pose the thorny questions relating to
children and gun murders that make most of us “uncomfortable” being in the center of
such a discourse. Articulately dispelled by Moore are the various mythical “causes” of
our “kid gun” problems: the presumed overabundance of violent movies and video
games in our culture, the satanic musical and lyrical influences by cult rockers like
Marilyn Manson, and the relative number of guns present in our nation’s households.
Thus highlighted, Bowling for Columbine forces the viewer to critically confront the
bothersome sociocultural and economic factors that give rise to behaviors whereby
American kids and teenagers find refuge in violent homicidal action as outlets for their
fears, problems, and various sociocultural dilemmas.
For Serres then, experiencing 3rd texts such as Columbine embodies or represents
the true meaning and purpose of education—to enter a third world, to have the third
conversation, to become the third person. For chaos theorists, this open space between
order and disorder, between entropy and negentropy, represents the “third territory”
(Hayles, 1990, p. 18), while Foucault refers to this concept as a “double space” when
speaking of the complex coherences between interior and exterior forces and events in
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living subjects (1966/1970, p. 274). To engage in, and to live in a world of relations, of
prepositions, between, in, amongst, with, and. A third self that dwells at the center, in the
murky, turbulent waters of uncertainty and “non direction”; dissipating, allowing energy
and matter to flow through the self, in due course finding order amongst disequilibria;
self-making, organizing the self and the consciousness; inventing knowledge, finding
one’s own way towards the safety of the banks, all the while chaosmotically drifting in a
tense, but anxious and stimulated state, somewhere between known and unknown,
between comfort and anxiety, between truth and myth, between hot and cold. Embracing
the self and the process as an open, autopoietic system, a multi-dimensional network
constructed and reconstructed by innate feedback loops; not by closed, linear, static, and
dead ended essentials. Foucault elaborates on this post Classical sort of epistemology as
it relates to living organisms in a sentiment that is remarkably “open systems” influenced
(1970).
The living being must therefore no longer be understood merely as a certain
combination of particles bearing definite characters; it provides the outline of an
organic structure, which maintains uninterrupted relations with exterior elements
that it utilizes in order to maintain or develop its own structure (p. 273).
Thriving in the 3rd space requires the 3rd person to be situated, not seated, moving,
not static; amongst the paradoxical and elliptical uncertainty between light and dark, in
the shadows; welcoming the dark, the unknown, nonknowledge even. The 3rd person is
allowed to embrace and even seek out the “unknown unknown”, they are amused by the
possibility of possibilities, they regal in the “multiplicity of multiples” (Serres,
1982/1995, p. 106). As such, knowledge, learning, experience, transformation, pain, and
uncertainty are compulsory to illuminate this dark, shadowy, fragile, circumstantial and
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complex place (Serres, 1991/1997, p. 38-45). The third person—the educated,
enlightened individual—is plastic, vibrant, hypermobile, chaotic and perpetual; “it never
stops being exposed. It evolves and travels” (Serres, 1991/1997, p. 51). It is
hypermobile; it is autopoietic; it is dissipative.
For the third person, “the known is constructed in the same way that the knower is
instructed” (Serres, 1991/1997, p. 52), by inclusion and exclusion; “it finds the sciences
and the humanities as it moves towards the discovery of a Northwest Passage, where one
is born in both senses” (p. 47). The third person refuses to see a hemiplegic dichotomy
between the left brain and the right brain; rather, they work together Hermetically to
create consciousness only by meeting in the middle; they fully realize that right handed
people are no different than left handed people, but rather that they are really the same—
they both use both hands, they both have the “other” in them (p. 4). For Serres, Hermes
represents the messenger that communicates between the various branches of knowledge,
amongst, in, to and from this and that. Hermes connects things; it delivers the messages,
both implicit and explicit in all types of knowledge. In this fashion then, the third person
ought be cultured in a postmodern, Hermetic manner of philosophical sensibility that
promotes the formulation of an inventive, plastic, and individualistic external reality,
outside any first or second person subject. A 3rd curriculum that constantly moves from
the local to the global and back, forwards and back, sideways, obliquely, all the while
taking full advantage to travel in and amongst Serres’ “reversible, folded time” (Serres &
Latour, 1990/1995, p. 71). A reversible time and a like-consciousness avoids being
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comminuted by appreciating the reversible nature of time that occurs with real learning
and exploration, and by valuing the inherent connectedness of all forms of knowing.
For Deleuze, Serres’ 3rd space can be seen as apt descriptors of Hume’s “theory of
association” whereby the human subject is perpetually formed through association with
ideas, thoughts, and perceptions in a chaotic, open and transformative manner that helps
establish some degree of personal, subjective order (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991/1994, p.
201-202). It is through a continual and chaotic use of philosophy, art and science, that
the subject learns differing ways to order the chaos that is the natural and
phenomenological world, or in Serres’ parlance the third place. Once capable and
comfortable residing in the middle third, the educated third is capable of recognizing the
vortexes, the middle and “natural” double spaces which exist between the sciences, and
the humanities, where the global (science) touches the local (culture). Thus experienced,
the instructed third is capable of inventing one’s own language and one’s own
phenomenological world view, which are both required for and produced by the
wandering that is so vital to a critical ontology. Thus lived, the 3rd person will also invent
one’s own culture.
The educated 3rd is capable of deconstructing and resisting the frenzy of what I
am creatively calling our “mediality” (a.k.a., media generated version of reality), and our
political spin machines, as does Michael Moore in Bowling for Columbine. The 3rd
citizen can thus work to temper and extinguish the culture of fear that predominates our
societies’ anxiety and misgivings over “others”, over the reported intents and motivations
of our worlds’ “evildoers”, and can be more at peace with both the unknown, and
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challenging the “known”. As Serres puts it, “to discover seems the only act of
intelligence…ideas that circulate are usually astonishingly old, thus, he who seeks
newness remains alone” (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 145). And, because of the
inextricable link between culture and education that Pierre Bourdieu points out, the
educated third, or the “self-taught man” will be “distinguished straightaway from a
school-trained man” (p. 347). As such, the self taught 3rd person will possess the
courage required for, and will be capable of withstanding the pain associated with the
infirmity of the new, the invented, and the dark shadows.
In harmony with Serres’ critical call for invention to serve as the primary focus of
education, Katherine Hayles suggests that the creative writer is perhaps the best example
of a free-floating and chaotic inventor, capable of connecting various epistemic cultures
(1990, p.19). Working from the “third territory” then, somewhere between order and
disorder, between form and flow, between fact and fiction, between dark and light, is
what allows Hayles’ creative writer to communicate beyond one particular field of study,
and thus better capture and articulate the “aura of cultural meanings that surround chaos”.
Upon reflecting on Michael Moore’s Columbine, it can be argued that his text is not only
a direct critique of the America’s social and political systems, but also of the American
educational system for denying the 3rd space(s) and the open development of the
subjectivity of the 3rd person. Interestingly, it is also apparent that Moore himself has
been immersed in, and enjoys residing in the 3rd space—he savors the middle, the
opportunity to invent, to question, to challenge everything and anything. In the end, it
appears as though it is the freedom of this 3rd space that stimulates and nourishes his
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artistic and critical texts. Michael Moore, a self- educated, dystopic 3rd; inventor of 3rd
texts and 3rd conversations; and dilator of multiple and dystopic 3rd space(s).
In light of Serres’ pedagogical contentions and the sociocultural commentary
presented in texts such as Columbine, it is my contention that schooling, at any level
ought be based on Serres’ argument that invention is education’s central purpose, not
ontological censorship or meaningless epistemological reproduction. Furthermore, it
should be apparent after watching Columbine that education writ large must be connected
to the larger socio-cultural mission of our society and democracy, regardless of the
perceived economic implications of various curricular models, the en vogue scientific
trends that spark our consumptive and restorative appetites, or the respective and future
professional aspirations of the students. Renowned sociologist Peter Berger coined the
ontological attribute that Moore is attempting to construct, sociological consciousness,
and wrote that the critical development of such rigorous intellectual skills would allow
the knower to deconstruct, or “see through” the various social structures that form
opinions and myth, privilege, power and authority, bias certain forms of knowing and
knowledge, and situate our social roles and identities (1965). From this perspective then,
Columbine’s investigation into youth violence and culture, media frenzies and their role
in our “culture of fear’, and its historical and contemporary critique of our country’s
foreign and fiscal policies can be seen as a potentially liberating and enlightening
pedagogical text for sparking the growth of a sociological consciousness. As such,
myriad pop culture texts like Bowling for Columbine, The Matrix, Minority Report,
Vanilla Sky, and myriad others too numerous to mention, may indeed prove suitable for
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inclusion into a cosmopolitically based 3rd Curriculum because of their potential for
deconstructing and displacing the various systems that constrain and define our cultural
epoch.
In order to do this—to invent the critical knowledge needed to reach sociological
consciousness—students must be allowed to traverse into, between and amongst the
pedagogical third place(s) (Serres, 1991/1997, p. 43). That is, administrators, teachers
and students, alike must be allowed to endure the pain, the discomfort, the uncertainty,
and most importantly the “boundarylessness of self” that accompanies critical ontological
evolution into the 3rd place. For this to happen, all pedagogues must reach out and
interact with students as subjects viably interconnected with the purposes of education
and democracy, rather than merely treating students as objects knotted within an overly
determined, objective and fixed educational process. They must be allowed to watch, to
interpret, to experience, and most importantly to discuss critical texts such as Bowling for
Columbine. Michael Moore effectively entered the 3rd space, and thus generated a 3rd
conversation with Columbine—he has provided a very difficult, sober and yet sometimes
humorous “passageway” that offers teachers and students a promising potential to enter,
to confront, to struggle and argue, to challenge, and hopefully, to transform. Teachers
and social leaders must do more of what Marilyn Manson suggests in Columbine when
asked what he would say to the students of Columbine HS; that is they must do more
listening [of students], and less speaking [to students]. Above all, educators of all
disciplines must be allowed and encouraged to teach students how “to be” citizens with
varied professional lives and purposes, not just merely how “to do” their chosen
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profession, including at the postsecondary level. All of our citizens must be critically and
ontologically connected to the larger problems of society, and to what is required to live
“in” a democracy, not just live “off” of a democracy. As evidenced by the closing
interview in Columbine, our culture could certainly be improved with fewer subjects like
Charlton Hestons, and perhaps more Michael Moores…less 1st persons and more 3rd
persons. Come to think of it, we just might also be better off with more Marilyn
Mansons who know the power of listening to children and young adults as they elucidate
their experienced and invented worldviews.
A 3rd Curriculum centralizes the myriad issues presented by Moore in Columbine
as equally relevant, critical, and primary nuclei of all, and any educational discourse or
inquiry, regardless of chosen academic major or field of study. Sadly though, the modern
educational process is fundamentally in many ways, antithetical to the pedagogical
concerns of Derrida, Deleuze, & Guattari, and to what Serres sees as the essential goal of
instruction, that being “invention” (Serres & Latour, 1990/1995, p. 133). Modern
dysciplined curricula, by and large don’t allow for the students to enter into turbulent and
undetermined spaces void of linearity, to experience disequilibria, or to have the freedom
to self-invent their own subjective views, or a deeply seated phenomenological and
subjectively reflexive understanding of events, concepts, and metaphysical phenomena.
In fact, it may even be rightfully argued that modern curricula actually work to prevent
turbulences, uncertainty and discomfort for all of its participants (by relying on
standardized tests, rigid lesson plans, and accreditation guidelines as the primary pillars
of their operational identity). Certainly then, Bowling for Columbine can be seen as an
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excellent and important schizoanalytic text that challenges our conception of reality as it
pertains to violence, fear, race, power, politics, and education. It certainly was for my 12year-old son and me on the day we entered into the 3rd space(s) presented by Moore’s
deconstructive text. Excluding socially conscious texts such as Columbine which have
the potential to deconstruct the various hegemonies constructed by our different political
and media institutions, can thus be seen as “preventing turbulence” in our schools.
Seen in this light then, the current discourse concerning a Serresian 3rd
Curriculum incorporates very specific ethical considerations as they pertain to
ontological and epistemological freedom, the subjective and critical generation or
invention of knowledge, self-transformation and subjectification, postmodern notions of
identity and truth; and their subsequent interconnectedness to pedagogy, and our socioglobal existence. Likewise, a Deleuzian and Gauttarian emphasis on the “process” of
education, self transformation, critical inquiry and discourse may better enhance and
develop the aesthetic and affective convictions required to authentically value these
critical and qualitative self-organizing and self-generating domains of knowledge.
Personally, an amodern and post structural perspective, similar to that put forth by Serres,
Martusewicz, Deleuze and Guattari, have better enabled me to look at all forms of
education as open, complex, multifarious, and chaotic processes that possesses the
potential for, and even demands a more critical, meaningful and transformative
curriculum. In my view, a 3rd curriculum is also pragmatic and realistically attainable,
but only if our central operating paradigms and collective social values can be
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simultaneously transformed from the ever increasing neoliberal and industrial tendencies
that now characterize our cultural epoch.
And so, if individual subjects are not provided “some” clean canvas, “some”
blank parchment, or “some” open space for which to invent one’s own objective
worldview, or one’s own self-constructed and reflexive language game, it can be
surmised that he/she will more than likely not be able to transform in unknown, open
manners; he/she won’t be able to cultivate a unique and plastic ontology, nor a critical
and multivocal epistemology. Forced to exist with current and historical language games,
to acquire a worldview from within an already vulcanized, fragmented and specialized
disciplinary field, inevitably and dangerously denies the subject the opportunity to
genuinely channel their respective experiences and worldly interpretations into a
meaningful and organic subjectivity. She/he will remain dysciplined. This is indeed a
dangerous road to travel—for all of humanity.
Walden Pond provided Thoreau with the opportunity to explore nature in its
natural splendor, the opportunity to invent his own biological worldview, and thus to
compare nature to the natural. With repeated exposure to these types of open and
reflective spaces, Thoreau was allowed to create an epistemic culture characterized by an
ontological and epistemological reformation and self construction that allowed him to
more critically reflect on a rapidly evolving and socially constructed industrial society.
This contrast of views and experiences provided Thoreau with a unique epistemic
privilege that infiltrated his literary and narrative works on many levels--a type of
dispensation that can be seen as being more consilient than linear, more comprehensive
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and multiple than singular, more liberated and less restrictive, more inventive and less
thin. On one particular day in the fall of 2003, I watched Bowling for Columbine with
my oldest son (then, 12 years old); we wandered out into our own ontological and
epistemological Walden Pond, we swam into and across the turbulent waters of this
particular 3rd space that Michael Moore dilated, we reveled in, and grew out of a 3rd
conversation together, we moved individually towards becoming our own 3rd person, and
we imbibed in our own subjective 3rd curriculum. And on different, heterogeneous and
subjective levels we consumed a 3rd text…a text that contrasted our previously existing
worldviews…a text that will ruminate, reiterate, and recapitulate all that we see, hear, and
say in the future…all that is different…like a rhizome. I…he…we invented something
that day…something that now exists between us…within us…amongst us…in the 3rd
space(s) between his subjectivity, and mine.
Concluding Remarks
In summary, I comply with the various deconstructive analyses put forth by
Lyotard, Readings, Giroux, Aronowitz, and cultural studies scholars that gone are the
days when university education critically served as the springboard for diverse and
meaningful intellectual transformation and exploration. In contrast, it can be viewed that
here are the days whereby academic majors have been explicitly and deftly designed to
produce technical experts capable of adequately contributing to the economic and
technological growth “needed” for our society’s democratic, social and industrial
“progress”. Obviously, such a radical transformation cannot occur quickly or simply, and
so there are various cultural factors, events, and dynamics that are inherent of the analysis
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of this particular aspect of our culture. With our society facing an increasing bevy of
complex and potentially fatalistic problems with which to deal with, or else risk our own
annihilation, we cannot afford to continue “producing” what Aronowitz calls “technoidiots” from our institutions of higher education (2000, p. 172). Although today’s
graduates may indeed be in possession of impressive and complex levels of industrioeconomic based skill and insight, far too many of them possess relatively little insight
into the complex ways of the natural and man made worlds that are needed to be
considered “intelligent” outside their chosen field of study or work.
If one stops to consider higher education’s “other” traditional utility, that being
the development of the individual, subjective self in addition to what can be called
“professional development”, an ethical imperative can also be perceived within the
discourse I am currently attempting to articulate. Ontologically, today’s vocationalized
university and its rigid and balkanized curricula designed largely to contribute to our
economic well being, can also be seen as one that subversively prevents the free and open
subjectification of individual students. In short, is readily apparent today that most
parents and students today seek out a college degree in order to better their chances of
economic success, or cultural and material survival. In fact, a recent survey of public
opinion on higher education conducted by the Chronicle of Higher Education found that
vocational and professional preparation was indeed the most important role for colleges
and universities today with 71% of respondents rating this role as “very important”
(2003, p. A11). In contrast, only 35% and 31% of the respondents felt that “providing
useful information to the public on issues affecting their daily lives”, and “promoting
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international understanding”, were very important, respectively. In today’s “student as
customer”, teacher as “worker” culture, the corporate university is more than happy to
oblige the student seeking a technocratic and neoliberalist based “higher education”.
Most often lost in this “professionalization of the curriculum” is general education as
universities move to meet the demands of their customers. In light of this transformation,
Patrick Callan, president of the National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education,
even goes so far to say, “most colleges have given up on general education” (as cited in
Chronicle, 2003, p. A13). Sadly though, students seeking the cultural capital, job training
and “excellence” commonly associated with holding a college degree don’t usually
recognize, embrace, or take advantage of the “other”, more enlightening and liberating
experiences such as “the world” and the utility and meaning of “their daily lives” that
true “higher education” has historically offered.
In light of the current state of the Dyscademy, higher education and its end
product—the “educated citizen”, it is my belief that modern society has an intense need
for an educational experience that strongly contrasts with the modernistic behavior
modification curriculum; one that typically and problematically produces a dirge of
technocratic and professionally competent consumers with limited intellectual depth,
diversity and understanding. A cursory glimpse of today’s various social and cultural
problems (the alarmingly high rates of divorce, debt, and depression among Americans
stand out) should easily expose the pressing sociocultural necessity for a more
postmodern curriculum, one reconceptualized to abolish absolute and hegemonic
boundaries and demarcations between the disciplines, one that deconstructs authoritative
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& closed metanarratives that promise objective truth and natural reality, and one that
allows…no one that requires invention, dissipation, and gradual, turbulent and
negentropic transformations of knowledge and individual subjectivities.
A post structural higher education particular to those of Michel Serres (1982;
1995; 1997), Gilles Deleuze & Felix Guattari (1994; 1995; 1995), Jacques Derrida (2000;
2002), and Rebecca Martusewicz (2001) works to address the chaotic nature of
knowledge by deconstructing the modernistic boundaries, rules, and hierarchies
constructed by the disciplines; whilst allowing students to be courageous apprentices,
nomads and seekers of “heretofore uncharted passages” (Martusewicz, 2001, p. 9). A
postmodern 3rd education, one tenuously taking up the tenets of open systems, complexity
and chaos theories, one that embodies a schizoanalytic and rhizomatic topography, and
one founded upon a certain cosmopolitical philosophy will permit, foster and even
encourage the student to chaosmotically “be” an open system; to compete with their own
contextual and local forms of self-organization, invention, disequilibria, feedback,
dissipation, and of course, their initial and welcomed states of decreasing entropy. In
short, it is optimistically proposed that a 3rd Education, presented as such will be adroit
in producing sociologically conscious and autopoietic subjects, fully capable of “selfmaking”, self-adjusting, self-organizing, and thus of “treating the dysacademic self”.
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